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1. INTRODUCTION
Innovation has been on the forefront of public policy as a panacea for economic
ills for a long time. In Europe, governments on the EU, Member State and local
municipality levels intervene in private businesses with public money. The aim is
to create economic growth by accelerating the creation and diffusion of innovation
with taxpayer contributions. In turn, the redistribution of funds and its efficacy is
of considerable interest to a wider audience. Discussions on specific projects can
often be found even in newspapers.1
The justification for intervening through public policy to enhance the innovative
capabilities of firms has been studied extensively. Firms lack optimal conditions to
appropriate their own research and development (R&D) efforts, leading to limited
investments and social welfare loss (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). Policy should
also address the distribution of R&D costs within and between firms (Mowery,
1983), the learning and knowledge transfer aspects of the innovation process (Nel-
son and Winter, 1982), and the interaction between institutions (Lundvall, 2010).
Over the past half century, science, technology and innovation (STI) policies have
widened in scope into multiple policy realms and have been used to develope
more sophisticated policy instruments (Borra´s, 2009; Laranja et al., 2008; Schot
and Steinmueller, 2018). Consecutively, the possible effects of policy instruments
are more intertwined, interacting and conflicting, suggesting a need to evaluate the
whole “policy mix” concurrently (Flanagan et al., 2011; Howlett, 2005; Howlett
et al., 2015; Magro and Wilson, 2013).
Firms seek innovations for competitive advantages — successful new products
and services that give them an edge on the market. Firms’ choices for creating
and executing their innovation strategies are influenced by a mix of internal and
external factors (Rothaermel, 2017). Capabilities and resources developed within
the firm create hard-to-copy advantages over competitors (Prahalad and Hamel,
1990; Teece et al., 1997). Differentiation as a strategy for competitive advantage
further emphasises this attitude (Caves and Porter, 1977). Even within industries
there are subgroups with unique inputs and outputs that affect the innovation pro-
cess (Lee, 2003). Firms are also bound by the barriers, constraints and enablers of
any sector in which they operate (Nelson and Winter, 1977, 1982; Winter, 1984).
Path dependencies in sectors are distinguished by potential for creating and diffus-
ing innovations in technological regimes (Dosi, 1982, 1988b; Nelson and Winter,
1 The public seems to be especially fond of stories which include deception, misuse and fraud.
Besides their entertainment value, they are a wonderful indicator that the public still cares about
where tax contributions are spent.
14
1977). Major commonalities of innovation strategies have been identified on the
sectoral level (Bogliacino and Pianta, 2016; Castellacci, 2008; Pavitt, 1984), lead-
ing researchers to search for similar behavioural traits on the firm level (Frenz and
Lambert, 2012; Hollenstein, 2003; Leiponen and Drejer, 2007).
However, research to date has not fully addressed the question of whether firms
change their innovation strategies when they receive public support for executing
certain innovation activities (Chapman and Hewitt-Dundas, 2015; Clarysse et al.,
2009; Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). Despite excellent work in establishing em-
pirical firm-level groupings of innovation strategies (Battisti and Stoneman, 2010;
Camacho and Rodriguez, 2008; De Jong, Vanhaverbeke, et al., 2008; Frenz and
Lambert, 2012; Hollenstein, 2003, 2018; Jensen et al., 2007; Leiponen and Drejer,
2007; Marsili and Verspagen, 2002; Pavitt, 1984; Pavitt et al., 1989; Srholec and
Verspagen, 2008) as well as decades of research on the impacts of public support
of innovative behaviour (Dodgson and Bessant, 1996; Martin, 2016; Petrin, 2018;
Salter and Martin, 2001), researchers investigating the effects of STI policy in-
struments have not fully explored the effects policy instruments on the dynamics
of innovation strategies within the firm.
I will fill a part of this gap by connecting these two themes. The aim of this thesis
is to estimate the possible effects of STI policy instruments on firm innovation
strategy. Several objectives have been set to achieve this aim:
• To analyse firm innovation strategies
• To describe the dynamics of firm innovation strategies
• To analyse public policy instruments for promoting innovation in firms and
develop a taxonomy based on the Estonian example
• To empirically estimate the relationship between innovation outputs and
policy instruments
• To empirically estimate the relationship between policy instruments and
dynamics of firm innovation strategies
All these objectives have details, sub-objectives, caveats and further relevant ex-
planations. These will be in the corresponding chapters, which explain the main
questions for each chapter and estimation.
The rest of the introduction briefly introduces the main topics deemed relevant to
investigate the relationship between policy instruments and innovation strategies.
These main topics are introduced in the following order: (i) the rationale for public
intervention with innovation policy; (ii) the problems with current taxonomies
of STI policy instruments; (iii) the strategic management view of the innovation
process; (iv) the technological regimes and trajectories view of the innovation
15
process; (v) the meaning of innovation, entrepreneurship and innovation strategies
in the context of this thesis; (vi) a brief description of data used in this thesis; (vii)
a brief description of methods used in this thesis; (viii) the contribution of this
thesis; and (ix) a brief description of the structure of this thesis.
The national innovation system framework (Lundvall, 2010) is the most relevant
for contextualising innovation policy and its instruments in this thesis. It empha-
sises the links between different actors in the innovation system, such as firms,
universities, financial system, etc. It also emphasises framework conditions, such
as attitude towards entrepreneurship, business culture, legal system, taxation and
incentives, etc. (Kuhlmann and Arnold, 2001). The national innovation system
framework is a step forward from the earlier linear innovation process models,
where the main aim of public policy was only to directly finance R&D (Schot and
Steinmueller, 2018).
The next probable phase of innovation policy, dealing more with transformative
socio-technological changes, is not currently widespread enough to be relevant
here (OECD, 2015; Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). Mission-based policies ad-
vocated by Mazzucato (2015, 2018) and the general increase of state interference
and decision-making in innovation policy is currently very popular in the EU dis-
course. Dubbed the innovation policy 3.0, it will probably have a large effect
on the design of policy instruments in the next decade. Especially in large-scale
projects funded by the European Comission in the new framework programme
Horizon Europe. However, these concepts are just taking off. Chapter 3 describes
the innovation policy in Estonia between 2000 and 2012, which is mainly based
on ideas from the second generation of innovation policies. Due to this, there will
not be an in-debth analysis of the possible new era, but more emphasis on what
has been currently done.
In the national innovation system thinking, the justifications for public interven-
tion have become wider than just financing R&D efforts (Laranja et al., 2008). Be-
sides appropriability of R&D outcomes, rationales for intervention include man-
agerial capabilities and failures in cooperation, learning and institutions. New
rationales demand a much wider set of instruments. Regulations, economic trans-
fers and soft instruments in various activities are recommended for policymakers
(Borra´s and Edquist, 2013). These activities include, but are not limited to, incu-
bation services, consultancies, R&D provision, competence building, standardis-
ation and creation of new support organisations (Borra´s and Edquist, 2013). The
scope of innovation policy is thus to increase the overall innovative performance
of a country, which, unsurprisingly, cannot be done with a single policy instru-
ment (Lundvall and Borra´s, 2006). Technology and science policy are therefore
subsets of the wider innovation policy.
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Current taxonomies of STI policy instruments are too narrow to encompass wider
sets of policy instruments. There are several reasons for this. First, innovation
policy itself is too wide in scope, as relevant lists of instruments would be hun-
dreds of items long. Second, there is positive discrimination towards R&D instru-
ments, e.g. Edler and Georghiou (2007) and Izsak, Markianidou, et al. (2013),
leaving out other simultaneously supported actions. Third, there are differences
between countries, so policy instruments are generally somewhat tailored to local
conditions. Nevertheless, there is evidence that homogeneity of innovation policy
instruments can be seen in the EU (Veugelers, 2015). Finally, taxonomies used in
empirical estimations should encompass the policy mix appropriately in order to
highlight possible effects (Flanagan et al., 2011).
Due to these reasons, I develop a new taxonomy of direct public support instru-
ments based on policy instruments which have been available in Estonia. This
taxonomy is the basis for empirical analysis in later chapters as well. The relevant
discussion, methods, results and descriptions are in Chapter 3.
The innovation process within the firm has been extensively developed during the
last century, ever since Vannevar Bush’s (1945) call to accelerate the develop-
ment of new products through the public support of R&D. I will introduce two
major literature streams in this thesis, the strategic management view of the inno-
vation process and the technological regimes approach to the innovation process.
In many ways, these literature streams emphasise contrasting views of the inno-
vation process and choices for strategy creation. The strategic management view
emphasises firms’ own ability to take actions and create its own path. The techno-
logical regime view emphasises the boundaries of firms’ technological level and
sector — how firms are not free to search in all directions for innovations. Both
views are necessary for understanding firm choice in the creation of innovation
strategies.
The strategic management literature emphasises within firm capabilities and ac-
tions, their planning and execution. The main catalyst is the firm itself, searching
for strategies that give long-term competitive advantages over competitors. Firms
rely on resources and routines which are difficult to imitate (Wernerfelt, 1984).
Furthermore, firms need to update these resources and routines to match chang-
ing environments (Teece et al., 1997). In effect, innovation strategies are born
from firms’ own ideas of what could give them a competitive edge and how these
should be executed. In Chapter 2.4, the internal capabilities of firms and choices
for constructing innovation strategies are described.
Another theory explaining the choices of firms while creating innovations is the
technological regimes and trajectories approach. Technological regimes describe
technological development paths for any sector in which firms operate (Nelson
and Winter, 1977, 1982; Winter, 1984). The major attributes of technological
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regimes are the potential opportunities for innovation, the appropriability condi-
tions in a given regime, the complexity of the knowledge base needed for innova-
tive activities and the cumulativeness of innovations. For a firm operating within
a technological regime, the process of innovation is path dependent. This path
dependency is called a natural trajectory or technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982,
1988b; Nelson and Winter, 1977). A common understanding within this regime-
trajectory framework is that industrial sectors share homogeneous characteristics,
i.e. firms operating in the same sector have common technological trajectories
(Castellacci, 2008; Pavitt, 1984; Pavitt et al., 1989). The expectation in this view
is that firms are homogeneous in their innovation strategies within sectors of eco-
nomic activities, and these strategies evolve slowly over time. Technological tra-
jectories are therefore major external influencers of innovation strategies. How
technological trajectories force path dependencies on firm innovation strategies is
described in Chapter 2.1.
Innovation in this thesis is defined in a similar manner as in the Oslo Manual
(2005), following from original Schumpeter contributions whereby innovation
should include commercialisation and novelty (Schumpeter, 1934, 1942). Four
main types of innovation are covered in this thesis: new product, new process,
organisational and marketing innovation. A more general definition to briefly de-
scribe them all would be: an innovation is the market introduction of a new or
significantly improved [good, service, process, etc.] with respect to its capabili-
ties (adapted from OECD, 2005, p. 48-52). This broad definition is the basis for
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) as well, the most widespread innovation
survey and data collection in Europe. CIS data is used for empirical analysis in
this thesis. A full description of the definitions of different types of innovation,
their caveats and strengths is in Chapter 4.1.
The study of firms, entrepreneurship and the innovation process has been central
to modern economics. Even though Schumpeter has had a dominant influence on
the current academic discourse, the roles and assumptions about entrepreneurship
and entrepreneurs are varied (He´bert and Link, 2006).
The Oslo Manual (2005)2 has been construed with the Schumpeterian entrepreneur
in mind. In this line of thought, entrepreneurship is innovation. Entrepreneurs are
not just capital owners, although they might be, nor are they managers akin to su-
perintendents, overseers with no wish for development. Entrepreneurs are people
who manage firms to create new combinations in production (Schumpeter, 1934).
In addition, entrepreneurs require leadership and keenness to act upon knowledge.
As Schumpeter (1934, p. 88) observed, inventions not carried out in practice are
2 There is a newer version of the Oslo Manual (2019) also available. However, all the data and
policies analysed in this thesis are more in-line with the previous version, therefore examples are
from there.
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economically irrelevant. Thus, the role of entrepreneurs is to use existing or new
knowledge in new combinations to give them the edge on the marketplace.
The Schumpeterian perspective on economic growth postulates that it can come
from competitive forces, new firms, ideas and innovations driving out the old
(Schumpeter, 1934) — a competitive destruction of products and services that
were once good enough but are now second best. On a macro level, the economy
grows because new ideas and technology has been introduced to the market; on
a micro level, firms seek advantages over their competitors. Endogenous growth
models have reached similar conclusions on the macro level, where new tech-
nology comes from deliberate actions within the system, as a method for overall
growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986, 1990).
I consider a wider definition of innovation to be relevant in this thesis as well. En-
trepreneurs deal not only with monopoly situations (innovation as monopoly rents
akin to Schumpeter), but also with arbitrage and incremental efficiency increases
(Kirzner, 1985, 1997; Leibenstein, 1968, 1979). The relevant dimension is that
entrepreneurs are occupied with the discovery of profitable niches or opportuni-
ties which abound in the imperfect world. Imperfections in demand or supply
in certain regions create profitable opportunities. It is a better justification for
the existence of travelling merchants than the Schumpeterian entrepreneur. These
entrepreneurs also innovate, yet they are more concerned with reducing inefficien-
cies in their business rather than creatively destroying markets.
The scope of the CIS encompasses both views, justifying the inclusion of both
views of entrepreneurs. In this thesis, I consider the actions of the firm to be the
actions of the entrepreneur.
The innovation strategy is a summary of firm choices while innovating. These
choices are the outputs of managerial decisions. This definition is more strict than
is often found in firms’ internal documents. “Strategy is a set of goal-directed
actions a firm takes to gain and sustain superior performance relative to com-
petitors” (Rothaermel, 2017, p. 6). This definition concludes nicely, drawing on
many other known authors of strategic management. The relevant coinciding parts
of both definitions are that strategy consists of actions and choices to achieve com-
petitive advantages. Innovations are a means to superior performance. However,
they may not be the only tool. This restriction is important in this thesis. I inves-
tigate the set of actions for firms while they are undertaking innovative activities.
Firm choices and actions for other activities are, unfortunately, out of scope.
The data about innovative activities used in this thesis comes from the Estonian
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) gathered by Statistics Estonia. The CIS is a
homogenised biannual survey in the EU, coordinated by Eurostat and part of the
EU science and technology statistics. The CIS is a representative survey of firms
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with over 10 employees. Firm innovation strategies are estimated based on CIS
data about Estonian firms between 2002 and 2012. A detailed description of the
CIS, its possibilities and weaknesses is in Chapter 4.1.
The CIS data about innovative activities is merged with exogenous data about
public sector policy instruments. Data is gathered directly from the largest paying
agencies and other relevant registers. Altogether, it consists of all known relevant
policy instruments available to firms in Estonia between 2002 and 2012. I be-
lieve this to be the most comprehensive database of policy instruments in Estonia.
Further description about policy instrument analysis is in Chapters 3 and 4.2.
The main methods for estimation in the logical consequential order, the same as
for the objectives, are as follows. I use exploratory factor analysis to reduce the
dimensions of firm choice and extract groups with k-means clustering. These
groups are the basis of patterns of innovation, i.e. strategies with enough simi-
larity. I describe the dynamics of these patterns with visual techniques usually
applied in discrete state analysis and estimate state transition matrices for proba-
bilities of shifting from one innovation strategy to another. I proceed with gener-
alised mixed models with binary outcomes to estimate the relationships between
patterns of innovation and innovation outputs. I proceed to estimate the proba-
bilities to shift strategies for firms with treatment with multinomial logit models.
Finally, I will conclude estimations with multi-state Markov models to describe
possible shifts between different innovation strategies when firms have received
business support.
Multi-state Markov models are proficient for estimating the dynamics in settings
where there is a high number of possible trajectories. In the models presented
in Chapter 9, multi-state markov models are used to analyse more than seven
thousand different combinations of firm innovation strategy dynamics.
Some notes on terminology are below. Firm innovation strategy refers to the
choices of a single firm while conducting innovative activities. Patterns of in-
novation3 are a combination of such strategies. Therefore, patterns of innovation
represent the dominant choices firms make. Patterns of innovation are combined
in a manner to create the largest between-group heterogeneity while preserving
the largest within-group homogeneity. In other words, firms in a group should be
as similar as possible and as different from other groups as possible.
To the extent of my knowledge, this thesis presents the most broad estimation
between innovation strategies, innovation outputs and public sector support that
is currently available to the public.
3 Also referred to as innovation modes (Frenz and Lambert, 2012; Hollenstein, 2003), patterns of
innovative activities (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997), technological trajectories (Castellacci, 2008)
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I contribute to our understanding of innovation policies in three ways. First, I in-
vestigate the effects of state intervention with policy instruments. Both innovation
outputs and innovation strategies are important measures of outcomes of innova-
tion policies. The former relates to firms being more innovative, i.e. the aim of
policies are usually to accelerate the creation of innovations, and the latter, to the
types of innovative behaviour that these interventions are generating or acceler-
ating. A simple example would be the interventions generating behaviour which
supports high-tech product innovations or low-tech process innovations.
Second, I contribute by investigating the dynamics of firm innovation strategies
with panel data. There are solid theories for doing this, which can be found in
different streams of literature, but there are not many empirical investigations.
Beyond case studies, estimates of innovation strategies have been cross-sectional,
e.g. De Jong and Marsili (2006), Hollenstein (2003), and Leiponen and Drejer
(2007). A single study with dynamics has been published in Switzerland as a dis-
cussion paper (Hollenstein, 2018). Hollensteins (2018) is the most comparable to
the estimations in this thesis. Large scale studies in this manner with representa-
tive population samples have not been done before, to the extent of my knowledge.
Third, I contribute to the relevant knowledge by introducing a new taxonomy
of public sector support which is given directly to firms. This taxonomy is an
example of all policy instruments available to firms during a ten-year period.
Drawn from empirical observations, it gives a contrasting picture to theoretical
taxonomies usually found in the innovation policy literature. Based on this group-
ing, I estimate the relationship between innovation activities, outputs and public
sector support.
The structure of the thesis is the following. First, I introduce the innovation pro-
cess within the firm and the possible choices for firm innovation strategies in
Chapter 2. Second, I introduce the possible public interventions with policy in-
struments to the firm and analyse the rationales for intervention. I conclude with a
taxonomy of public sector policy instruments which are directly aimed at the firm
and point to how it influences the firm innovation process in Chapter 3. Third, I
introduce the sources of data and describe what is in the data and what is not, in
Chapter 4. Fourth, I give an overview of the Estonian business environment and
relevant descriptive statistics about innovative activities in Chapter 5. Fifth, I de-
scribe the methods used for estimations in every estimation chapter: 6.2, 7.2, 8.2,
9.1. Sixth, I estimate the dynamics of innovation strategies in Chapter 6. Seventh,
I estimate the relationship between firm innovation outputs and public sector sup-
port in Chapter 7. Eighth, I estimate the relationship between dynamics of firm
innovation strategies and public sector support in Chapters 8 and 9. Finally, I
conclude the thesis in the discussion and conclusions chapter.
2. FIRM INNOVATION STRATEGIES
2.1. Technological regimes
Firms’ choices in the innovation system are constricted by the nature of their pro-
duction or services and, therefore, by the competitive environment in which they
stand. This applies for the technological nature of production, but also for other
means, in which the firm can search for innovation – organisational structure, de-
sign, marketing, process, etc. This section describes in detail the possible search
mode for innovation and its relation to the sectoral level of the firm and its com-
petitive environment.
The role of economic and technological restrictions imposed by the competitive
environment for the innovation process is described by technological regimes
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984) and technological paradigms (Dosi,
1982, 1988b). The latter emphasises differences between sectors, based on his-
torical evidence of technological change. Within these paradigms, technological
trajectories describe the search process for a single firm.
Firms seek innovation for a competitive advantage, a technology or process to
give them an edge on the market. The technological regime in which it operates
dictates four elements of this innovation process. These elements are the sources
of technological opportunity, the appropriability conditions for rents, the cumula-
tiveness of innovations and the complexity of the knowledge base. I will discuss
all four elements in turn.
Technological and scientific opportunities within a technological regime depend
on the current technological level and knowledge created within the technological
regime, in other technological regimes and conditions imposed within the innova-
tion system as a whole. Scientific opportunities may open new possibilities within
the current paradigm or create new competing paradigms that will come to dom-
inate old ones. An example of a technological regime is the push for lighter and
more durable materials and effective design to reduce seat cost per mile on air
crafts (Nelson and Winter, 1977). The opportunities are driven by the market, i.e.
competitive advantage comes from lower cost, where long flights and high vol-
umes are demanded. The technological regime defines the opportunities available
to the innovating firm, therefore reducing possible search costs. In the case of
early 20th century aviation technology, opportunities before the advent of small
electric components and lighter materials were limited. At one point, advances in
jet engines were enough to dominate the old technological regime.
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Technological opportunities can also be included in other search modes, such as
the design of products or the work process itself. These may yield more incre-
mental innovations. Depending on the technological regime of the sector, there is
variance between possible scientific or technological opportunities. To compare,
the process of innovation in pharmaceuticals entails R&D in the form of devel-
oping new chemicals, rigorous testing in and out of the laboratory and finally
releasing a product. The process of innovation in wood harvesting technology in-
volves R&D in the form of utilising more materials, designing efficient machinery
and workflow and reducing waste. The nature of opportunities in these two exam-
ples are in different activities, yet, in both cases, they describe possible avenues
of search. The possible scope of the search for innovations is limited, therefore
reducing costs in the innovation process.
The appropriability conditions in different technological regimes influence the
possible methods for rents. R&D activities may have qualities of a public-good
nature and positive spillover effects, which in turn might discourage firms to un-
dertake these activities (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). Firms expect to be compen-
sated for these activities through protection of their innovations from imitation
or by external funding (Teece, 1986). This issue is not limited to R&D activi-
ties. Design, work process and products can also be imitated by competitors. In
some technological regimes, e.g. pharmaceuticals, formal appropriability meth-
ods are prevalent, such as patenting. In others, e.g. food production, secrecy of
components or work process, package design and branding can be used. The ap-
propriability conditions can be changed with public policy to promote innovation
in a specific technological regime (Levin et al., 1987). However, in many techno-
logical regimes, lead time from imitators, secrecy, service and sales efforts matter
more than formal intellectual property rights institutions. Levin et al. (1987) sug-
gest a case-by-case approach to public policy in managing appropriability condi-
tions, in which technological regimes are analysed on the sectoral level to ensure
an effective approach for fostering innovation.
The cumulativeness of innovations in the technological regime characterises whether
innovations are of an incremental or radical nature. This is also associated with the
Schumpeter Mark I and Mark II patterns of innovation (see next subsection). The
incremental nature of innovations builds upon previous technological advances,
where incumbents or previous innovators have an advantage in the technological
regime. In sectors with very high cumulativeness of the technological regime,
entry barriers are also higher. Breschi et al. (2000) describe four different levels
of cumulativeness which are associated with the technological regime. They can
take place at the technological, organisational (firm level), market (the ‘success
breeds success mechanism’) and industry (through spillovers) level.
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The complexity of the knowledge base describes on what type of knowledge the
innovation process draws. The knowledge base can be described in at least two
dimensions, firstly, the level of tacitness of skills and knowledge. Karl Polanyi
(2009) wrote that “we know more that we can tell.” There are elements of any
technology or innovation process which are hard to imitate because they can not
be codified. If workers are unable to describe their skills and are only able to
teach them, e.g. the master-apprentice system, it also limits the easiness in which
potential innovators can “dip in the public knowledge pool.” Tacit skills can be
acquired on the market as well, for example, by employing workers from com-
petitors. However, the costs associated with tacit knowledge can be high, since its
transfer between people is uncertain (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Codified knowl-
edge within a firm can be its working manuals or rules, customer banks and so
forth. Outside the firm, codified knowledge is available about public basic re-
search or market preferences. It depends on the firms’ own capabilities to apply
this knowledge.
A second dimension of the knowledge base describes the specificity of knowl-
edge. Generic knowledge can be applied in a very broad manner, permeating
different technological regimes. Specific knowledge is targeted in a narrow set of
problems. Another distinction of the same nature is that basic science develops
broad generic understanding, which can also be used in applied science. However,
applied science develops knowledge which stems from practical issues (Breschi,
Malerba, and Orsenigo, 2000). The knowledge base of a technological regime
can also vary on its independence from other technological regimes, depending
on how much of its knowledge can be extracted and separated from a larger sys-
tem.
Table 2.1: Major dimensions of technological regimes
Opportunity Appropriability Cumulativeness Knowledge base
Level Level Technology Generic/specified
Pervasiveness Means Firm Tacit/codified
Variety Sector Simple/complex
Sources Area Independent/system
Source: Breschi and Malerba (1997)
Table 2.1 highlights the major dimensions of technological regimes that have been
described in this section.
The concept of technological paradigms captures the essence of technological
regimes in a more sector and technology specific manner. Dosi (1982; 1988)
analyses technological paradigms in different sectors and further develops upon
technological trajectories. A natural trajectory, i.e. a process, is one for which
firms innovate within their own technological paradigms. Dosi (1988) highlights
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the microeconomic setting for technological paradigms and trajectories, empha-
sizing the diversity between sectors and technology based on examples from many
different sectors.
Technological trajectories are mostly within sectors. There are also major tech-
nological revolutions in human history, when some technologies disrupt multiple
industries at the same time. Currently, we are beyond the fifth technological revo-
lution, which was indicated by the coming of the microprocessor (Perez, 2009) —
the age of information and telecommunications. Previous ages are characterised
by the coming of the industrial revolution, steam engines, electricity and so forth.
Technological changes have been pervasive in the whole of society, creating new
working conditions, working and leisure cultures, cultural institutions and actors
in society (Mokyr, 2002).
These ultra-long waves of techno-economic paradigms shape all industries, cre-
ating new technological regimes at the same time (Freeman and Perez, 1988). In
essence, technological regimes and trajectories are found within larger techno-
economic paradigms. When a new techno-economic paradigm has been initiated
and the catalyst innovations are diffusing rapidly in many sectors, we would ex-
pect turbulent choices as well for innovation strategies. In the context of this
thesis, if firms are receiving an influx of new technologies and knowledge which
they have been derived of from before, say due to development level or political
reasons, a microcosm in the sense of techno-economic paradigms is possible.
The dimensions of technological regimes can take a variety of different combina-
tions. One approximation is using the logic of technological regimes to analyse
sectoral patterns of innovation. Three major taxonomies or typologies are dis-
cussed here, emphasizing different aspects of possible combinations of the under-
lying dimensions in technological regimes – Schumpeterian patterns of innova-
tion, the Pavitt’s taxonomy, and the high-tech low-tech divide.
2.1.1. Schumpeterian patterns of innovation
Based on Joseph Schumpeter’s writings, The Theory of Economic Development
(1934) and Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), two distinct concepts
for patterns of innovation have been noted (Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Breschi,
Malerba, and Orsenigo, 2000; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996, 1997; Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984).
Schumpeter Mark I is a pattern of innovation described by creative destruction, the
significant role of entrepreneurs, smaller firms, and entry and exit. Also referred
to as a “widening” pattern of innovation (Breschi, Malerba, and Orsenigo, 2000)
or an “entrepreneurial” regime (Winter, 1984), where main innovators have not
innovated before. The technological regime where Mark I patterns of innovation
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exist is characterised by high opportunities, relatively low technological barriers
for entry and no fixed hierarchy for innovators, i.e. low cumulativeness and low
appropriability. These signify a disequilibrium state in the market, where firms
have ease of entry and seek disruptive change.
Schumpeter Mark II is a pattern of innovation described by high cumulativeness,
large R&D investments and laboratories, large market power of incumbents and
stability of leading innovators. Also referred to as a “deepening” pattern of inno-
vation (Breschi, Malerba, and Orsenigo, 2000) or a “routinized” regime (Winter,
1984). Mark II is a pattern of creative accumulation, i.e. the same agents intro-
duce innovations repeatedly. Mark II characteristics of technological regimes are
high opportunity, high cumulativeness and high appropriability. This means that
a smaller group of incumbents are innovating within the sector, due to restrictions
of entry or resources needed for innovation.
2.1.2. Pavitt’s taxonomy
Pavitt’s taxonomy (Pavitt, 1984) is a well-known sectoral taxonomy of patterns
of innovation. Pavitt (1984, p. 343) aimed to describe similarities and differences
amongst the sources, nature and impact of innovations in sectors. Pavitt used
inductive reasoning mainly to combine the technological trajectories of different
firms within sectors into a taxonomy. Three main dimensions of technological
trajectories were assessed (Pavitt, 1984, p. 343):
• The sectoral sources of technology used in a sector: in particular, the degree
to which it is generated within the sector, or comes from outside through the
purchase of production equipment and materials.
• The institutional sources and nature of the technology produced in a sector:
in particular, the relative importance of intramural and extramural knowl-
edge sources, and of product and process innovations.
• The characteristics of innovating firms: in particular, their size and principal
activity.
A distinctive characteristic is the focus on the interrelations between knowledge
and technology providers. It combines the elements of technological regimes with
actors in the innovation system. Compared with Schumpeterian patterns of inno-
vation, this approach is focused more on firms’ choices in the innovation system,
the technological trajectories within sectors, and then the results are aggregated
(Castellacci, 2008). These relations as a basis for taxonomic deduction allow
technological regimes and trajectories to be compared on a sectoral and firm-level
basis (Archibugi, 2001).
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Pavitt’s taxonomy concluded four major categories:
• Supplier dominated – Sources of technology are suppliers, big users and ex-
tension services. The main method is process innovations. Typical users are
price-sensitive, and technological trajectory is cost-cutting. Technological
diversity is low and vertical. The relative size of innovating firms is small,
and the main means of appropriation are non-technical, such as trademarks,
marketing, advertising and aesthetics. Example sectors are agriculture, con-
struction and traditional manufacturing.
• Scale intensive (production intensive) – Sources of technology are production-
engineering department suppliers and in-house R&D. The main method is
process innovations. Typical users are price-sensitive, and the technologi-
cal trajectory is cost-cutting in product design. Firms tend to be large with
high vertical technological diversity. The main means of appropriation are
process secrecy, know-how, technical lags, patenting and dynamic learning
economies. Example sectors are steel, glass (materials) and cars.
• Specialised suppliers (production intensive) – Sources of technology are in-
house R&D and users demand. The main source for opportunities is based
on design and development to match user need. The main method is prod-
uct innovation. Firms are typically small and concentrated in technological
diversity. Customers are performance sensitive, and main means of appro-
priation is design know-how, knowledge of users and patenting. Example
sectors are machinery and instruments.
• Science based – Sources of technology are in-house R&D, knowledge based
on public science, engineering departments and suppliers. It is charac-
terised by mixed methods of innovation and mixed technological trajecto-
ries. Firms are typically large with low intensity and vertical technological
diversity, or high intensity and concentrated technological diversity. The
main methods of appropriation are R&D know-how, patents, process se-
crecy and dynamic learning economies. Example sectors are electronics
and chemicals.
These stylised commonalities between sectors show how firms are not always
free to search for innovations in any knowledge base or range of possibilities, but
rather technological change is cumulative. The nature of technological change is
dependent on firms’ past behaviour.
A later addition included one more group to this taxonomy, which has been fore-
thought (Pavitt et al., 1989):
• Information intensive – Sources of technology are software departments
and specialised suppliers. Typical core products are financial services, re-
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tailing or software products. The main trajectory for technology is efficient
and complex information processing with related products.
This basic trajectory has been relevant in further studies and recognised in empir-
ical works as well (e.g. Castellacci, 2008; Hollenstein, 2003; Miozzo and Soete,
2001).
2.1.3. High-tech versus low-tech
This is likely the most popular method for classifying industries. The main link
of this taxonomy with innovation patterns is the linear model of innovation, i.e.
science push model. It implies that basic science leads to applied science and the
product development phase before it is sold on the market (Bush, 1945; Godin,
2006). The scientification of the innovation process creates simplicity. To create
innovations, according to this model, more basic science and R&D is needed, and
innovations will follow. This simplification is also appealing to policy-makers
(Caracostas, 2007).
This taxonomy is available in several major databases, calculated on a sectoral
level (e.g. OECD, Eurostat). Though some details can vary, the major contributor
to classification is the percentage of R&D within firms or sectors. An example
is the OECD classification, where R&D above 5 percent is considered high-tech
(Hatzichronoglou, 1997). This classification has elements which are critiqued,
mainly, because economic growth, cohesion and competitiveness rests above all
on low- and medium-tech enterprises, while most attention goes toward high-tech
industries (Hirsch-kreinsen et al., 2003). Nevertheless, in general, it is not wrong
to emphasize the role of high-tech industries (Heidenreich, 2009). However, the
high-tech-low-tech divide lacks analytical capabilities when trying to encompass
technological regimes (Von tunzelmann et al., 2008).
2.2. Technological regimes of service sectors
Literature about the technological regimes of service sectors has been mainly de-
veloping along three approaches (Coombs and Miles, 2000; Gallouj and Savona,
2009).
The assimilation or technologist approach rests on the assumption that innovation
in services is similar to manufacturing and therefore can be studied in the same
context. Tools and frameworks already developed in the manufacturing context
are either directly applied or widened to encompass service peculiarities (e.g.
Evangelista, 2000; Hollenstein, 2003; Miozzo and Soete, 2001). An important
assumption or justification is that innovation in services has become increasingly
technology and capital intensive (Gallouj and Savona, 2009). A very clear exam-
ple is the widespread use of ICT in service industry innovations.
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The assimilation approach is a widespread way of analysing innovations in service
industries (Carlborg et al., 2014; Witell et al., 2016). Especially when considering
the original Pavitt’s taxonomy, the assimilation approach can be used to combine
manufacturing and services within the same framework. This is most aligned with
the Schumpeterian view that innovations are outcomes new to the world and create
exchange value (Witell et al., 2016). The downside is that it emphasises the tech-
nological nature of innovations, not encompassing non-technological innovations
as much.
The demarcation approach holds that innovations in services are highly unique
and therefore require novel theories and instruments. Studies in the demarcation
approach expect different surveys for services and manufacturing firms, or at least
dual-approach surveys where different questions are asked for either. Unless ser-
vices overall or a single sector are in question, the demarcation approach is not
very well suited for analysing services and manufacturing firms combined.
The synthesis or integrative approach appeals that service innovation perspective
is suited for analysing both manufacturing and service industries. The key is to
understand the converging nature of manufactured goods and services and cre-
ate a common framework. However, this also assumes re-defining products and
services (Gallouj and Savona, 2009).
In this thesis, the assimilation approach is the most appropriate. First, innova-
tion strategies are considered at the same time for both manufacturing and service
firms. Second, it is the most appropriate when considering the Community Inno-
vation Survey (CIS) as a starting point for empirical work (Gallouj and Savona,
2009). Third, the addition of other innovation outcomes besides product and pro-
cess in the CIS has already converged some of the distinctions between manufac-
turing and services. Service sectors were seen as laggards in terms of innovation
and innovative activities when considered in theories about technological regimes
(Pavitt, 1984). All services were categorised at first as supplier-dominated, mean-
ing they are passive adopters of technology created elsewhere. Later addition
to Pavitt’s taxonomy included financial and retailing services in the information-
intensive technological trajectory (Pavitt et al., 1989).
Technological regimes in service innovations have included networking effects,
either physical or informational, as one major contributor (Miozzo and Soete,
2001). Example industries are transportation and financial services. These in-
dustries are using their infrastructure network to define what types of innovations
are necessary and include very large firms with enough capacities to develop their
own innovations. Recently, this has been adopted together with scale-intensive
firms to create a scale- and information intensive trajectory (Bogliacino and Pi-
anta, 2016). The main descriptions include large firms, extensive adoption of ICT
and cost competitiveness.
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Another important distinction in technological regimes of service innovations is
knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) (Miles, 2006). They represent
firms which are highly reliant on expert knowledge, whereby a large proportion of
the labour is highly educated. These firms mostly provide services to other firms,
so their customers are organisations. Examples include architects, software devel-
opers, lawyers and so on. A good nickname for some of them is “problem solvers
for advanced manufacturing firms” (Castellacci, 2008, p. 981). A comparable
trajectory in the classic Pavitt’s taxonomy would be specialised suppliers.
2.3. Evolution of innovative activities
2.3.1. Product life cycle and reversed product life cycle
The dynamics of innovation strategies are linked to the product life cycle theory.
Firms develop new products and shift strategies to optimise processes for produc-
tion (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). Innovation strategy stages can be seen on
a product level (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). This model links together in-
novation or competitive strategies, the stage of production development process
and innovative activities (Gallouj and Savona, 2009). Before dominant designs
appear, many competitors build on radical innovations and test new concepts on
the market. After standardisation occurs, strategies involve production processes
and cost efficiencies, which yield competitive advantages.
The product life cycle theory predicts that at first, firms concentrate on product in-
novations. These radical innovations aim to maximise perceived quality (Gallouj
and Savona, 2009). After that, incremental innovations take over. Markets get
used to the innovations as the product reaches maturity and market starts to get
saturated. Then the focus shifts to process innovations. Strategies involve more
production methods and cost reductions in the final stage.
This model shows why both product and process improvements as innovative out-
puts are important for productivity growth and competitive advantage. Under-
standably, this simple model cannot fit every circumstance. Pavitt (1984, p. 365)
also observed that it is possible that whole industries may shift from one techno-
logical trajectory to another when their process technology has matured.
In service industries, this model can be seen working in opposing direction. The
reverse product life cycle predicts that, in the first stage, new technology is applied
to increase the efficiency of delivery of services. In the second stage, technology
is applied to increase the quality of services, and, in the third stage, technology is
applied to generate new services (Barras, 1986, 1990). The role of product and
process innovations is reversed in this model when compared to the product life
cycle model.
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This shift in trajectories over time is mainly related to IT-based innovations. Judg-
ing from the era, when these ideas have been formulated, most economic areas
were on the verge of applying IT to any conceivable process. However, not anec-
dotally, Barras notes that these shifts were visible between the 1970s and 1990s
in the financial sector and local governments (Barras, 1986, 1990).
Critically, the reverse product life cycle approach can be considered to be based
on too much emphasis on technological innovations (Gallouj, 1998). Innovation
activities can result in innovations which are not just new products or processes.
Therefore, the reverse product life cycle model is probably only one type of dy-
namic which can be seen in service innovations and strategies. Some evidence
is provided in a paper about the Thai banking sector (Uchupalanan, 2000). A
range of possible dynamics were seen in adopting IT and innovating services in
just one business sector. Interrelations between competitors, regulators and inno-
vation phases were seen to be too important for dynamics of innovation activities,
such that the reverse product life cycle model is just too simplistic. However, the
importance of the reverse product life cycle framework in highlighting possible
dynamics in service innovation dynamics has been important (Miles, 2006).
Based on these theories about the dynamics of activities undertaken in different
phases of products, we can expect to see firms starting in a more radical innovation
trajectory and ending up in a more process innovation trajectory. The early phase
includes more R&D and later phases more outsourcing and cost competitiveness.
Also, we can expect to see differentiation between manufacturing and service
industries, where services may follow an opposing path. However, theories about
dynamics are sometimes discussed in long timespans nearing Kondratiev waves,
which are not measured with data used in this thesis. Therefore, we expect to see
relatively mild shifts for firms between different innovation strategies over time.
A question also rises about the unit of analysis. In the product life cycle and
reversed product life cycle, theories dynamics of innovative activities are proposed
on the product level. We cannot see innovative activities on the product level in
most surveys, but rather on the firm level. It is safe to assume that most firms
produce more than one product.
However, when the unit of analysis is the firm, there may be conflicting strategies
on a product level, since most companies produce more than one product. Al-
though most sales and exports come from a few core products (e.g. Arkolakis and
Muendler, 2010), most firms also shift their product lines as often as every five
years (Bernard, Redding, et al., 2010). If we know this, but cannot observe more
than one product per firm, we also cannot observe if there are different strategies
or innovative activities involved with regard to different products. If these strate-
gies are conflicted within the company for different products, then our current
surveys are unable to disentangle these strategies properly.
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2.3.2. Industry life cycle
The industry life cycle view has similarities with Schumpeter Mark I and Mark II
patterns of innovation. In Mark I industries, small firms have an important role.
There are low barriers to entry and small incumbent advantages. In Mark II in-
dustries, cumulativeness and high appropriability are more important. Incumbents
are mostly larger firms with R&D departments and high capitalisation.
The industry life cycle view presents these ideas simply: young industries have
higher innovation rates than declining industries, and product innovations are re-
placed with process innovations when industries mature (Klepper, 1997). There-
fore, it is expected that firms can change from a Schumpeter Mark I to a Mark II
pattern of innovation over the course of its life (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995).
We expect to see industries with younger and smaller firms to have higher rates
of product innovations and a higher rate of new to the world innovations. Alter-
natively, we expect to see industries with a more equally distributed market share
to have more radical innovations and more frequent change in leading innovators.
Empirical evidence about levels of R&D and change in innovative behaviour over
industry life cycles is still mixed (Bos et al., 2013; Mcgahan and Silverman, 2001;
Tavassoli, 2015).
2.4. Strategic management view
2.4.1. Resource based view
Sources of competitive advantage are the focus of scholars in strategic manage-
ment as well. The clear emphasis is on the firm specific effects. Every firm should
adapt to its external factors, but ultimately it relies on its own competencies. If
these competencies are unique to the firm, truly embedded and allow product
differentiation on the market, they are firms’ core competencies (Prahalad and
Hamel, 1990). These can be the source of competitive advantage. Core compe-
tencies must permit potential access to new markets, be seen by the customers as
a principal source of value, and be difficult to imitate by competitors.
Core competencies rely on resources and capabilities within the firm. Resources
are assets such as cash, machinery or intellectual property. They can be either
tangible or intangible. Capabilities are skills, organisational practices and culture,
which are intangible. Capabilities are visible in the company’s structure, manage-
ment practices, culture and routines. Interplay between resources and capabilities
become activities, which can be thought of as business practices1. Turning inputs
into goods and services and selling them are the ultimate goals of activities.
1 Similar ideas have been described as routines in the technological regimes literature, e.g. see
Nelson and Winter (1982).
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The resource based view of the firm sees firm resources as the driver to compet-
itive advantage. Deployment of resources with firm specific capabilities are the
source of core competencies. The resource based view rests on two important
assumptions (Barney, 1991). First, firms within an industry can be heterogeneous
in their control of strategic resources. This assumption declares that bundles of
resources and capabilities are unique, even within the industry, and both tangible
and intangible resources and the capabilities to use them are allocated unequally.
Therefore, unique bundles can be found in every firm, which allows them to com-
pete. This is a clear violation of the perfect competition model. Second, these
resources are not perfectly mobile, thereby creating long lasting heterogeneity.
According to this model, the deliberate creation of this control over possible re-
sources is the source of long term competitive advantage. The stickiness of re-
sources creates competitive advantages, and resources and capabilities which are
hard to imitate can extract long-term rent.
In this model, resources are all tangible and intangible assets which a firm uses
to choose and implement its strategies (Barney, 2001, p. 54). Tangible assets
are visible with physical attributes such as labour, land, buildings, machinery,
supplies, etc. Intangible resources are invisible, without physical attributes, such
as culture, knowledge, brand equity, reputation, property rights, etc. Scholars also
divide important resources into somewhat different categories (Wo´jcik, 2015), for
example, physical capital, human capital and organisation capital (Barney, 1991)
as well as technological, reputational and financial resources (Grant, 1991).
Competitive advantages are created when these resources should be valuable, rare,
imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable - known as the VRIN criteria (Bar-
ney, 1991). If a firm develops resources that meet all VRIN criteria, they can be
thought of as entry barriers for new firms as well (Wernerfelt, 1984).
Capabilities can be described as the mode in which resources are used — the prac-
tices, activities, capacities and so forth. Several influential definitions are found in
the literature2. Capabilities are a set of high-level routines, that convey decision
options for the management in creating outputs from inputs (Winter, 2000). The
important nature of these routines are that the management is somehow aware of
them. If the routines are invisible within the firm, then there may not be any way
to influence or take advantage of them. Capabilities, by definition, are tools.
Another possible notion is that capabilities are skills that are necessary in em-
ploying possible resources and consciously using them strategically (Rothaermel,
2017). Skills and routines both convey the message that there is managerial con-
trol and ability involved. Lastly, capabilities are described as processes within the
firm that use resources to match and create market change (Eisenhardt and Martin,
2000). This definition adds dynamic nature to the idea of capabilities, that they
2 An overview can be found in Wo´jcik, 2015, p. 91.
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create or provoke change within the firm while using resources. It is an important
idea for this thesis to describe the advancement of dynamic capabilities theory in
creating competitive advantage for the firm.
Commonly, capabilities are skills, routines or processes to use resources in a de-
sired result for creating competitive advantages through differentiation strategy or
resource efficiency (Wo´jcik, 2015). This paper adapts the idea a bit more sim-
ply, conceiving capabilities as conscious organisational processes which enable
utilisation of resources to a desired effect.
2.4.2. Dynamic capabilities
The resource based view can be criticised in viewing the competitive environment
as static. Competitors develop new technologies, new markets, innovative prod-
ucts and processes that may be well above a firm’s core competences in regards to
resource efficiency or organisational capabilities. Core rigidities are processes that
hinder a firm’s ability to develop and deploy resources (Leonard-Barton, 1992).
In parallel, core competencies can turn into core rigidities when firms are not agile
enough in changing with the environment.
Therefore, firms’ resources and capabilities to deploy them should be in constant
change, or rather be upgraded, modified and leveraged to create competitive ad-
vantages over time (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). This is
known as the dynamic capabilities approach to competitive advantages. The idea
is to create sustained competitive advantages over short-term or short-lived advan-
tages (Rothaermel, 2017).
Dynamic capabilities bring forth new theoretical constructs. If firms have pro-
cesses evolving over time, then there are also path-dependent histories of firms at
play (Teece et al., 1997). Path-dependency has been acknowledged as a possible
mechanism affecting firm choice in markets (Arthur, 1989). When capabilities are
described as processes or skills, then this notion becomes not only technological
but rather practical in management. If there are possible strategic choices in util-
ising some resources that yield maximal return, then this practice should be used.
However, it should be used by competitors as well. Dynamic capabilities predict
change in firm behaviour in making these managerial choices, the process of de-
ploying resources to maximise return, therefore predicting the possible emergence
of best practices (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). In essence, there are processes
which are universal for firms, and many practices emerge which are considered to
be the best.
For example, recent years have seen an advocacy for so-called open offices. They
are supposed to provoke interaction, cooperation and creativity and increase per-
formance (Waber et al., 2014). The concept is naturally simple, recognising that
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as people are given more space and possibilities for networking, as social beings,
they will do just that. Firms may therefore take advantage of the inherent nature
of humans to network. The layout of the office, a tangible resource, is a simple
matter for the managers to organise. Therefore, if it truly boosts performance, dy-
namic capabilities would expect open offices to turn into a best practice, universal
to all firms. In the end, we would all work in one. Fortunately, there is some
evidence that the expected gains in collaboration in open offices may not always
be there (Bernstein and Turban, 2018).
This example highlights possible shifts in firms’ processes. Changing the tangible
resources has intangible effects on collaboration and office culture. They change
the possible routines within the firm, both visible and invisible. The point here is
not to advocate for or reject open offices, but rather to illustrate how this change is
expected in the dynamic capabilities’ perspective. Managers are expected to take
advantage of every piece of new information on possible best practices and utilise
them to the advantage of the firm. If it would really turn out that open offices are
a godsend to mankind’s performance, cubicles would be slowly dying out as an
evolutionary process of design.
Common features among firms can create similar value and at the same time ex-
hibit different processes. An example of the knowledge creation process shows
that a common feature in firms is having external linkages with outside knowl-
edge sources (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). At the same time, there are different
possible forms for these external linkages, such as informal relationships, rela-
tions driven by promoting active relationships with the wider community within
the firm, and formal alliances.
The dynamic capabilities perspective also highlights the difference between re-
source stocks and resource flows (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Resource stocks
are static, the amount on balance from which a firm’s competitive position can
be estimated. However, strategy involves choosing optimal resource flows. Re-
source flows create long-term advantages, they are investments to maintain re-
sources. This applies to intangible resources as well. For example, Apple’s ability
to market and charge a premium for its products cannot be created and replicated
overnight. The reputation, prestige and level of expected consumer comfort that
Apple is known for are intangible resources which receive constant investment.
The dynamic capabilities approach highlights two features important in this pa-
per. First, firms rely on the resources that are available within their environment.
These resources are both tangible and intangible. Also, capabilities to utilise these
resources matter. The combination of both are varied between firms even in the
same industries, yielding non-perfect competition we see in most markets. Sec-
ond, there are dynamic processes involved. The adage competition never sleeps
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captures this in full. For a firm to stay competitive and extract rent on the market,
constant change in developing and utilising resources is needed.
Based on these assumptions, we would expect to see high variation between firms
in the same industries. Industry specific effects on creating competitive advan-
tages are less important than firm specific effects. Also, these assumptions predict
a constant change within the firm to utilise its possible resources, a constant up-
grade of processes to remain competitive. Without adapting and developing, firms
lose competitiveness and are forced out of the market.
2.5. Open Innovation
Both the strategic management view and technological regimes concepts acknowl-
edge the role of external partnerships. The idea that firms can actually shed costs
and create strategic competitive advantages by sharing their R&D and innova-
tion efforts by opening up their processes really took off after the influential work
by Chesbrough (2003). “Open Innovation is the use of purposive inflows and
outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets
for external use of innovation, respectively” (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, et al.,
2006, p. 1). Many firms use open innovation strategies to keep up with com-
petitors and meet market demand, which makes this concept useful beyond R&D
(van de Vrande et al., 2009).
Firms can leverage both the inbound and outbound open innovation to their ad-
vantage (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). Inbound open innovation includes the
acquisition of external technologies and knowledge to the firm through R&D con-
tracts, university partnerships, in-licensing, M&A deals and so forth. The general
idea is that firms need not rely only on in-house R&D capabilities to leverage new
knowledge and technologies in their innovation process. Outbound open innova-
tion includes licensing own technology to others via intellectual property licenc-
ing, spin-offs, joint-ventures or other mechanisms. Firms do not need to leverage
everything they created themselves, but can support their own revenue stream by
letting other partners open up new markets with the technology they have sold or
licensed off. Outbound open innovation lets firms concentrate on their own core
activities and, at the same time, benefit from their R&D efforts by letting others
exploit them. Inbound open innovation can be described as either sourcing or
acquiring, and outbound open innovation as selling or revealing (Dahlander and
Gann, 2010).
The open innovation paradigm emphasises firms’ use of internal and external ideas
to create a competitive advantage and advance their pursuit of innovations. The
role of searching for innovations implicitly also describes how firms’ innovative
activities are shaped by external ideas (Dosi, 1988a; Nelson and Winter, 1982).
36
Similarly, the concept of absorptive capacity shows that firms need be willing to
accept and use information coming from external sources (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990).
Still, open innovation has been influencial in research. Measuring openness by
just the amount of partnerships per firm has shown that being more open has
a positive relationship with firm performance and innovativeness (Laursen and
Salter, 2006; Love et al., 2014). Small firms can also benefit, even though there are
substantial costs in finding partnerships and firms are not very keen on adopting
open innovation practices (Vahter et al., 2013; Wynarczyk et al., 2013).
Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2018) point to three market failures which might hin-
der strategies which are based on more cooperative relationships. These is (i) a
lack of awareness of the benefits of cooperating; (ii) limited information on func-
tional capabilities of potential partners; and (iii) limited information on trustwor-
thiness (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2018). Policies designed to remove or reduce
these barriers can influence the strategy of the firm to be more cooperative and
take on new partnerships. Policies to support open innovation can align well with
what is already influencing firms, although it broadens the scope of innovation
policies (De Jong, Vanhaverbeke, et al., 2008).
2.6. Innovation process within the firm
Previous sections described the search mode for innovations, the possible motiva-
tion and constraints for creating innovation strategies. Finally, I will introduce a
model of the innovation process that will elaborate the processes described before.
The model presented here is somewhere along the fifth, and currently last, gener-
ation of innovation process models (Rothwell, 1994). There have been several, if
not dozens, of innovation process models presented in the previous four genera-
tions (Godin, 2015). Since the fifth generation model is an expansion of previous
models, I will only briefly mention the biggest improvements.
The first generation is called a technology push model or linear innovation model.
It forms a direct sequential relationship between basic science, design and devel-
opment, manufacturing, marketing and sales.3 This is a straightforward process
where all innovations can be traced back to basic science. The simplicity is one
explanation for the heavy focus on R&D in innovation policies (Caracostas, 2007).
The criticism of the lack of demand factors in the linear model led to the second
generation of innovation process models — the demand push model (Godin and
Lane, 2013). The model contrasted the technology push model by iterating the
market need as the first step of the sequential relationship towards innovations.
3 This model also has no clear authors. A review of its history can be found in Godin (2006)
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Innovations come from market needs, which are then developed (basic science
and R&D), manufactured and commercialised.
The third model of innovation — an integrated model — combined both supply
and demand factors (Marinova and Phillimore, 2003). The innovation process
was still considered to be a linear process but with feedback loops (Rothwell,
1994). Processes can contain loops and feedback mechanisms to assess whether
they should continue, be revised, follow through to next steps or be abandoned
altogether (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986).
The fourth generation of models combined this knowledge and started emphasis-
ing systems (Marinova and Phillimore, 2003). One example is the national inno-
vation system (Edquist, 1997; Lundvall, 2010), where the role of actors outside
the firm is highlighted. Another advancement is the cyclic nature of the innovation
process (Berkhout et al., 2006), where firms have to work with similar processes
continuously, learning-by-doing and building capabilities.
Currently, the most comprehensive innovation process model is described and
drawn by Carac¸a et al. (2009), shown here in Figure 2.1.
It is a cyclical model, where the innovation process can begin at any stage within
the firm — either in the invention and basic research phase, design or prototyping
phase, or perhaps in the commercialisation phase. Therefore, it encompasses both
the demand-pull and science-push models, where the catalyst for innovation can
come from either creation of new knowledge or from the feel of market demand.
The model also depicts feedback loops within every stage within the firm, high-
lighting the contribution of the third wave of innovation models, especially the
chain-linked model by Kline and Rosenberg (1986).
The model illustrates the role of the micro and macro environment and the avail-
able knowledge base and market messages. These form a relationship with the
firm through interfaces, which can be thought of as the organisational capability
to understand its environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The influence of the
fourth wave of innovation models is apparent.
Finally, the model also positions possible outputs of the innovation process. ”The
outcome of learning can be either product or process innovations, or the cre-
ation of new market segments and new approaches to organise business routines”
(Carac¸a et al., 2009, p. 864). This is clearly influenced by the Schumpeterian
perspective of possible innovation outcomes.
These outputs are in line with the empirical part of this thesis as well. Described
in detail in the data section in Chapter 4. In brief, the data used in this thesis
also measures these four possible innovations as outputs. Other elements of this
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model are also captured in the data used in this thesis, both micro and macro
environment, all three interfaces and the internal processes.
The whole Chapter 2 describes the elements depicted in this model in detail. I
will highlight the most important connections briefly starting from the outer layer
of the model.
Technological regimes and trajectories are describing the scientific and techno-
logical research connection with the firm. The technological trajectories approach
highlights especially the role of existing scientific and technological knowledge.
Firms have a search mode for new technological breakthroughs, but they are
bounded by possible (and most logical) paths. The search for new knowledge
is not random. It is guided by what is already available and what are the most rea-
sonable, cost-efficient, or rational options to go forward (Dosi, 1988b). Insights
from the technological trajectories and regimes approach imply that firms have
some commonalities within economic activities that are based on similar techno-
logical levels. These could be what are commonly known as sectors of economic
activities (such as NACE), but they may not align.
The interface with the scientific and technological base is dependant on the ca-
pabilities of the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Since knowledge exchange is
not easy nor cheap, it takes time and effort to create a working interface. These
concepts are at the very centre of the fourth wave of innovation models, but are
also clearly part of the strategic management idea of creating core competences.
Without a working interface, the firm is not able to capture the benefits of R&D
done outside the firm. It leaves only internal processes, or, as is often the case,
firms are not able to keep up with the competition.
Business methods research and organisational knowledge illustrates the role of
practices, core competences within the firm, capabilities, best practices, and rou-
tines. Scholars in the technological regimes literature tend to describe these as
routines and capabilities, and in the strategic management literature as best prac-
tices and internal competencies. They both highlight very similar ideas.
Routines and practices are relevant to distinguish why some firms are able to gen-
erate new knowledge or understand market needs and other firms are not. In the
technological regimes literature, the emphasis is on R&D, how firms organise
their operations. However, organisational knowledge also captures other aspects,
such as logistics, supply-chain management and internal creativity support. These
aspects of organisational capabilities are often discussed in the strategic manage-
ment literature. Finally, the interface also influences how dynamic these capabili-
ties are. Are firms nimble enough to change their routines and avoid harmful path
dependencies? Are they able to absorb best practices?
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The third direct link with feedback loops to the firm is market research and design.
In essence, it captures the firms ability to understand the needs and preferences of
its users. Although it is drawn near the commercialisation phase, the role of users
can be influential in earlier phases as well (Hippel, 1986, 1988). The demand
driven innovation process emphasises this in full. Firms first try to understand
what is needed, then develop based on this (Scherer, 1982).
The interface with market research and knowledge about markets illustrates two
aspects: first, the firms’ capabilities to understand signals from the market and
the firms’ clients; second, the firms’ ability to appropriate its knowledge from
the other side of the market — its competitors. The latter is important since it
positions the firm within market forces. If it develops some knowledge about
the market and users needs, competitors are also interested in this knowledge,
preferably without costs. Intellectual property is a mechanism to both protect and
also exhibit this knowledge.
The macro environment is based on large institutions that are guiding our whole
economy. In the context of innovation process, these have been noted on both
sectoral (Malerba, 2002) and national (Lundvall, 2010) levels. Institutions in
this context are ”sets of common habits, routines, established practices, rules, or
laws that regulate the relations and interactions between individuals and groups”
(Edquist and Johnson, 1997, p. 46). Organisations are governing these institutions
by providing related services.
An example to illustrate the differences between organisations and institutions in
the macro environment for a single firm. The education system as an institution
can be described as the propensity of people to learn and exchange new ideas
such as the established practices on how teaching is organised, how much the
society values education and what aspirations students have. Organisations are
schools, the education board or ministries, universities, etc. A firm can interact
with schools and universities if it demands knowledge or labour. However, the
institutions overall influence whether the firm has any probable partners to even
interact with. If educational institutions are very weak, societies are unable to
provide the high-skilled workforce which may be needed to attract firms.
Similarly, firms are dependant not only on organisations that finance endeavours.
Access to banks, risk capital and other financing schemes are influenced by insti-
tutions within the innovation system. If there are weak regulations, lack of trust
and enforcement of rule of law, access to additional capital is severely hampered.
The macro environment influences most firms in the innovation system simulta-
neously. Possible system influence depends on the level of analysis as well. Inno-
vation systems are a framework to think in, not well-defined theoretical models.
Therefore, if the analysis of the innovation system is on the sectoral level, there
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are effects on some industries and not others. For example, the education system
could be very well suited for producing high-skilled computer scientists, but not
wood chemists. Attitudes and public support as institutions matter a lot in these
contexts. If the national innovation system is considered as the level of analysis, a
wider picture emerges that depends on access to capital or labour, willingness to
take risks, efforts of different organisations to mutually benefit each other or work
in silos, and so forth.
An element which is not pictured in Figure 2.1 is STI policies. They are part of
the science and technology system (if they exist), and their focus is usually in
developing the innovation system. A more detailed description of the scope and
ambition of innovation policies is in Section 3. The section also shows that STI
policies can influence many organisations and institutions beyond the science and
technology system.
The micro environment relates to the firm’s ability to engage with potential part-
ners and knowledge sources. These are suppliers, users, competitors, distributors,
etc. The list in Figure 2.1 is an example. In reality, firms can have many more
potential partners in their micro environment. Extreme examples are like Nokia,
a single firm which was the centre for ICT innovations in Finland for a long time
(Ali-Yrkko¨ and Hermans, 2004).
Based on their position in the micro environment, some taxonomies of innovative
practices have also been created (Castellacci, 2008; Pavitt, 1984; Pavitt et al.,
1989). They highlight various roles a firm can have in the innovation system
depending on the relationship with its micro environment. These relationships
define the flow of knowledge, sources and partners for innovative activities and
new technologies — also the types of activities that are internal and outsourced.
The micro environment and the firms’ role in it is a major characteristic of how
any firm chooses to be innovative.
The internal processes of the firm depend on the available knowledge of new tech-
nologies, new processes, market needs, internal capabilities and chosen projects.
Potential projects are chosen, developed and commercialised. What is relevant
here is the firm’s own capability to develop these projects. If firms lack resources
in any of these stages, innovative activities may fail. Secondly, firms can develop
innovations without going through all the stages illustrated in Figure 2.1. Innova-
tions are often without any changes to core concepts, reinforcing and developing
on what is successful in the marketplace (Henderson and Clark, 1990).
The innovation process model encompasses all possibilities for firms to innovate.
In reality, most firms skip several of these stages or outsource them to others. The
empirical part of this thesis investigates how firms have been creating their inno-
vative strategies. The model presented here allows us to picture all possibilities
for any firm.
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3. PUBLIC SUPPORT OF PRIVATE BUSINESS
In this chapter, I will give an overview of public support of private business that
has been available to firms in Estonia. The chapter proceeds as follows. In section
3.1, I will introduce the necessary context of public support that is under analysis,
explain what is lacking in current taxonomies of public policy instrument tax-
onomies and introduce overarching rationales to intervene in private business. In
section 3.2, I will explain the method and the data used to create a new taxonomy
of public support. In section 3.3, I will analyse the public support of private busi-
ness in Estonia and their possible justifications, and will introduce a classification
of direct public support based on observations from Estonian firms. In section
3.4, I will explain how these policy instruments have evolved over time. Finally,
in section 3.5, I will analyse how these policy instruments can possibly impact the
innovation process within the firm.
3.1. Public support, STI context and intervention
rationales
Innovation policy, usually incorporated into science, technology and innovation
(STI) policy, is wide ranging.1 These policies cover elements which are supposed
to affect both organisations and institutions to create more innovations. ”Inno-
vation policy comprises all combined actions that are undertaken by public or-
ganizations that influence innovation processes”, whether they are intentional or
unintentional (Borra´s and Edquist, 2013, p. 1513). When the innovation process
model presented in Chapter 2 is considered, it leaves ample room for all kinds of
activities.
In fact, innovation policy has increased in scope, complexity, policy inclusion and
ambition over the last decades (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). Figure 3.1 illus-
trates how goals and objectives of STI policies are linked with policy instruments.
Innovation policy is created to fulfil some societal goals, usually derived from po-
litical processes. For a long time, the only societal goal for innovation policy was
economic growth (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). However, some developments
have been noted in recent decades, where the goal of innovation policy is more
aligning with other societal goals, such as clean environment, better healthcare or
increased lifespan (OECD, 2015; Robinson and Mazzucato, 2019).
1 Unless specifically mentioned, STI policies and innovation policy is used interchangeably in this
thesis.
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Figure 3.1: Goals, objectives and scope of innovation policy. Source: Borra´s and
Edquist (2013) and Schot and Steinmueller (2018)
The aim to use innovation policy for transformative change in innovation systems
is a rather recent call to arms (Grillitsch et al., 2019; Schot and Steinmueller,
2018; Weber and Rohracher, 2012). Schot and Steinmueller (2018) have framed
it as innovation policy 3.0. The most important difference from previous con-
cepts of innovation policy is that the third frame puts more emphasis on societal
goals and generating transformative change. The former is easier to visualise,
as the goal of innovation policy will become wider to encompass the needs of
society better. There is less emphasis on GDP growth, and greater emphasis
on inclusive growth. The latter, transformative change, aims to create shifts in
socio-technological systems: how we produce, what is demanded by the market,
and how to change institutional support systems (Weber and Rohracher, 2012).
An example is transformative change in transport. Instead of tackling waste by
creating environmentally friendly cars, the aim is to reinvent urban transport by
introducing new modes of transport, such as electric scooters.
Since Estonia is not at the forefront of the most innovative of innovation policies
that would stimulate transformative change, I will not concentrate on the emerging
third frame. Even though the most important difference in how the three waves of
innovation policy are categorised by Schot and Steinmueller (2018) stems from
societal goals and aims of the policy.
Innovation policy 1.0 and 2.0 have emerged continuously with progress on our un-
derstanding of the innovation process within the firm. The first wave has its roots
in linear models, emphasising market failures in R&D creation and developing in-
struments to mitigate such failures. The second wave encompasses elements from
innovation systems thinking, pursuing relationships and linkages between knowl-
edge creation, discovery and commercialisation. Instruments in the second wave
44
are wider in scope and application, characterised by systemic failures instead of
market failures (Laranja et al., 2008).
The first and second waves of innovation policy have put economic growth at the
forefront (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). The first wave emphasises growth as a
direct outcome of R&D, along the lines of growth visualised by Vannevar Bush
(1945). The second wave goes wider in sources for economic growth, but does
not change the underlying goal. In Figure 3.1, the main societal goal is GDP
growth in both innovation policy 1.0 and 2.0. Although, there is an opposing view
to the notion that previous research and agenda setting in innovation policy has
given thought only to GDP growth, calling the argument a bit offhanded (Giuliani,
2018).
Direct goals of innovation policy are set based on innovation activities, expressed
in innovation terms. In the innovation policy 1.0 framework, direct goals are
grounded in R&D activities, either expressed as expenditures, engaged personnel,
outcomes like patents and inventions, or variations thereof. In the innovation pol-
icy 2.0 framework, things are a bit more complicated. The most famous example
is the attempt to gather the direct goals of innovation policy into a single index,
the European Innovation Scoreboard (Hollanders and Es-Sadki, 2018). The mea-
sures aiming to describe the direct goals of innovation policy in the Innovation
Scoreboard include PhD graduations, access to venture capital, R&D expendi-
tures, scientific publications, SMEs introducing product innovations to the market,
public-private-co-publications and high-tech exports, among many others.
Innovation activities (that are under investigation by researchers) have, therefore,
also widened in scope. Since the first innovation process models, our understand-
ing of them has evolved (as described in Chapter 2). More and more innovation
activities are taken into account, and, if needed, policy actions are determined. In-
novation policy instruments and the justifications for their creation are illustrated
on the right side of Figure 3.1.
The most important breakthrough in understanding that led to the first wave of
innovation policy is that R&D has qualities akin to public goods (Arrow, 1962;
Nelson, 1959). Markets fail when positive or negative externalities are not in-
cluded in the final price of goods or services. Knowledge, once created, can dis-
tribute freely and cannot be used up. Firms face appropriation challenges if their
proprietary knowledge can be used by competitors without bearing the develop-
ment costs. Without correction, there are disincentives for societal investments in
R&D. The rationale for intervention in R&D creation is, therefore, that if society
is not willing to bear some of the costs, firms are not willing to start innovative
activities. We would not even know what we are missing.
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The first wave of innovation policy instruments were actively seeking problems
with R&D activities. Hence, the first wave of instruments also deal only with
R&D creation and diffusion.
The second wave of policy instruments include the national innovation system
framework thinking which emphasises relevant institutions and organisations that
have influence over innovative activities within the economy (Edquist and John-
son, 1997; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Lundvall, 2010). Relevant actors in-
clude firms and whole industries, universities, competitors and financial institu-
tions (banks, venture capital). Institutions such as education systems, legal frame-
works, financial systems (regulations, attitudes), standards and norms also qualify,
to name a few. The national innovation system framework has been successful as
a tool to discuss interlinking aspects and influences of innovation in economies
with policy-makers.
Recent descriptions of possible instruments to influence economic and innova-
tive activities in the realm of science, technology and innovation policy have also
adapted the national innovation system framework. Examples can be found on
the EU level (Izsak, Markianidou, et al., 2013), in research papers (Dolfsma and
Seo, 2013; Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Georghiou, Edler, et al., 2014) and policy
reports (Izsak and Edler, 2011). This is a top-down perspective in which firms are
one agent among many. The innovation system perspective is good for policy for-
mulation; it helps with understanding possible interactions between institutions
and the creation of policy mixes (Borra´s and Edquist, 2013).
There has been a widening and deepening of innovation policy instruments (Borra´s,
2009), meaning that innovation policy accounts for a more diverse set of actions,
especially outside the focus of R&D. Secondly, innovation policy has become
more linked with other policy spheres.
This widening can also be thought of as representing an emerging hierarchy within
STI policies (Lundvall and Borra´s, 2006). Science policy deals with the creation
of scientific knowledge. Technology policy deals with advancement and com-
mercialisation of technical knowledge. Finally, innovation policy deals with the
overall innovative performance of a country. The latter remains the context for
this thesis as well. Innovation policy is considered to be much wider than just the
creation and diffusion of scientific or technical knowledge.
It is also relevant to emphasise the scope of instruments that can arise from this
delineation. What Lundvall and Borras (2006) effectively show is that innovation
policy has the widest set of policy instruments compared to technology or science
policy, due to its overarching focus.
Besides R&D, rationales for government intervention with policy instruments
evolved beyond market failures. Within the STI domain, there are multiple ar-
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guments for justification of intervention, possible instrument mix and objectives
(Laranja et al., 2008). Other rationales are explained via system and institutional
failures, and failures to link elements of the innovation system for cooperation, a
coordination or network failure.
A review of past research done by Klein Woolthuis and colleagues (2005) cat-
egorises the justification rationales for innovation 2.0 into a framework of eight
system imperfections or failures. These are infrastructural, transition, path de-
pendency, hard and soft institutional, strong and weak network and capabilities
failures. Infrastructural failures are related to the physcial infrastructure that ac-
tors need to function. Transition, path dependency and capability failures refer
to actors that are unable to transform themselves, either by lacking the necessary
knowledge or support.
Hard and soft institutional failures and strong and weak networking failures are
related to institutions which are either not supportive or not evolving. Hard insti-
tutions typically include legal systems, intellectual property rights systems, stan-
dards and norms, etc., while soft institutions include culture, attitude, tolerance
to risk, social values, and so forth. Networking failures are related to problems
of coordination, when firms have either too close links and miss out on outside
opportunities (strong networks) or they are unable to coordinate (weak networks),
which leads to an absence of complementarities.
Hard and soft institutions described above relate to formal and informal arrange-
ments affecting an organisation’s performance. These can be measured as institu-
tional quality, which enables comparison of the conditions across innovation sys-
tems. The quality of institutions is one of the most important aspects of economic
growth (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In the innovation systems framework,
conditions such as financial environment, incentives for innovation, standards and
norms, and appropriation conditions are all relevant for SME development and
innovative activities (Kuhlmann and Arnold, 2001; Lundvall, 2010). If there are
negative incentives, unclear regulations or other externalities hidden in, for ex-
ample, intellectual property legislation and application procedures, it can result
in lagging competitive advantages for firms. Institutional failures can be viewed
both as forms of market failure and systemic failure (Laranja et al., 2008).
Based on Estonian innovation policy instruments, I will refer to market failure-
based rationales as innovation policy 1.0 rationales and systems thinking failures
as innovation policy 2.0 rationales. This will inform the categorisation of ra-
tionales for justification with policy instruments. Innovation policy 1.0 and 2.0
rationales can co-exist simultaneously, as is often the case.
Current taxonomies of innovation policy instruments cover both innovation pol-
icy 1.0 and 2.0 instruments and rationales (Borra´s and Edquist, 2013; Edler, Cun-
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ningham, et al., 2016; Edler and Fagerberg, 2017; Edler and Georghiou, 2007;
Izsak, Markianidou, et al., 2013). When contrasted with the supposed relation-
ship between science, technology and innovation policy instruments (Lundvall
and Borra´s, 2006), they cover all of them. However, to consider the variation
within the public sector support given to firms, in monetary terms, these tax-
onomies are not detailed enough.
The European Commission report on innovation policy instruments includes di-
rect business innovation support, consisting of support given to product devel-
opment, marketing, commercialisation, services innovation, innovation manage-
ment, industrial design, support to innovation readiness, acquisition of machinery,
equipment, know-how, and promotion of internationalisation (Izsak, Markian-
idou, et al., 2013, p. 88). All these are presented within one category. Clearly,
many of these activities can have more or less influence on the overall innovative
output. Furthermore, this taxonomy is one of the most accommodating when con-
sidering monetary support to firms which is given under different policy domains.
Edler and Georghiou (2007) and Borra´s and Edquist (2013) both consider mainly
R&D instruments in their taxonomies of innovation policy instruments, leaving
little room for technological upgrading or commercialisation efforts. When most
firms are probably creating incremental innovations rather than radical innova-
tions, it can be too narrow to consider only R&D based instruments as innovation
policy tools.
Edler and Fagerberg (2017) and Edler, Cunningham, et al. (2016) develop a classi-
fication based on policy goals which also aligns with the objectives in this thesis.
However, they aim to give an overview of large groups of policy instruments,
therefore classifying very broad categories that can have overlaps. Their classifi-
cation is useful when the whole (national) innovation system is under analysis.
For this thesis, the main focus is on direct support to firms. This means that firms
are directly influenced (treated) by the policy instrument. Indirect effects, such as
changes to institutions and actors above the firm level, are not under analysis.
There are three reasons for limiting this thesis to policy instruments where firms
are direct recipients of treatment. First, sectoral and national level instruments
affect all firms simultaneously at the corresponding level. Second, there is no
way to disentangle which firms did not get treated by indirect effects of policy
instruments. For example, if policy instruments are aimed at creating a more
entrepreneurial culture in the IT sector through awareness campaigns in universi-
ties, delineating firms by sectoral classification is probably not appropriate. Third,
since the main interest in this thesis is the effect of policy instruments on firm in-
novation strategies, the unit of analysis is also the firm, not the innovation system.
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Due to the focus of this thesis, the lack of detail in current taxonomies of policy
instruments and above reasoning, I develop a new classification of innovation
policy instruments which emphasises direct public support to firms. The aim is
not to classify all possible innovation policy instruments, but only those which are
directly given to firms, usually expressed in monetary terms.
Going back to the focus of STI policies by Lundvall and Borra´s (2006), policy in-
struments analysed here can actually be found under all of them. There are R&D
instruments under science policy, such as grants for conducting R&D. There are
labour force training and skill development instruments under technology pol-
icy. There are organisational development instruments and clustering instruments
under innovation policy. All these apply, since they are directly given to firms.
However, instruments like competition regulation, standardisation and norm cre-
ation, intellectual property rights regimes and higher education reforms are out of
scope in this new classification.
The taxonomies of innovation policy instruments that have been described above
are too broad in their categories. Hence, if only one type of instrument is under
analysis (direct support to firms), then there is a possibility to look further into
this category. A deeper analysis can also give insights into what supported actions
are more related to firm innovativeness. For example, in the Edler and Fagerberg
(2017) taxonomy, all direct support falls within one category. However, there may
be differences in outputs if direct support is in the form of technology acquisition
or R&D activities support. In fact, the analysis in Chapter 7 shows just that.
This is not meant as a critique to the taxonomies currently found in the litera-
ture. Their focus is to describe all possible innovation policy instruments within
the innovation system, targeting all actors and institutions. However, in this the-
sis, there is an opportunity to look at instruments targeting one specific group of
actors, namely firms. Within this narrower scope, there is room to distinguish
between different supported activities and instrument types, which is not realistic
due to comprehension limitations on the whole innovation system level.
Direct business support, which is usually categorised into a single group among
policies targeted to SME development, such as offering advice, training, best prac-
tices, networking and marketing assistance, exporting information schemes and
other soft services, are found in almost all OECD countries (OECD, 2000). These
are all relevant for innovation policies as well, if they encompass the whole range
of STI.
There are several overarching economic rationales for policy intervention in the
STI realm to explain why some markets are not functioning in a way that produces
maximum welfare to society. These are general cases which can be seen in various
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specific areas. Usually policy instruments have more narrow reasonings which are
derived from these general market failure or systemic failure arguments.
Intervention to R&D is mostly justified by the market failures argument. In other
policy domains, similar reasoning about intervention rationales can be seen, e.g.
transport (Docherty et al., 2004), energy (Jaccard, 1995) and environment (Rein-
hardt, 1999). Economic arguments for government intervention revolve around
societal welfare such that if the market system does not reach its maximum, a
rationale for intervention exists. This argument is an umbrella for all types of
interventions.
Markets can fail when information asymmetries exist (Akerlof, 1970). The gen-
eral solution would be to reduce the cost of information, which then delivers a
trade off between cost and efficiency. Information asymmetries can be relieved,
for example with quality assurances to buyers.
Markets also fail when positive or negative externalities are not included in the
final price of goods or services. One example is R&D itself, which has qual-
ities akin to public goods (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). Similarly, production
processes often have negative externalities in generating waste in the local envi-
ronment. If these are not priced in, the burden of cost is allocated to society, while
consumers receive discounted goods.
Market control over competitors can also yield results that are not optimal in so-
ciety. For example, monopoly powers tend to reduce production capacity to in-
crease profits while creating a dead-weight loss in society. Examples to reduce
anti-competitive behaviour in firms under regulation are more than a century old.
In the US, the Sherman Antitrust Act was created in 1890 to reduce the effects of
dominant market power.
Besides market and institutional failures, inefficiencies in business management
is a third relevant element in direct business support (Lattimore et al., 1998). Inef-
ficiencies in business management are visible in the long tail of productivity dis-
tribution (Andrews et al., 2015; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Syverson, 2004).
Although differences can be seen in institutional quality, management practices
and policy reactions across countries, a significant portion of badly managed firms
exist. Gearing attention towards this long tail instead of market leaders could ar-
guably benefit society in the long-run (Haldane, 2017).
There seems to be no lack of good rationales to argue for policy intervention in
the private market. Market failures, systemic failures and management failures
offer possibilities for a wide range of instruments. In this context, direct support
for firms will be taken into focus. Based on empirical observations from Estonia,
direct business support is categorised into classes which highlight the activities
support with instruments.
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The rest of this chapter describes how this classification is created, the main re-
sults, how it relates with innovation policy 1.0 and 2.0 rationales, and finally,
which innovation activities these instruments are supposed to affect when the in-
novation process model presented in the previous chapter is reintroduced.
3.2. Method and data description to develop a
classification of direct business support
Sabatier (1986) compared and analysed top-down and bottom-up approaches to
policy analysis. The top-down approach is more useful when analysts wish to con-
sider a single program or a single policy, especially when there are single powerful
actors involved, for example, on government agency overseeing the whole policy
field. In contrast, the bottom-up view is more appropriate when there are multiple
actors involved without specific power-dependency. In addition, the bottom-up
view is more appropriate when the analysis investigates the dynamics of actor
interactions in a specific policy sector.
Based on the seminal work of Sabatier (1986), the classification created in this
chapter also takes the bottom-up view. Since innovation policy instruments have
been under the auspices of many local policies, this approach is more useful. Di-
rect business support can apply to actors involved with science, technology and
innovation policy, environmental policy, social policies or agricultural policy. In
general, the use of various actors as tools for public policy has increased (Sala-
mon, 2002), especially since there are actors involved who can be either public,
private or non-profit in delivery networks (Blair, 2002). As can be seen later, this
also true in the Estonian case.
In the bottom-up view, there can be overlaps in activities supported. To classify
the possible interacting instrument mix, direct business support has to be dis-
sected into categories from the bottom up rather than top down. Otherwise, it
would mean that there is an ex ante choice of policies and instruments which can
represent direct business support. I believe that this ex ante decision cannot be
made in reality, since that would mean that researchers would also be aware of all
possible instruments that a sample of firms has been a part of before the analysis
is done. It is a case of unknown unknowns.
I start this bottom-up view on the possible choice of instruments from the firm per-
spective, meaning instruments which are directly geared towards the firm, whether
to create incentives or disincentives for certain behaviours. These can be direct
funding of behaviour, e.g. buying machinery, training of workers in the firm, or
being part of consultancy programs.
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I make no distinction between specific or general policies (Freitas and von Tunzel-
mann, 2008). Policy instruments can be given to firms in specific sectors or to any
firm that applies. I also make no distinction between tangible or capacity building
policies (Schneider and Ingram, 1988). Instruments may involve strong incen-
tives, e.g. costs are eligible only if they reduce emissions by some percentage, or
the firm may use funds as it sees fit, more akin to voucher programs.
Policy instruments that firms cannot apply to are out of scope. This includes
policy instruments which are general in the innovation system, e.g. reforming
middle school education to include more science and technology education. Of
course, the latter also affects firms in the long run, but indirectly. Therefore, the
instruments covered here should be ones that the firm can either apply to or take
part in directly without applying.
This classification is a taxonomy, i.e. empirical classification generated by quan-
titative identification (Peneder, 2003). Instruments are classified according to
their similarity. The resulting classes are polythetic, meaning that the instruments
within one class are not identical in every dimension. This is natural, since policy
instruments also evolve over time, and the activities they wish to promote undergo
major and minor tweaking, but their overall goal can stay the same.
Empirical observations of direct business support have also one major drawback
— they have to be observable. Most direct supports that involve money are
counted and documented with precise care, especially public sector money. How-
ever, many types of direct public support are actually allocated indirectly. For
example, a firm manager may receive training in a publicly funded workshop tar-
geted to managers. Funds can be paid directly to the organiser of the workshop
based on a headcount of participants. However, this headcount, the number of
people who actually participated and their identity, is documented on paper in an
archive. Who has not seen a registration sheet at a seminar on a table near the
entrance, waiting for signatures? The information on these papers is more often
than not unobservable. Therefore, the use of instruments, or rather the treatment
by different instruments, is underestimated with an accounting perspective based
on different registries. Even so, the instrument might aim for direct business sup-
port and is paid for by the public.
Figure 3.2 shows two possible paths of following direct business support. The
upper path is observable when both direct support and treatment come from the
public agency simultaneously. The lower path is often unobservable in full. Direct
support to the treatment provider is accounted for and publicly available, but their
actual provision of treatment is not. For example, when a business incubator gets a
subsidy for five years, the amount per year and total is readily observable in public
registries and in the treatment provider’s annual report. However, the data on how
many firms actually had incubation services and how successful they were, is not
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Figure 3.2: Observable and unobservable paths of direct business support
available or easily accessible. Generally, we are interested in who has received
treatment, not funding recipients.
Thirdly, inspired from the taxonomies exhibited in Edler and Fagerberg (2017),
Izsak, Markianidou, et al. (2013) and Edler, Cunningham, et al. (2016), the clas-
sification is based on supported activities. These are shown as the objectives of
instruments, which determine the main category of classification. For example,
whether they are to give consultancy or funds to acquire machinery. Policy ratio-
nales also align with supported activities. A step further from these taxonomies
is the sole focus on direct support. Where these taxonomies have a single in-
strument, direct support to R&D and innovation, the new classification will be
able to explore effects within such categories. When policy strategy documents or
legislation has no indication for justification rationales, these are estimated from
similar instruments found in the literature.
Finally, the allocation of instruments to different classes is based on document
analysis. For every public instrument where multiple firms are affected, there is
legislation available. Regulations usually state policy aims, supported activities
and eligibility criteria for costs and beneficiaries. Policy strategy documents and
development plans also state the purpose, aims and sometimes supported activi-
ties. If none of these are available, titles of actual projects within the instrument
are used to estimate supported activities.
A lengthier description of data sources used in this thesis is in Chapter 4.2. A few
short notes are given here as an introduction.
Data about direct business support instruments comes from all relevant public
agencies on the local and national level in Estonia between 2001 and 2016.
Two public agencies, Enterprise Estonia and Agricultural Registers and Informa-
tion Board, are the main paying agencies dealing with both large firms and SMEs.
Both have supplied their full register of all business support given to beneficiaries,
including project titles, relevant instruments, sum of money and dates.
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The EU structural fund register is also combined into the dataset. These include
many of the larger projects, some infrastructure projects and instruments geared
towards other organisations such as workshop or training providers. This register
is available since 2004.
In addition, Estonia’s State Aid register has been scraped. In 2007, Estonia trans-
posed EU competition regulations into Estonian law and set up a digital State Aid
register. All Estonian state aid and de minimis aid is tracked through this register.
EU competition policy has strict state aid rules, and exemptions have to be noti-
fied and are monitored. All aid must be approved by the European Commission,
fall under block exemptions or be under de minimis aid limits. The maximum
amount of de minimis aid currently allowed is 200 000 euros per undertaking over
any period of three fiscal years. Since many direct business support instruments
are low in sum, a balance of payments is kept for every beneficiary in the register.
Also, there are examples in this register where aid given to firms is indirect, to be
calculated afterwards. For example, when workers have been retrained in a public
program, the cost of the program is not payed directly to the firm, but it has been
estimated and kept on balance in the firm’s state aid or de minimis aid total sum.
This is one, and probably the best, way to observe the treatment of instruments
where funds have not been paid directly to the firm — to observe the unobservable
path.
The structural funds register and state aid register add another 20 public organ-
isations that have been giving direct business support over the years. The main
paying agencies are the Environmental Investment Centre, Technical Regulation
Authority, Ministry of Economic Affairs (only very large projects directly), Min-
istry of Finance (also large projects), Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund,
and some specific foundations for R&D support and loan guarantee services for
SMEs.
This data covers direct support given to businesses, non-profit organisations and
public enterprises. Instruments specially meant for public organisations, e.g. local
governments, are not included.
Most of these instruments provide direct support for which firms have to apply
themselves. Many instruments operate within specific sectors, are limited in ac-
cess to firms of a certain size or age, and specify conditions for eligibility criteria.
Since direct support is an input to innovative activities, or, at the very least, firms
are opportunistic in relieving budgetary constraints in their entrepreneurial activ-
ities, this taxonomy is based on supported activities. From the firm perspective,
instruments can then be considered as inputs to the activities that these instruments
wish to promote. If needed, these supported activities can be taken to the inno-
vation system level. However, with some instruments, relevant institutions and
54
the direction of input between institutions cannot be recovered on the innovation
system level.
This data covers the information about which instruments were used by firms in
this thesis.
Policy instruments, their rationales and supported activities are covered in strat-
egy documents and legislation. These can be found on the web pages of agen-
cies involved, call documents for policy instruments themselves, in the national
legislation web page Riigiteataja or from ministries’ web pages, where national
strategy documents are hosted.
Altogether, 113 different policy instruments and their documents were analysed to
create this classification. A list of all policy instruments classified in the taxonomy
is in Appendix I
3.3. Classification of direct business support in Estonia
Following is a description of 11 business support types that can be distinguished
from empirical observations. Table 3.1 on page 67 highlights all classes with a
short description. Table 3.2 on page 69 highlights all classes with possible inter-
vention rationales.
Collaboration programmes are instruments to support R&D or modernisation
projects in cooperation between competitors, industry and academia, or several
academic institutions. Mostly, these are international projects with partners from
several countries. The policy aims of these programmes are to increase university-
industry collaboration, increase technology transfer and exchange of knowledge
between universities and industry. Also, they aim to promote cooperation between
universities and local governments across borders. Widely known examples of in-
struments in this category are the EU Framework Programmes for Research and
Technological Development, the latest of which, FP8, is known as Horizon 2020.
Other examples are the EU Interreg programmes and local programs such as the
Estonia-Latvia science exchange programme.
Open innovation takes advantage of knowledge inflows and outflows to accel-
erate the innovation process (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, et al., 2006). Under-
investment in collaborative efforts to perform innovative activities has negative
consequences for firm innovation performance (Laursen and Salter, 2006). The
reasons for these under-investments can be expressed in terms of market failures.
Three specific market failures related to information asymmetries reduce the in-
centives to undertake collaborative innovation activities. These are: (1) firms’
lack of understanding of potential benefits of open innovation or can not estimate
its potential outcomes; (2) firms’ inability to estimate the potential capabilities
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of their partners; and (3) firms’ limited information about the trustworthiness of
potential partners (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2018). From the innovation system
perspective, this would mean that there is an interaction or network failure (Weber
and Rohracher, 2012).
The potential benefit for firms participating in open innovation is increased inno-
vative performance. Nambisan and Sawhney (2011) identify four private benefits
of open innovation: (1) firms’ reach for new ideas, markets and technologies is
increasing; (2) the cost of innovating is reduced; (3) the risk of commercialisation
is reduced; and (4) the speed of development is increased. Firms participating
in these instruments should indicate internal or external R&D performance, links
with other actors in the innovation system and new products or processes in the
piloting stage.
Consulting instruments are subsidies for hiring external experts for firm diagnos-
tics, creating development plans and other types of consultancy. Generally, they
are project and domain based, short-term assistance. The distinguishing charac-
teristic of consulting instruments is that they are limited in term and are designed
for offering advice on best practices.
Consultancy is an experience good (Nelson, 1970). Buyers cannot assess before-
hand whether the advice they are getting is good. This implies that there may
be an information asymmetry problem with consultancy, leading to a suboptimal
purchase. Firms are not able to evaluate whether the advice they are getting is
generating positive returns. To compensate, a reduction in the fixed cost of pur-
chasing advice can be justified. An EU commissioned report on business support
service relating to the provision of information and advice found four main cat-
egories where markets can fail (Atherton et al., 2002): (1) adverse selection of
business advice services through information failures; when information has (2)
public good or (3) mixed good qualities; and (4) when information has externali-
ties.
There may be transaction costs for searching and participating in consultancy,
especially for SMEs (Lattimore et al., 1998). Managers have to invest consider-
able time, which can have high alternative costs, especially if firms are small and
managers have multiple roles within the firm.
Consultancy programs can range from very technical to general management prac-
tices and according to policy domain. STI policies deal with intellectual property,
agricultural and industry policies deal with best practices, and environmental poli-
cies deal with reducing pollution. Consultancy instruments include, for example:
engaging development consultants in product design, commercialisation or in-
ternational marketing; industrial design and patenting applications; forestry de-
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velopment plans and best practice hotlines; and manufacturing and supply chain
management.
Training instruments are intended to increase innovation or entrepreneurship re-
lated skills. These are often aimed at business managers, researchers, workers and
interns, both blue- and white collar. Training and skill development programs are
widespread and fairly low-cost instruments.
Training and skills development programs are similar to consultancy programs.
Consultancy offers external advice, a tangible knowledge, whereas training is a
method to pass on intangible knowledge. Possibilities for market failures in both
remain fairly similar. There are high search costs and difficulties in distinguishing
quality service providers ex ante, and service providers are not generally long-
term partners. Under-provision of training in the workplace also occurs if work-
ers are too short-sighted to expect future higher wages or if firms are afraid of
renegotiation of wages after the training (Brunello and De Paola, 2004). Also, if
the training is general enough, firms are reluctant to invest for fears of poaching
(Becker, 1993).
Policy domains range horizontally between policies and subfields. On the policy
level, for example, there are STI policies for developing entrepreneurship skills
in creative industries and regional policies for worker retraining programs to re-
duce structural unemployment. On the subfield level, instruments differ between
sectors, as can be seen by specific training programs for agricultural industries,
local government workers or technical fields. Examples include general training
programs for young workers in specific fields; business plan development train-
ing for freelancer designers; international training programme reimbursement for
engineers; general manager training programmes to increase awareness of inno-
vation capabilities and benefits of innovative activities; open calls for firms to
reimburse worker training costs, etc.
Marketing and export promotion support instruments for planning and executing
marketing activities can vary between commercialisation efforts, export realisa-
tion efforts and plan development. The distinguishing characteristic is the aim to
increase visibility of current products and reduce the costs of entering new mar-
kets.
Lattimore (1998) identifies seven possible market failures to justify policy inter-
ventions: (1) reputational externalities; (2) knowledge transfers from overseas
leading edge customers; (3) externalities from knowledge about new markets; (4)
adverse business attitudes to exporting; (5) ignorance of benefits of exporting; (6)
capital market imperfections; and (7) tariff compensations. Market failures 1 to 3
are about the externalities of exporting. Learning by exporting is a hypothesised
effect whereby firms can gain new knowledge and enhance productivity and inno-
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vativeness after becoming an exporter. Exporting firms have higher productivity
(Bernard and Jensen, 2004). But whether it is due to knowledge spillovers from
exporting activities or because firms with higher productivity self-select into ex-
porters has been debated for some time (Clerides et al., 1998; De Loecker, 2007,
2013; Salomon and Shaver, 2005). The latter arguments 4 to 7 of protectionism
legacy in business culture or on tariff compensation are not very convincing. At
least in the European union context, there seems to be no case made for either.
A more realistic argument would be that the cost of information about new mar-
kets is expensive. Firms with high capital constraints are not willing to pursue
possible new markets without knowing the possible return on investment. Busi-
ness development agencies are willing to cover some of the cost by acquiring
knowledge about other markets, developing contacts and networking. The social
cost of acquiring this knowledge is shared and is smaller than it would be if all
firms develop this knowledge on their own. Such knowledge is passed on with
policy instruments to beneficiaries. The market failure for firms would be an un-
certainty of return on their investment. This, compounded with a lack of skills
about market penetration, can be a high burden for firms. If their first strategy for
exporting is not correct, they may feel that there is no second chance.
Policy domains can cover STI policies, regional policies, industry policies or lo-
cal entrepreneurship development policies. Examples include support to develop
marketing plans for export markets, subsidies to visit or present at trade fairs, and
joint marketing events for businesses abroad.
Innovation and R&D instruments enhance innovation competences and support
investment in research and technologies. This class of instruments combines sev-
eral supported activities together that may have very fuzzy boundaries or are often
eligible within the same instruments.
The first type is pure research instruments, where firms can reduce the cost of
basic or applied research and apply for external funding. These can often be
demand-side instruments, where new knowledge is acquired through procurement
schemes. The support of basic or applied research in the material technology sec-
tor and applied research support in Smart Specialisation fields are two examples.
The second type is innovation and development voucher instruments. These are
small lines of credit for firms to either gain knowledge about whether their devel-
opment idea has enough potential for further investment or to purchase services
from other providers to develop their innovative product to market maturity. Ex-
amples are innovation voucher instruments, R&D voucher instruments and sup-
port for reducing costs in developing pilot projects.
The third type is specific grants for firms to develop new products or services.
These grants are evaluated by public agencies. When approved, beneficiaries are
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eligible to cover costs of production and present a product in due time. An ex-
ample from the creative arts sector is film grants, where small production firms
compete for a grant to cover the development of a full feature firm. Other exam-
ples are firm based grants based on committee evaluations with individual funding
rules, specifically: grants to develop an ICT based language teaching tool; defence
sector grants for developing patriotic games and film media; and grants to support
specific services like major concerts or art shows.
The fourth type is specific product development or SME support instruments,
where the aim of the instrument is to create new products or new firms with in-
novative products. These can be individual or group efforts involving multiple
firms. Examples are: agricultural grants for firms to develop additional products
or services which are not in their main field of business activities, to diversify
their business portfolio; grants to develop tourism products in specific regions;
support to firms to reduce costs while cooperating with technology development
centres; and the EU LEADER instrument where local communities invest in local
products and services.
The rationale for public support of R&D, as already explained, is due to the preva-
lence of positive externalities which lead to suboptimal investment in society.
Laranja et. al (2008) explain possible rationales for public intervention in STI
policies in the context of different economic theories. These range from possible
market and institutional failures to cognitive and learning failures. Since this class
of instruments is already defined by the STI perspective, possible rationales are
diverse. Rationales themselves are also defined by policy goals. For example, if
there is a goal for optimising resources in society and a need for market failure cor-
rection, a simple reduction of cost is needed. If there is a goal to create a complex
and highly functional cluster of innovative industries in some region, the policy
rationale for intervention tends to become more comprehensive and various.
Innovation and R&D instruments here cover basic and applied research and prod-
uct development. This is only a part of possible STI instruments. Product de-
velopment itself is a nuanced process which entails decisions on concept devel-
opment, supply chain design, product design, performance design and validation,
and production and launching (Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001). There can be pos-
sible rationales for intervention with even more specific instruments in all these
processes. Therefore, it is evident that possible policy domains are diverse.
Innovation and R&D instruments are not always part of STI policy, but can stem
from agricultural or regional policy domains as well. If product development is in-
volved, it can be part of developing new industries, for example, the creative arts.
Disentangling of innovation and R&D instruments is also difficult, because often
the same instruments can cover early pre-competitive development and applica-
tion or commercialisation costs. To disentangle and analyse the possible effects
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of innovation and R&D support separately, a finer distinction has to be made on
the project level.
Investment instruments mainly support the modernisation of physical capital. In
essence, these could be a fifth category of innovation and R&D instruments, but
they are so prevalent that they merit their own category. The commonality be-
tween investment and innovation and R&D instruments is their likely output.
Since process innovations are a frequently estimated type of innovations, most up-
grades of infrastructure or manufacturing machinery within the firm should yield
some improvements in working processes. Therefore, most investment instru-
ments likely yield innovations and could be counted as an innovation and R&D
instrument.
However, besides their popularity, three more considerations are in favour of es-
tablishing a distinct category. Firstly, investment instruments can be differentiated
in their scope. Their cost eligibility rules state only buying new machinery or bet-
terment of firm infrastructure, such as buildings, roads or ICT. These instruments
are aimed at purchasing investment goods, not development based on investments.
For example, investing in R&D infrastructure like laboratory equipment is an in-
vestment, not R&D itself. Secondly, most of these instruments are designed for
laggards in technology, to increase productivity based on available technology
which can be purchased. These are aimed at supplier dominated technological
trajectories (Castellacci, 2008; Pavitt, 1984). Instruments for which firms develop
their own machinery would be included in the innovation and R&D category.
Thirdly, this is not only the most popular category of instruments, but also the
most costly, especially in Central and Eastern European countries where Struc-
tural Funds are available. Transition and development economies play catch-up
with national or supranational support.
The rationale for investment instruments to subsidise private capital in the form of
machinery and equipment supposes that investments increase productivity growth
in a way that social returns are higher than private returns (De Long and Sum-
mers, 1991). De Long and Summers (1991) suggest that the relationship between
investment and productivity growth is causal, and social returns on investment are
around 30 percent per year. There is a critique that this relationship is not general
enough (Blomstrom et al., 1996), and emprical results on this topic are mixed.
There are positive findings, zero effect and mixed findings when only EU policies
are concerned (Brandsma et al., 2013). There are also findings that possibly al-
location and policy failures are at fault for the lack of positive results in capital
subsidising (Bergstro¨m, 2000).
The rationale for investment instruments in Central and Eastern Europe comes
mainly from EU stated goals of improving regional competitiveness and employ-
ment, promoting economic growth and convergence, and European territorial co-
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operation (European Commission, 2017). A full list of possible expenditures in
the EU Cohesion Policy includes 86 items from all conceivable policy domains
(Ferrara et al., 2010).
Investment instruments are diverse in policy domains. STI policies include in-
vestment instruments for firms and research facilities for innovation capabilities.
Agricultural policies include investment instruments for productivity and innova-
tion increases. Environmental policies include investment instruments for reduc-
ing waste and compliance with environmental regulations. Social policies include
investment instruments for developing infrastructure in health care facilities, ed-
ucation facilities and special need care facilities. Specific local government poli-
cies include investment instruments for local supply service infrastructure needs,
like power grid investments, water supply, long distance heating or waste treat-
ment. Regional policies include investment instruments to target specific laggard
regions. In fact, the list is endless in possibilities. For countries with an extensive
business support infrastructure, there are examples for investment instruments in
most sectors.
Examples of investment instruments are acquisition of new machinery; investment
in transport infrastructure; acquisition of environmentally friendly machinery or
waste reduction systems; investments in R&D infrastructure like laboratories or
piloting facilities; reduction of cost for utilising antiquated infrastructure; acqui-
sition of new farming infrastructure; modernisation of sea vessels for transport or
fishing; investments in ICT infrastructure; reduction of cost for purchasing elec-
tric vehicles.
Mixed support includes instruments where support activities are varied within the
instrument or are not clearly defined. Most of the instruments in this category are
early phase mixed support instruments. These are direct business support aimed
at start-ups or newly created SMEs. Early phase instruments allow for a variety
of different activities simultaneously, such as reducing cost for first product de-
velopment, acquiring some technology, marketing and visibility efforts and skills
development. At the same time, these instruments are fairly low-cost per benefi-
ciary, typically ranging around 15 000 euros. Mixed support also includes incu-
bation instruments, where firms receive several types of services at the same time.
Therefore, there is no reliable way of making sure what the actual supported ac-
tivities are to every beneficiary under these instruments. Typical examples in this
category are start-up support for newly created ventures, a lump-sum type instru-
ment, e.g. support to participate in business incubators.
New venture creation and growth relies on financing capabilities (Aghion et al.,
2007). There is a financing gap between young firms and banks and private equity
lenders (OECD, 2011), because they have no collateral and their prospects are
risky. The recent financial crisis exacerbated this gap, furthering the gap also
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between young firms and venture capital (OECD, 2011). Early stage funding
market failures come mainly from information asymmetry problems (Wilson and
Silva, 2013).
Information asymmetry is due to young firms’ inability to signal their capabili-
ties, as they have no track record and no internal funds. This may lead to social
costs where many new ventures are just not created, a so called ”missing mar-
kets” problem. Secondly, young firms have positive spill-over effects to society at
large, creating an ecosystem of entrepreneurial spirit, venture capital funding and
start-up creation. This has externalities which lead to economic growth and job
creation (Kerr et al., 2010).
There is also some evidence that small-scale support to venture creation can act
as a hidden labour market programme, which turns previously unemployed into
employed in a untypical form of single-purpose business which may be outside
the scope of labour laws (Roma´n et al., 2013). Hence, there may arise a new
market failure after mixed support instruments, which creates new forms of self-
employed who do not aspire to be entrepreneurs in the long-term. Policy goals are
usually depicted to create entrepreneurs akin to Schumpeterian market destroyers.
The implications for policy are stricter selection processes for new entrepreneurs
(Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Shane, 2009).
Mixed support instruments also involve instruments to more mature SMEs. The
services offered are similar to early phase development, but they are aimed at firms
with an already developed product or service. The general aim is to develop the
firm to a ”new competitive level”. This may include some form of technological
upgrading, training, marketing efforts or consulting. It is similar to the idea of
creating national champions, just at a very micro scale. This may also include a
national goal type effort, where firms get mixed support to develop their processes
to meet new regulatory standards. For example, to reduce waste while processing
a product, mixed support instruments can assist with training, R&D, acquisition
of machinery, idea generation or legal efforts.
Mixed support instruments, especially early phase development instruments, exist
horizontally and vertically in different policy domains. There are national devel-
opment plans for new venture creation, but also local government development
plans for fostering entrepreneurship. These instruments can be very similar in
their eligibility rules, scope and funding, but they originate from different levels
of governance. Horizontally, there are specific instruments in ICT, agriculture and
industry. Also, there are horizontally competing instruments available in social
or labour policies, where unemployed are re-trained and given initial capital to
form new ventures. If there are overlaps in geography and possible fields of ac-
tivities, beneficiaries can shop around for more relaxed rules, bigger funding and
governing bureaucracy.
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Labour support instruments are subsidies and direct monetary support for creating
new jobs and hiring workers. In labour support instruments, firms are remunerated
for hiring and maintaining labour, essentially reducing their cost of labour. Several
distinct types of instruments are within this category.
Firstly, firms are remunerated for hiring underprivileged workers. These can be
long-term unemployed, workers with disabilities or workers with special assis-
tance needs. Mostly, these instruments fall under social or regional policy do-
mains to increase labour participation generally or in specific areas.
Secondly, firms are remunerated for creating jobs. These are essentially social,
regional or industry policies to increase labour participation rates and persuade
firms to open new ventures in specific places. For example, firms can recover
50 percent of the cost of labour for 1 year in newly created jobs. A special case
of this type are sector based instruments, where firms recover part of the cost of
labour based on their amount of workers overall. For example, flag of convenience
policies provide shipping firms with direct business support based on the number
of workers on boats annually.
Third, internship and training support based on labour participation provides firms
with remuneration for some of the cost of hiring interns. There are examples based
on the number of interns hired and based on the cost of mentors.
Fourth, improving working time quality overall is a rare type of instrument whereby
firms can apply for direct support to improve the quality of working conditions by
introducing rules of conduct, ethics, support to unionisation, manuals and other
rules or guidelines. In essence, quality of working life improves when workers
are more aware of their rights, obligations and rules pertaining to their work. Im-
provements of physical infrastructure regarding working life quality does not fall
under this type of instrument.
In this category, instruments are aimed at increasing labour market participation
rates in some specific geographic areas or for some specific parts of the labour
force. Factor immobility is a classic argument of market failures. Industry and
labour immobility both have adverse effects for competitive equilibrium. How-
ever, if factors of production can freely move between firms, there may be limits
for creating competitive advantages (Peteraf, 1993). Without them, firms may
under-invest out of fear of not appropriating results.
Market failures may arise also from labour market discrimination. The crux of
the issue is whether firms pay relatively lower or higher wages to certain labour
groups based on some non-economic characteristics which do not affect labour
productivity. Therefore, if this is true, the labour market is inefficient. Total
output seems to be unaffected by standard economic models of labour discrimina-
tion, suggesting that various signalling methods like licences, education and tests
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should be enough (Cain, 1986). Still, as Cain (1986) acknowledges, many forms
of discrimination are not based on any economic reasons, thus economists may
ignore these effects.
Information externalities in labour markets refer to lack of information about
workers’ productivity. If there is non-economic discrimination towards some dis-
advantaged groups and economic discrimination towards others, it may be ben-
eficial to lower the cost of hiring. For example, long-term unemployment can
reduce workers’ overall motivation and abilities enough to create lasting effects
in reduced wages over a lifetime (Arulampalam, 2001). Disabled workers receive
smaller wages overall and have smaller labour market participation rates (Jones,
2008). If the cost of the policy is smaller than other forms of assistance for these
groups, it can increase labour market participation, increase total output and re-
duce social costs at the same time.
Financial guarantees are a form of funding assistance. They are generally a form
of indirect funding, where state actors alleviate some of the risks of private capital
raising. Policy domains are usually for entrepreneurship but can range in sector
specificity. The most common instruments provide loan guarantees and sureties to
firms when they apply for funding from commercial banks. The typical example
is guarantor services for SMEs.
A special case of instruments under financial guarantees are national insurance
instruments. These are compensations in the case of catastrophic events, loss of
agricultural yield due to wildlife, and loss while hosting major cultural events. A
typical example is remuneration to beekeepers for bear damage.
This is similar to market failure in regard to new venture creation. There are in-
formation asymmetries in signalling capabilities, so financial markets are not able
to assess risks with enough due diligence. The public sector therefore provides
guarantees to cover some of the costs, thereby negating some risks.
Direct subsidy or operating aid instruments are cash transfers for specific, often
national, goals. Two types of instruments are categorised together. The first is
regarding instruments where business support is not tied to any specific activity,
but is based on the output of the firm, meaning that the aim of direct support is
to boost the possible output in quantity. This can be, for example, direct business
support to other agencies providing some sort of treatment to firms. They can
use this money in their day-to-day activities, but there is no expectation that they
will change their behaviour because of it. Therefore, it is a direct subsidy to
their budget, and no treatment effect is expected. Typical examples are NGOs
that provide training to workers, support to creating or maintaining professional
associations, and support to NGOs through the EU LEADER scheme which acts
as a local liaison.
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Secondly, firms that are acting on behalf of some specific national interests can
receive direct subsidies to reduce the cost of their operations. At the same time,
they do not demand any upgrade in service quality, innovativeness or productivity.
A typical example is remuneration for post firms to operate last-mile routes, and
direct support to regional airports to cover their operating costs.
Policy domains are mixed in this category. Often, specific instruments are cre-
ated for one-time instruments based on firms’ and current needs. Operating aid
can often be found in areas where private firms do not wish to operate and state
enterprises fulfil national goals.
The second category of direct subsidies to firms should entail some qualities of
public goods or quasi public goods. There is no need to go into details in this paper
about whether some typical examples in this category such as postal services or
infrastructure projects should be privatised. There are good arguments on both
sides. What is relevant, though, is that this type of direct support to businesses is
often observable in an accounting perspective. How these finances are earmarked
or made available for use is based on auctions or other mechanisms specific to
certain fields. For example, in support to local airports, there is hardly a case for
auctioning to build new ones. For postal services, many regions are bundled and
auctioned separately.
The first category is more interesting as a business support subsidy. In general, this
is a type of demand-side policy instrument where public sector procures services
to be handed out in society. Evidently, there are market failures involved, since
the public sector needs to offer these services. The question is whether these
services were provided before to firms with a higher price or were not provided
at all. In the former case, this is a reduction in price to overcome some market
failures, such as information asymmetry or externalities. This depends solely on
the project involved. In the latter case, there is a problem of missing markets.
These services were not provided in this region at all.
In any case, this category mostly falls under the unobservable path in Figure 3.2
if we wish to understand business support. Often the recipients of direct subsidies
are treatment providers. We can be aware that some business service is provided,
but we are not aware of who actually benefits.
To conclude, all 113 policy instruments which were analysed have been classified
into these 10 categories. A summary is presented in Table 3.1 on page 67. Natu-
rally, some of these are much more popular among firms and widely used, while
others are rare. The same goes for their costs, as all categories are dwarfed by
investment instruments.
It is evident that direct business support instruments can have interaction effects
between different possible supported activities. It is also evident that firms can be
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a beneficiary in multiple instruments at the same time. This is especially apparent
when policy domains are overlapping, policy goals are supposedly achieved with
similar instruments, and when firms are opportunistic while shopping for state aid.
To understand whether these policy instruments have any effect on firm behaviour,
we have to rule out possible altering effects from other instruments. In most em-
pirical papers about policy instrument treatment effects, there may be a serious
case for omitted variable bias. The number of possible policy domains that should
be covered and datasets simultaneously compared is large.
A simple investigation within the dataset analysed here revealed the existence
of firms that received business support simultaneously, in at least 5 categories
of this taxonomy within the span of two years. Further research will uncover
details on firm preferences and the types of instruments most likely to be applied
to concurrently.
The small descriptions given above about possible policy domains and governance
levels suggest that there may be many interaction effects at play on the policy level
as well. For instance, for early phase, mixed support, there are many policy level
interactions possible where a single firm in a specific region could fund its new
venture from four different funds simultaneously.
These interaction effects can come from STI, agricultural and environmental projects,
and so forth. Simultaneously, they can come from all possible levels of govern-
ment, from local to supranational. Firm behaviour can be altered by incentives to
reduce waste or energy use, which can be subsidised by environmental policy in-
struments. These effects are still visible as possible process innovations, but they
are not part of formal STI policy. Therefore, our own scope as researchers should
be broader when considering policies that alter innovation performance. This is
especially true if we wish to investigate possible treatment effects empirically with
real world data.
The classification analysed and presented here will be used as a basis for empirical
analysis in further chapters. Without creating this classification, more than 90%
of policy instruments would have been within one overarching category if wider
taxonomies of innovation policy instruments found in the literature would have
been used. The classification created here highlights some of the differences that
can be found in the realm of direct business support and grants, where firms are
direct beneficiaries.
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3.4. Evolution of entrepreneurship and innovation
policies in Estonia
In this section, I will give a brief overview of public support to private business in
Estonia between 2002 and 2012. As already discussed in Section 3.1, STI policies
can be wide in their policy domains, covering many other policy fields as well or
have overlaps. In the relevant literature, scholars usually talk about STI policies
or innovation policy in general. In policy documents and national development
plans, policy makers might have opted to call it something else. Therefore, I will
introduce the evolution of innovation policy in Estonia and how relevant policy in-
struments have changed. These instruments have been within different policy do-
mains and are found in different development plans enacted concurrently. These
are the main development plans which are responsible for instruments that have
been classified in Section 3.3.
A brief description of the evolution of these instruments and development plans
will also clarify why we see more intensive use of instruments in latter periods,
and also why the range of instruments have become wider during latter periods.
Results from the data can be found in Section 4.2.
In this section, I will emphasise the evolution of policy and instruments which is
aimed directly to firms. As in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, the focus is on instru-
ments for which firms are beneficiaries. Instruments aimed at other actors in the
innovation system or institutions are mentioned only briefly.
Main development plans related to public support of firms and fostering entrepreneur-
ship are shown in Figure 3.3. These are the main policy documents responsible
for economic growth and entrepreneurship policy. Estonia’s knowledge-based de-
velopment plans include R&D and higher-education policies.
Estonia joined the EU in 2004. Access to EU Structural Funds, and inclusion to
Cohesion Policy and Common Agricultural Policy meant that new development
plans had to be created. This is the reason most development plans end in 2006
and start again in 2007. They are aligned with EU programming periods for easier
operation with policy funding.
The first relevant national development plan is found in the general principles
of the Estonian export policy2, ratified in the Parliament in 2001 (Riigikogu,
2001a). This development plan set the stage for many other economic growth
or entrepreneurship support plans in the future. The general principles of the Es-
tonian export policy emphasised the need for high-tech exports and support for
SMEs. Therefore, there should be some sort of picking winners strategy for spe-
cific sectors, and large firms are not the focus of the policy.
2 Eesti ekspordipoliitika po˜hialused.
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Figure 3.3: Main Estonian development plans related to public support for firms.
Two main policy instruments are put forth: export guarantee programs and export
support programs. The first is a national insurance program for importer defaults.
The second is support for visiting trade fairs, developing export plans, consultancy
in finding new markets, visiting trade fairs, export promotion events, and other
similar instruments. These are fairly low-cost and aimed at promotions or skill
development. Low brand recognition of Estonia and Estonian products and lack
of skills in exporting are two main obstacles for entrepreneurship highlighted in
the first export policy development plan.
The first entrepreneurship policy development plan3 was an SME policy (MKM,
2002). The main goals are to foster an entrepreneurial spirit, new job creation
and increase competitiveness, all mixed with balanced regional development. The
main focus is on SMEs, and there will be no discrimination between business
sectors. It can be said that there have been attempts to pick business sectors in
Estonia that are to be nationally developed as champions, but there has never
been any political consensus long enough for it to stick. Many development plans
indicate that there should be a focus on high value-added sectors or high-tech, but
it has rarely been enforced on the policy instrument level.
The SME plan had two focus areas which are relevant here — human resource
development and development of financing capabilities. Three other focuses are
3 Ettevo˜tlik Eesti. Eesti va¨ike- ja keskmise suurusega ettevo˜tete arendamisele suunatud riiklik poli-
itika 2002-2006.
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dealt with infrastructure development for entrepreneurship, awareness campaigns
and reduction of bureaucracy.
Still, the main obstacles are lack of capital and skills. Human resource develop-
ment instruments included consultancy instruments and training instruments. Fi-
nancing development included guarantees for SMEs, new venture creation assis-
tance (lump-sum), investment aid and additional assistance to high-risk projects.
The latter instrument never materialised in reality.
The first R&D and innovation (RDI) policy is called Knowledge-based Estonia4
(Riigikogu, 2001b). RDI policy set forth two major goals — advancing the knowl-
edge base and increasing the competitiveness of firms. Key business sectors or
areas in focus were user-experience driven IT solutions, bio-medicine and mate-
rial technologies. This was also the first time when Parliament ratified a goal to
increase total spending on R&D to 1.5% of GDP (from ca 0.75%). The aim was
to first increase public spending on R&D in order to stimulate private spending on
R&D. Current total spending on R&D in Estonia is at 1.3% (2017).
Most instruments in the RDI policy were aimed at the public sector, specifically to
public universities. Funding was provided for infrastructure, machinery, collabo-
ration networks, etc. For firms, the major instrument was co-financing for R&D
projects. All other instruments aimed at firms were really indirect, for example,
awareness campaigns for innovative activities or training of university R&D staff
for spin-offs, collaboration and industry needs.
This is the first period for policies in Estonia that had a solid development plan
behind them and had specific goals and instruments put forth. Before these, most
instruments were haphazard and divided between a large number of public sec-
tor foundations. A foundation reform also took place during this era and gathered
most policy instruments into two main bodies for entrepreneurship support — En-
terprise Estonia (EAS) and KredEx. The former deals with support instruments,
the latter with financial guarantees.
Estonia had a relatively small budget at this time for public support. Before the
era of EU funding, there were not many instruments, and there was not much
to hand out. All the instruments mentioned here, which were directly aimed at
firms, had a total budget of less than 13 million euros between 2001 and 2004
(Praxis, 2007). That covers the R&D projects, new venture creation, consultancy
and training instruments and export development programs. Financial guarantees
had a total of about 83 million euros during the same period (Praxis, 2007).
4 Teadmistepo˜hine Eesti. Eesti teadus- ja arendustegevuse strateegia 2002-2006.
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After the EU accession, Structural Funds became available in Estonia. To access
this funding, Estonia created a national development plan5 (Eesti Vabariik, 2003).
This laid out plans for all policy areas where EU funds could be used including
economic affairs, social affairs, environment and agriculture.
Entrepreneurship policy combined both entrepreneurship instruments from the
SME policy and RDI instruments from Knowledge-based Estonia. There were
not many additions to the instruments themselves, but the availability of EU fund-
ing increased the budget significantly. If before 2004 these instruments received in
total about 13 million euros, then between 2004 and 2006 the budget was around
97 million (of which 73 million was from the European Regional Development
Fund).
Table 3.3: First period of Estonian entrepreneurship and RDI policy instruments
(2002-2006)
Activities promoted Instruments
Business development Aid for new venture creation; Consultancy & training;
Export plans & market research; Awareness campaigns
for entrepreneurship
Business infrastructure
development
Establishing business incubators; Physical infrastructure
Promotion of RDI R&D project co-financing; Research centres; R&D in-
frastructure and technology transfer; Awareness cam-
paigns for innovation
Tourism New product development; Marketing support; State pro-
motion
Note: Instruments whose beneficiaries are not firms themselves are in italic.
Source: (Eesti Vabariik, 2003)
The first period of instruments is summed up in Table 3.3. The main instruments
are: lump-sum aid for new venture creation, consultancy and training; export
plans and market research support; R&D project co-financing; and product de-
velopment and marketing support for tourism companies. There are some cases
where firms also get investment aid, but these are under physical infrastructure
instruments, e.g. new facilities or communications in or near the factory, or R&D
infrastructure, where it is possible to buy new machinery or technology. However,
in this period, the latter is not very common.
There were some policy goals to increase networking at the time as well. How-
ever, all instruments were geared strictly towards public research institutions and
universities, for them to increase their knowledge base and become more attrac-
5 Eesti riiklik arengukava Euroopa Liidu struktuurifondide kasutuselevo˜tuks - U¨htne programm-
dokument 2004-2006. (Eesti k. tuntud kui riiklik arengukava ehk RAK).
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tive in turn as a partner to the private sector. The general aim of these policies was
to increase the competitiveness of firms and increase employment. By competi-
tiveness, it is implied that Estonian firms will become better at exporting, which is
supposedly the main source of economic growth. The period from 2001 has been
the first time since Estonia started to have a co-ordinated entrepreneurship policy
with strategic aims, governmental support and initiative (Kuura, 2006). However,
it still remains mostly an SME policy.
In 2005, the European Council approved the Growth and Jobs Strategy, where
EU heads of state agreed that each Member State should create an action plan
to promote economic growth and job creation. In Estonia, this was called the
Action Plan for Growth and Jobs 2005-2007 for the implementation of the Lis-
bon Strategy6 (Eesti Vabariik, 2005). It was mostly a continuation of previous
development plans without much progress. The main arguments were still lack
of access to capital and lack of entrepreneurial skills, and the main focus was on
SMEs.
In general, the Action Plan focused more on the instruments that involve other
actors and institutions in the innovation system, such as higher education, science
base, entrepreneurial spirit and awareness, demand of skills, etc. The Action Plan
was also much more optimistic than reality has proven to be. For example, the
document as accepted by the Estonian government declares that public expendi-
ture on R&D shall exceed 1 percent of GDP in five years and 1.2 percent of GDP
in 10 years. The public expenditure of R&D in Estonia was around 0.4 percent of
GDP at the time.
From the Action Plan where this goal is stated: ”The guiding principle of the gov-
ernment has been to set realistic and achievable goals and guarantee their fulfil-
ment. Therefore, its goals are based on conservative estimates” (Eesti Vabariik,
2005, p. 25). During this time, there was very high economic growth and opti-
mism. This is visible even in national strategic documents. In reality, Estonia has
never reached the 1 percent goal of public spending on R&D. This indicates that
some of the planned instruments and budgets were actually never allocated. Some
instruments never opened, even if they were put forth in development plans.
To sum up, the first period of instruments started to develop from the early 2000s
and continue without much changes until 2007. There was a slow increase in
funding during this period, and the portfolio of instruments slowly grew wider, as
policymakers developed them. Most of them had their first rounds around 2002
and 2003. After 2004, when EU funds became widely available, budgets increased
substantially.
6 Eesti majanduskasvu ja to¨o¨ho˜ive tegevuskava 2005–2007 Lissaboni strateegia rakendamiseks.
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The second period of policies in Estonia all started with 2007 to match the EU
programming periods for funding. The main development plan is the Estonian
Entrepreneurship Policy 2007-20137 (MKM, 2006). This policy was developed
further in 2010 under the same name8. The RDI policies were in the Knowledge-
based Estonia development plan9 (HTM, 2007).
In addition, there were four development plans which were written to conform
with EU rules to access EU funding. This was very important at the time, since
the national budget had limited possibilities. These were the Estonian National
Strategic Reference Framework10 (Eesti Vabariik, 2007d) and the operational pro-
grammes for human resource development (Eesti Vabariik, 2007b), economic en-
vironment (Eesti Vabariik, 2007c), and the living environment (Eesti Vabariik,
2007a)11. These development plans set forth how most instruments were funded
that are described as a national policy.
The main barriers for entrepreneurs were relatively similiar to the previous pe-
riod (MKM, 2006). Firms, especially new ventures, lack access to finance, while
entrepreneurs lack skills to innovate and internationalise. Lack of cooperation
between firms as a possible barrier to growth was recognized as a new concept,
although system instruments to support cooperation ventures did not follow at
first.
The main instruments for Estonian entrepreneurship policy between 2007 and
2013 were continuations and developments of previous ones: trainings and skill
development; consultancy; access to capital through loans, guarantees or lump-
sum support for SMEs and new ventures; and export planning, market research
instruments, marketing instruments for exports, and business missions.
Furthermore, the 2007-2013 period budget was significantly higher than the pre-
vious period. There were a few new instruments available to firms which became
the most important ones in Estonia. To support technological catch-up, there was
an understanding that not only entrepreneurs need to know what is possible (con-
sultancy and training), but they also need a boost in acquiring new technology.
Old investment instruments provided support for certain infrastructure near firms,
such as communications or access. New investment instruments provided support
to acquire new technology or machinery.
7 Eesti ettevo˜tluspoliitika 2007-2013.
8 I thank Kaupo Reede from the Ministry of Economic Affairs for pointing this out and providing
both versions from their archive.
9 Teadmistepo˜hine Eesti 2007-2013, vahel Teadmistepo˜hine Eesti II.
10Riiklik struktuurivahendite kasutamise strateegia 2007-2013.
11Inimressursi arendamise rakenduskava 2007-2013, majanduskeskkonna arendamise rakenduskava
2007-2013, elukeskkonna arendamise rakenduskava 2007-2013.
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The second major change was that entrepreneurship policy was no longer an SME
policy. Most of the budget went to support internationalisation, acquisition of
new technology and training instruments, which were available to all firms. The
target group for a lot of the instruments therefore became wider. Often, the same
instruments had several calls and separate budget allocations to cater to SMEs and
large firms separately.
Knowledge-based Estonia developed RDI instruments simultaneously. The main
goals for firms were aligned with the entrepreneurship policy — higher produc-
tivity and more exports. The latter is still seen as the source for economic growth.
Compared with the previous RDI policy, public sector research facilities and uni-
versities are now seen as competent enough to cater to entrepreneurs. The focus
for entrepreneurs has shifted more towards co-operation support with universities,
both local and international, and support for applied research. Some instruments
continued from the previous period, such as support for R&D projects, spin-offs,
creation of business incubators and research centres, and some new instruments
were also created. These include: support for hiring or training R&D personnel;
consultancy and firm diagnostics instruments; awareness and training in intellec-
tual property rights; market research for new technology; business cluster support;
seed-funding and early-phase support for technology-intensive start-ups; and fi-
nally, acquisition, testing and prototyping new technology.
Instruments in the entrepreneurship policy and RDI policy had some overlaps and
catered to the same target group. In general, there was a widening of instruments,
as many more new activities were funded. Also, the target group was wider than
in the previous era.
The Estonian National Strategic Reference Framework which indicated how EU
Structural Funds were planned in the programming period 2007-2013 was aligned
with the Estonian entrepreneurship policy and Knowledge-based Estonia pro-
gramme in full. The barriers for entrepreneurship highlighted were all the same
as can be found in other programmes. Subsequently, the instruments described
were the same as well. Estonia’s policymakers figured that if these documents are
aligned, national policy can be made with EU funding.
The policies involved in these programmes targeted new business sectors as well
during the second period, such as sectoral targeting for the creative industries
(Eesti Vabariik, 2007c). Instruments were designed to promote new ventures,
innovations, marketing and awareness of entrepreneurship in creative industries.
The operational programme for human resource development (Eesti Vabariik,
2007b) detailed instruments involving hiring, training, skill development and con-
sultancy. Foundations had been laid in the entrepreneurship policy and RDI pol-
icy plans. More activities were now involved with the supply side as well, such as
76
instruments to develop consultancy programs themselves and train better consul-
tants.
The third pillar of programs from the era, the operational programme for the de-
velopment of living environment (Eesti Vabariik, 2007a), had less direct support
to firms. Since the third pillar contains also local municipal infrastructure invest-
ments for resource efficiency, we can observe some of the effects in the data of this
thesis. These are essentially investment instruments where the main goal is bet-
ter resource management, better waste management or other types of efficiency.
Firms that are beneficiaries can be seen as purchasers of new technology. Thus,
these instruments are parallel to the entrepreneurship policy instruments where
firms acquire new machinery and new technology.
Table 3.4: Second period of Estonian entrepreneurship and RDI policy instru-
ments (2007-2013)
Activities promoted Instruments
Capabilities and skill de-
velopment
trainings; skill development; consultancy; internship sup-
port; management training programs; mentoring pro-
grams; awareness campaigns
Investments SME grants; loan guarantees; micro-loans to SMEs; in-
vestment support for new-technology and machinery ac-
quisition; infrastructure investment support
Internationalisation export guarantees; business missions; export planning
and marketing; industry-fair visits; market research; sup-
port for business networks; state promotion; FDI promo-
tion
RDI R&D project support; acquisition of new technology;
promotion of spin-offs; research centres; awareness
campaigns; cluster programmes; R&D co-operation pro-
grams
Sector specific tourism product development and marketing support;
new venture and innovation programs in creative indus-
tries; state promotion; awareness campaigns
Note: Instruments where beneficiaries are not firms themselves are in italic.
Source: Eesti Vabariik (2007a,b,c,d, 2008) and MKM (2006, 2010)
The second Action Plan for Growth and Jobs12 for the period 2008-2011 was also
created (Eesti Vabariik, 2008). It lists 6 goals for the development of entrepreneur-
ship and innovation. However, they are a rehash of policies and instruments al-
ready described in the Estonian entrepreneurship policy, Knowledge-based Esto-
nia and the National Strategic Reference Framework. Almost all instruments de-
scribed therein are also planned to operate between 2008 and 2013, which spans
12Eesti majanduskasvu ja to¨o¨ho˜ive kava 2008 - 2011 Lissaboni strateegia rakendamiseks.
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outside the development plan itself anyway. A positive aspect of the Action Plan
is that it further codifies the main policies and instruments.
Table 3.4 highlights the portfolio of direct business support in Estonia for the
period 2007-2013. The portfolio has become wider, it has significantly larger
budget, and it caters to a wider target group of firms. As can be seen, many of the
instruments have continued from the first wave. Barriers and possible solutions
have remained relatively stable since 2004.
Outside assesors to the entrepreneurship and RDI policy pointed out some poten-
tial problems during these periods as well. Estonian R&D funding had duplication
issues, where two different councils both promoted similar projects, thereby cre-
ating fragmentation issues (Nedeva and Georghiou, 2003). This created potential
bridging problems between basic research and applied research funding. Both
councils were united only in 2012 into the Estonian Research Council.
By 2007, a shift from the supply of R&D to strengthening the demand of R&D
by private firms is suggested (Polt et al., 2007). However, many of the suggested
policy instruments never manifested. Still, the shift from undersupply of public
research capabilities to attention to private firm capabilities was noted. This is
also clearly seen in the type of instruments deployed afterwards.
To conclude the overview of Estonian entrepreneurship policy and RDI policy in-
struments between 2001 and 2013, there can be made a few summarising points.
Firstly, the core set of instruments have been relatively stable over this time.
Secondly, there has been a shift from SME financial support to business devel-
opment in the form of investment support and growth (capabilities and recruit-
ment) support (Ma¨nnik et al., 2011). Possible financing mechanisms have been
diverse throughout the period. There are loans and loan guarantees available, di-
rect lump-sum support, and also indirect support to intermediaries for business
services (Ma¨nnik et al., 2011). Finally, a vast increase in the budget allocated to
the instruments can be seen throughout these years.
I believe this overview of entrepreneurship and innovation policies in Estonia pro-
vides enough insight to make it clear how the classification created in Section 3.3
came to be. Policy instruments available in Estonia have become as diverse during
this period as can be seen from the classification. Data and examples of uptake is
in Section 4.2.
A final note remains to be made on entrepreneurship and innovation policies re-
garding agricultural policies. These have been concurrent to the policies described
here. Two development plans are relevant during this era — the Special Acces-
sion Programme Agriculture Rural Development (SAPARD) 2000-2006, Rural
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Development Programme 2007-201313. I have opted not to include these in the
overview here for three reasons. First, Estonian entrepreneurship policy acknowl-
edges the existence of rural development plans, but their goals are not aligned,
and development plans have little overlap. Second, there is little overlap between
firms in both policies. Third, the firms in the sample used in this thesis do not in-
clude agricultural businesses, policy instruments from the rural development plans
are basically not observed. For these reasons, the inclusion of policies aimed at
developing agricultural businesses seems to be excessive in this thesis and would
create more confusion than understanding of the issues at hand.
3.5. Interaction between public support and firm
innovation process
Section 2.6 concluded with how the innovation process within the firm can take
place along with its relationship with the innovation system. Public support to
firms aims to remove some barriers in order for this process to take place, or
at least accelerate it. Therefore, most innovation policy instruments are also di-
rected towards some specific actions within this innovation process. This section
describes what aspects of the innovation process within the firm are affected by
the instruments categorised into a classification based on supported activities.
In general, it is possible to describe three types of additionality of policy instru-
ments - input, output and behavioural additionality (Buisseret et al., 1995). In-
vestigations into input additionality examine whether public policy instruments
have the effect of generating or increasing inputs to the innovation process, such
as R&D expenditure (Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013a, 2014). Input addi-
tionality evaluates whether policy intervention creates inputs that would no be
there otherwise. Output additionality examines whether public policy instruments
increase or generate outputs in the innovation process, e.g. increased innova-
tiveness (Czarnitzki and Delanote, 2015, 2017; Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2018).
Measured innovation outputs are generally patents, innovations (products and ser-
vices), revenue from innovations, etc.
Behavioural additionality deals with differences in the behaviour of firms after
intervention (Buisseret et al., 1995; Falk, 2007). It is not a very specifically
defined concept, and it can range from instant on-off changes of behaviour to
long-term persistent change in R&D and innovation activities (Go¨k and Edler,
2011). Georghiou and Clarysse (2006) differentiate between strategic and opera-
tional behavioural additionality. In this thesis, most of the data used is more on
the strategic level of innovative activities according to this model, but these levels
13SAPARD - liitumiseelne programm esimese Maaelu Arengukava koostamiseks, ja¨rgnes Maaelu
Arengukava (MAK).
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are not differentiated. It would create another layer of complexity to the inves-
tigation of dynamics of firm innovation strategies that has limited payoff. Go¨k
and Edler (2011) also separate evaluations of behavioural additionality into four
categories based on coverage and persistence. The topics covered in this thesis
are related most closely to their third category, which covers both R&D activities
and innovation activities in general and looks at the persistence of effects.
An overview of results from different OECD countries suggests that there are
positive effects to company behaviour after government R&D funding (OECD,
2006). Positive changes include more willingness to collaborate with external
partners, changes to commerical strategies, long-term R&D strategy planning and
execution, and subsequent and extended innovation activities beyond the initial
project.
To describe the possible effects of policy instruments, the concept presented in
Chapter 2, Figure 2.1 is used as a basis. Since there are many different types of
policy instruments included in the taxonomy created in this chapter, the model is
redrawn in a different form to facilitate the addition of policy instruments. The
underlying concept is the same but repurposed. The final result is presented in
Figure 3.4 on page 83, which shows the possible effect of innovation policy in-
struments as a description of inputs, i.e. what type of input the policy instrument
is to the innovation process. Further investigation into this process will look at
both outputs of this process (Chapter 7) and behavioural changes (Chapters 8 and
9).
There are four major areas of the innovation process in this model which can be
influenced by policy instruments. These are within the firm, in interfaces with
existing knowledge outside the firm, with the micro-environment and the macro-
environment.
Training and skill development and labour support instruments are the only in-
struments shown to affect the innovation process solely within the firm. These
instruments raise the level of expertise of workers and management for better
performance of the innovation process. That is not to say that these instruments
cannot have an effect that is also linked with other actors in the end, but rather
these instruments train people to perform better themselves. With labour support,
it is the reduction of personnel cost that can aid in any within-firm process.
Innovation and R&D, mixed support, and marketing and export promotion instru-
ments all influence the firm and the interface at the same time. Mixed support
instruments offer both training and skill development type activities, and also link
firms with best practices from others. For example, in incubators, firms are taught
new skills, but they are also networking with others to gain knowledge about pos-
sible paths for growth.
80
Innovation and R&D and marketing and export promotion instruments are both
also on the fringes between a within-firm type of instrument and creating interface
links. They are differentiated by what interfaces they operate on, one for external
R&D knowledge and the other for marketing knowledge.
Collaboration programmes are an interface promoting instruments mostly in the
R&D part. In innovation policies, they aim to bring together industry and academia
in general. Business cluster instruments could be operating in more interfaces than
R&D, since they aim to enhance co-operation between industry competitors. Pos-
sible benefits are also stronger marketing efforts and exchange of best practices.
Consultancy instruments are a good example of a policy that promotes the inter-
face between the firm and existing knowledge. In Figure 3.4, consultancy instru-
ments are duplicated in every interface. There are examples of teaching about best
practices for management, marketing, export markets, design, technology, supply
chains, etc. In essence, consultants can be used in all possible business areas.
Investments and direct subsidies forge a direct link with the micro-environment
by creating incentives to engage with other actors, mostly suppliers of new tech-
nology and machinery. These instruments provide new investments to the firm by
which the innovation process within the firm also changes. For example, a new
machine for production also changes the work process as a result. However, the
main link is through relationships with the micro-environment.
Direct subsidies can also have within-firm effects by creating new processes with-
out investments, for example, when there are open calls for services which the
firm did not offer before. With direct subsidies as a financial incentive, firms can
begin to provide these new services to the market without outside assistance.
Financial guarantees are a type of instrument that alleviates market failures within
the larger financial system. Therefore, they operate on the boundary of the in-
novation process by reducing information asymmetry costs for capital providers.
This is the only type of instrument where firms are direct beneficiaries, but the
possible direct effect involves the whole firm. In essence, we have no indication
on which part of the innovation process the additional capital has been allocated,
but we can only estimate that firms receive financial means that were not available
before.
As Figure 3.4 indicates, innovation policy instruments are inputs to the innovation
process. With the classification created in this thesis, it is possible to look at the
different possible influence mechanisms. However, the link from inputs to outputs
is not so clear. For example, which should be the possible outputs from investment
instruments? Section 7 provides some insight on the issue.
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Finally, the classification created here and the detailed description of the inno-
vation process should provide enough understanding of the possible choices for
the firm for empirical estimation. Further chapters in this thesis take both of these
concepts into account and estimate possible relationships between innovation pol-
icy instruments and firm innovation strategies.
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4. DATA
The data used in this dissertation is gathered from various sources for an in-depth
analysis of the complex relationship between innovativeness, business activities
and public support. Data about innovative activities comes from the Community
Innovation Survey (CIS), data about public support from several public agencies
and public registries, data about firm appropriation tactics from the Patent Office,
and data about firm fiscal statement from the Business Register. All datasets are
matched by their respective firm specific ID. All datasets are discussed in turn;
their caveats, complementarities and benefits. An overview of all datasets and
their sources is shown in Table 4.1
Emprical observations in this dissertation cover Estonian firms between 2002 and
2012, both years inclusive. Altogether, 3502 firms are analysed in an unbalanced
panel data setting. The core dataset about firm innovativeness has been gathered
by Statistics Estonia and is representative of the population of Estonian firms.
Table 4.1: Overview of datasets and their sources used in this thesis
Information Data Period Data source
Innovative activities, inputs
and outputs, knowledge
sources, etc.
Community
Innovation
Survey (CIS)
2002-2012
(5 surveys)
Statistics Estonia
Policy instrument support full register 2003-2015 Enterprise Estonia
Policy instrument support full register 2001-2013 Agricultural Regis-
ters and Information
Board
Policy instrument support full register 2004-2015 Structural Funds reg-
ister
Policy instrument support full register 2007-2016 State Aid Register
Intellectual property rights full register 1993-2015 Estonian Patent Of-
fice
Annual report data for firms Annual
reports
1994-2014 Estonian Business
Register
4.1. Community Innovation Survey
There are two widely used methods to investigate firm innovative behaviour that
also include outputs, i.e. innovations themselves. The first method is to use
patenting data, which is readily available from local or international patenting
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offices. As with everything, patenting data has strengths and weaknesses. An
overview of the positive and negative arguments has been made by Smith (2005)
and Kleinknecht and Reinders (2012).
Positively, patenting data has a rich history, dating back more than a century by
now. Patents are usually granted for promising new technologies with commercial
application, i.e. innovations. Patents also systematically document underlying
technologies and include citations to other patents and scientific works which can
be used in a bibliographic analysis.
The downsides of patenting data are related to what can actually be patented.
Patents rely heavily on inventions. They can be without any commercial success
or current application, meaning that they should not be considered innovations as
such. Patents are widely used in some sectors but not used in others at all. For
example, patenting activity in software based solutions is low, because the speed
of progress is too fast to rely on patenting rights. Patents can also be used as a
strategy to hinder the progress of the competition. In general, patents are not a
sure indicator of progress and economic significance to any firm.
The second widely used data for investigating innovations is survey data. Subject
and object approaches can be distinguished (Smith, 2005). The object approach
identifies formidable innovations through some external mechanism and surveys
firms about their innovative behaviour. The most famous example in the relevant
literature is the SPRU database (Townsend, 1981). It covers approximately 4000
major innovations in the UK between 1945 and 1983. They used a panel of ex-
perts from various fields to identify innovations and surveyed information about
sources of knowledge, types of innovation, links with other industries and so forth.
This type of data collection is rare and not widely available. In addition, innova-
tions must be somewhat significant in society for experts to name them worthy of
inclusion, leaving out many incremental innovations (Smith, 2005). Results from
this approach are still relevant, albeit the original method is difficult to replicate.
The subject approach relies on firm-level activity and details information about
general innovation inputs and outputs, such as R&D, knowledge base, innovation
types and financing (Smith, 2005). This is the survey type used in this thesis.
The CIS is arguably the most used survey about innovative activities in the world,
at least in the EU. It is a standardised survey, coordinated by Eurostat and car-
ried out by all Member States plus Norway and Iceland1. The CIS is part of
the EU science and technology statistics designed to survey innovative activity in
enterprises. All the questions are harmonised between Member States for com-
1 Further information can be read from the Eurostat website https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/
microdata/community-innovation-survey
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parability, and relevant materials are published in the Oslo Manual (2005). Data
from the CIS is also used as one part of the European Innovation Scoreboard.
The CIS surveys firms about relevant inputs and outputs of innovative activities.
There have been 9 waves of the CIS in Europe so far. Over these waves, the survey
has been modified to clarify definitions, while some topics have been added and
others removed. In addition, there is a special section in every wave designed to
investigate some aspect of the innovative process. Recent examples are the role
of design in innovative activities and the role of different appropriation methods.
The most relevant dimensions which are surveyed in the CIS are:
• Expenditure on activities related to innovation, e.g. acquisition of machin-
ery, R&D, training & skills development, design, etc.
• Types of innovation, different output configurations, e.g. are these product
or process innovations, new products or services, new to the local market or
new to the world, marketing and organisational innovations
• Sources of knowledge, e.g. suppliers, clients, universities, etc.
• Collaboration partners, e.g. within the group, clients, suppliers, etc.
• Strategy in developing innovations, goals and barriers, e.g. cost reduction,
market penetration, etc.
• Financial data, public support, size, firm position in a group, etc.
The CIS is not free of criticism. It is a self-reported survey, it does not survey
non-innovative firms, and it is based on technological innovations.
Self-reported surveys rely on the respondent to answer truthfully without any aid
from the researchers. Their cues are only what is written down on the question-
naire. Therefore, there can be bias in answers in self-reported surveys (Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2001). People are influenced by the way questions are formu-
lated2. Even the order of answer lists might influence results. Furthermore, there
is social desirability bias, whereby people have a tendency to answer in a way they
believe the researchers or the wider audience would like them to, which serves a
desire to fit in. Lastly, self-reported surveys may lack coherency from the same
respondents. The measured outcome of some surveyed attitude can be relatively
unstable in a short period.
The CIS does not survey firms which have not innovated very well. Firms that
respond that they have not had any innovations or cancelled projects on innova-
tions can skip most of the survey. The CIS is designed in a way that all questions
2 A whole range of studies have been devoted to this in the behavioural economics field, see also
Kahneman (2011) and Thaler and Sunstein (2009)
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are in the context of innovative activities. For example, the question about coop-
eration with possible partners is phrased like this: ”did your enterprise co-operate
on any of your innovation activities with other enterprises or institutions?” This
means that we are missing a counterfactual in the survey. Firms that cooperate
with partners, while believing that they do so in a context that is not innovative,
are missing from our responses. Therefore, we can investigate whether firms that
believe themselves to be innovative are cooperating with partners, but we can not
investigate whether firms that are cooperating with partners are innovative. One
solution to this problem is to add external data from other sources which reliably
covers the sample. Then we can also investigate whether some type of activities
also correlate with firms who believe themselves to be innovative. The reverse
condition is always true. If we observe that innovative firms never cooperate, we
can argue that innovative firms are not correlated with cooperation. However, such
conditions are rare to exist.
The CIS relies on a definition of innovations which is more technology based
(Smith, 2005). Since the CIS is also evolving, the definitions have laxed a bit over
different waves. Smith (2005) brings forth an example from the second CIS car-
ried out in 19963. The definition of innovations is following: “Technological in-
novations comprise implemented technologically new products and processes and
significant technological improvements in products and processes”. Furthermore,
new products and improvements are also described in a manner which emphasises
technological upgrade.
Since then, CIS 3 already made changes that can include less technology heavy
innovations and it has continued since. In this thesis, CIS 4 (2002-2004) until
CIS2012 (2010-2012) is used. Therefore, examples are brought from those. In
CIS 4, the general definition of innovations is following: “A product innovation
is the market introduction of a new good or service or a significantly improved
good or service with respect to its capabilities, such as improved software, user
friendliness, components or sub-systems” (Eurostat, 2004, p. 4). It is self-evident
that the CIS has reduced its technology heavy definition over time to include a
somewhat more vague definition of innovations. The Oslo Manual (2005) justi-
fies that this definition tries to encompass all sorts of innovations, whether they
are clearly defined projects with a single significant change or a series of small
incremental changes. In the latest CIS used in this thesis, CIS2012 , the definition
used is following: “A product innovation is the market introduction of a new or
significantly improved good or service with respect to its capabilities, user friend-
liness, components or sub-systems” (Eurostat, 2012). These are rather similar and
comparable.
3 Unfortunately, I am unable to find a copy of the original CIS 2. Estonian CIS waves start from
CIS 3.
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The CIS surveys firms fully if they have done or continue doing product and pro-
cess innovations. Organisational and marketing innovations are also surveyed, but
most of the questionnaire can be skipped for them. This also contributes to the
counterfactual problem. The definitions of organisational and marketing innova-
tions have become wider between 2002 and 2012.
Organisational innovation is defined in CIS 4 as “the implementation of new or
significant changes in firm structure or management methods that are intended to
improve your firm’s use of knowledge, the quality of your goods and services, or
the efficiency of work flows” (Eurostat, 2004, p. 10) and in CIS2012 as “a new
organisational method in your enterprise’s business practices (including knowl-
edge management), workplace organisation or external relations that has not been
previously used by your enterprise” (Eurostat, 2012, p. 9). The first is defined in
terms used mostly by economists who study innovations and the latter in terms
used in business and referring to managerial decisions. This could have con-
tributed to the cognitive bias problem. Respondents read fairly similar text in
meaning, but the wording has changed notably. There is no way to tell how much
it has contributed to the noise in responses.
Marketing innovations have undergone similar changes. In CIS 4 they are defined:
“A marketing innovation is the implementation of new or significantly improved
designs or sales methods to increase the appeal of your goods and services or
to enter new markets” (Eurostat, 2004, p. 10). In CIS2012: “A marketing inno-
vation is the implementation of a new marketing concept or strategy that differs
significantly from your enterprise’s existing marketing methods and which has not
been used before” and they must involve significant changes to the four P’s4 and
exclude seasonal or routine changes (Eurostat, 2012, p. 10). The latter definition
is a bit wider, including more types of innovation as possible answers.
Some other questions in the survey have also undergone minor changes during
this period. For example, cooperation with clients in general was surveyed in the
earlier waves, whereas public and private clients are separated in latter CIS waves
. All similar examples are combined into one or matched to give continuous and
comparable answers. If some questions are completely dropped or have under-
gone too vast changes, these are not included in any analysis. Unfortunately, this
also meant that many interesting questions had to be excluded.
An example from CIS2012 on how questions related to innovative activities are
formulated follows. About sources of information: “During the three years 2010
to 2012, how important to your enterprise’s innovation activities were each of the
following information sources? Include information sources that provided infor-
mation for new innovation projects or contributed to the completion of existing
projects,” and a list of potential sources and their relevance follows (Eurostat,
4 Product design or packaging, placement, promotion or pricing
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2012, p. 8). These details are relevant about our conclusions. Firms are sur-
veyed only about sources of information related to innovative activities and about
possible projects that they reported earlier — product and process innovations.
Therefore, the CIS surveys about possible management choices while delivering
innovations, but not for regular business activities, if these two do not coincide.
Finally, a note on CIS measures of innovation. Firms are surveyed whether they
have done any innovations in a three year period. They may choose several types
of innovation, e.g. new products, services and distribution processes. However,
the answers are binary and without weights. It is not possible to infer which of
these innovations were more important. Furthermore, it is not possible to infer
how many innovations were made in total. Many firms have several product lines
and several services where they can commercialise innovations simultaneously.
There is one question regarding the importance of innovations in the CIS. Firms
are asked what percentage of their turnover is due to these recent innovations.
This is known as innovation intensity in relevant literature. According to the
Schumpeterian view of innovations, a higher share of innovative products leads to
competitive advantages and better performance. However, relevant questions only
survey product innovations and do not disentangle these. Therefore, if a firm does
not produce a new product or service innovation, we cannot gauge the importance
of innovations in relation to firm turnover or profitability with CIS data.
4.2. Public sector support data
Data about direct business support instruments comes from all relevant public
agencies on the local and national level in Estonia between 2001 and 2016. Four
datasets have been merged to gather population data in Estonia. These will be
introduced in turn.
Two public agencies, Enterprise Estonia and Agricultural Registers and Informa-
tion Board are main paying agencies who deal with both large firms and SMEs.
Both have supplied their full register of all business support given to beneficiaries,
including project titles, relevant instruments, sum of money and dates (Agricul-
tural Registers and Information Board, 2016; Enterprise Estonia, 2015).
Enterprise Estonia was founded in 2000 as a successor to five different govern-
mental foundations merged during a reform. These five foundations were part of
different ministries at the time, in charge of tourism, regional, trade, innovation,
infrastructure and transit policy instruments. Enterprise Estonia became one cen-
tral agency in charge of all these policy instruments for an overarching Estonian
entrepreneurship and regional policy governance.
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The Agricultural Registers and Information Board (ARIB) was also founded in
2000. The ARIB was a successor to a foundation created in 1998 that was in
charge of the EU SAPARD5 programme after Estonia initiated EU accession talks.
The ARIB has been under the Ministry of Rural Affairs (previously Ministry
of Agriculture) since its inception and is the relevant paying agency for Esto-
nia’s rural development policy instruments. However, rural development policies
have included a wide range of instruments geared towards agricultural and non-
agricultural firms to increase their productivity and innovativeness. Mostly, they
are funded by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Relevant funds are the
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), the European Agricultural Fund
for Rural Development (EAFRD), and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund
(EMFF).6
Estonia joined the EU in 2004. Many public sector support instruments were cre-
ated under the auspices of EU Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). There are
three types of funds which are highly influential for Estonian instrument funding
(State Shared Service Centre of Estonia, 2018):
• The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which offers support
to the Member States in order to harmonise the development of various re-
gions and strengthen economic and social cohesion in the European Union.
• The European Social Fund (ESF), which supports initiatives that promote
employment, contribute to the improvement of people’s qualifications, and
increase the competitiveness of employees.
• The Cohesion Fund (CF), which supports those Member States where the
gross national product is below 90% of the European Union average. The
CF provides support for large environmental and infrastructure projects.
Estonia is among the Members States that receive this support.
These funds are main contributors to Estonian policy instrument funding in nearly
all categories. Varblane (2014) suggests that about 75% of investments by the
public sector and 90%-95% of entrepreneurship support instruments in Estonia
are funded via funds related to the EU. Therefore, the EU Structural Funds register
is also combined in our dataset. These include many of the larger projects, some
infrastructure projects and instruments geared towards other organisations, such
as workshop or training providers. This register is publicly available since 2004
(State Shared Service Centre of Estonia, 2015).
5 The Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and Rural Development started 6 months after
EU accession negotiations began.
6 These are current funds. The CAP was founded in 1962 and has a rich history with many reforms.
These funds were replacements to the original European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee
Fund (EAGGF) set up in 1962.
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In addition, Estonia’s State Aid register has been culled. In 2007, Estonia trans-
posed EU competition regulations into Estonian law and set up a digital State Aid
register (Ministry of Finance, 2016). All Estonian state aid and de minimis aid is
tracked through this register. EU competition policy has strict state aid rules, so
exemptions have to be notified and are monitored. All aid must be approved by
the European Commission, fall under block exemptions or be under de minimis
aid limits. The maximum amount of de minimis aid currently allowed is 200 000
EUR per undertaking over any period of 3 fiscal years.
Since many direct business support instruments are low in sum, a balance of pay-
ments is kept for every beneficiary in the register. Also, there are examples in this
register where aid given to firms is indirect, calculated afterwards. For example,
when workers have been retrained in a public program, the cost of the program
is not payed directly to the firm, but it has been estimated and kept on balance
in the firm’s state aid or de minimis aid total sum. This is one, and probably the
best, way to observe the treatment of instruments where funds have not been paid
directly to the firm.
The Structural Funds register and State Aid register add another 20 public organ-
isations who have been giving direct business support over the years. The main
paying agencies are the Environmental Investment Centre, Technical Regulation
Authority, Ministry of Economic Affairs (only very large projects directly), Min-
istry of Finance (also large projects), Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund
and some specific foundations for R&D support and loan guarantee services for
SMEs. A full list of paying agencies and instruments is given with descriptive
statistics in Chapter 5.
This data covers direct support given to businesses, non-profit organisations and
public enterprises. Instruments specially meant for public organisations, for ex-
ample local governments, are not included.
Most of these instruments provide direct support for which firms have to apply
themselves. Many instruments operate within specific sectors, limit access to
firms according to size or age, and specify conditions for eligibility criteria.
4.3. Patent office data
Data about the different strategies firms have adopted to appropriate their innova-
tions has been provided by the Estonian Patent Office (The Estonian Patent Office,
2015). Data covers years between 1993 and 2015. The Estonian Patent Office has
acceded the European Patent Convention in 2002, after which they also provide
access to all patents enforced in Estonia by others.
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The Estonian Patent Office provided data about all trademarks, industrial designs,
patents, utility models and geographical indications that have been granted to Es-
tonian firms. These are all types of intellectual property rights that can be applied
for in Estonia. The following brief descriptions are based on information on the
Estonian Patent Office website (The Estonian Patent Office, 2018).
Trademarks are graphically represented signs which can distinguish goods and
services from competitors’ goods and services. Trademarks are cues for con-
sumers that identify specific goods or services. Main types are i) word marks,
words or letters; ii) combined marks, words and letters with figurative elements,
colloquially known as logos; iii) figurative marks, only figurative elements; iv)
three-dimensional marks, three-dimensional representation of product, packag-
ing, etc; v) sound marks, sounds or melodies.
Trademarks are only used to distinguish goods. They do not offer legal protection
about the production process or contents of any good. Trademarks in the Esto-
nian trademark register only offer protection within Estonia, so firms that only
export might choose not to protect their trademarks in Estonia. However, the cost
of entering a trademark in the Estonian trademark register is currently 45 euros.
Arguably, cost is not prohibiting any firms from protecting their brands, logos or
slogans.
Trademarks are not obligatory for firms. They provide a right for the firm to use
specific words, letters or pictures when designing and commercialising their prod-
ucts. Innovative firms that are concerned with protecting their unique products or
services in the local market should protect not only the production process but
also the commercial product design.
Industrial design is a two or three-dimensional appearance of a product, i.e. the
outer shape or the appearance of a product can be registered as an industrial de-
sign. Similarly, the exterior design of a product can be registered. This can be a
cloth pattern, website design, furniture design, shoes with specific patterns, and so
forth. Only the exterior design is protected, the part that is visible to consumers.
Hence, technical solutions or production processes, or even parts of the product
that are not visible, can not be protected with industrial designs.
Industrial designs give manufacturers exclusive rights to produce products with
distinctive visual appearances. These rights can be sold or licensed to others. A
real life example follows. A new venture designed an outdoor grill kitchen as
one of its first products. Another Estonian outdoor grill manufacturer scoured the
web for inspiration and decided to copy the first venture’s design and presented
it at a trade-fair. Since the new venture sought protection for its design, the two
firms reached a consensus that the other firm would stop producing a very simi-
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lar product.7 However, necessary changes to the initial product for it to fall out
of protection can be small enough that designers would be worried. Still, cur-
rent state fees for industrial designs are around 100 euros, which would not be
considered restrictive.
Patents and utility models are intellectual property rights for inventions which
are technical solutions to technical problems. These can be devices, processes,
materials or combinations thereof. Patents are used for inventions with a new
inventive step and are used for industrial applications. Utility models have more
relaxed requirements for the inventive step. Patents can form a group of linked
inventions, whereas utility models are all distinct.
Patents are considered to be very indicative of innovations, so firms wish to pro-
tect their new technological solutions and establish short-term monopoly rights.
Patents are regularly used as a proxy for innovations. However, some shortcom-
ings are discussed in chapter 4.1. For further discussion on the use of patents as
innovation indicators, see Smith (2005) and Kleinknecht and Reinders (2012). In
this thesis, patents and other appropriation are indicators of innovation strategies.
Since there are differences in appropriation methods between industries, use of
intellectual property rights is one distinguishing character to differentiate man-
agerial choices.
Geographical indications are used to indicate specific geographical origins of a
product and, often, specific terms associated with products from that geographical
region. Worldwide known examples are brandies from the Cognac region called
Cognacs or hard cheeses called Parmigiano-Reggiano or Parmesan, which can be
produced in five specific Italian provinces. Other manufacturers are prohibited
from using the same terms on their products.
After Estonia’s accession to EU, these geographical indications which are pro-
tected on the EU level are no longer under national law. Some firms have pursued
geographical indications in Estonia to protect their products from being copied.
Geographical indicators have incentives which influence local producers to inno-
vate on the marketing and production side (Moerland, 2018).
The role of intellectual property rights data in the context of this thesis is to in-
dicate innovation strategies. Main innovation outputs are acquired from the CIS
data. Arguably, CIS data is more rich than data from patent offices. Especially
for industries where patenting or other types of intellectual property rights are not
very common. Estonian firms are not very R&D heavy or inventive in general,
and the CIS should give a better understanding of their innovative behaviour. De-
scriptive statistics about Estonian firms’ use of intellectual property protection is
given in Chapter 5.
7 https://www.aripaev.ee/uudised/2015/05/30/disainerid-hadas-kopeerijatega-ulaelu-kook-patent
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4.4. Business Register data
The Estonian Business Register holds data about firms, foundations and state en-
tities. They cover general information, personnel information and annual reports.
In this thesis, data about firms’ annual reports between 1994 and 2014 has been
provided by the Estonian Business Register privately (Centre of Registers and
Information Systems, 2015).
Annual report data contains information about firm balance sheet, income state-
ment, cash flow statement and statement of changes of equity. There is also some
general information available, such as the number of workers and industry NACE
code. However, since annual report data allows firms to make their own struc-
ture of account names, these are often not easily comparable. This means that
some assets and liabilities are combined under different headings or divided in a
structure which makes sense only for that specific company. Similarly, Estonian
regulations allow for two different schemes to present income statements which
cannot be combined together.
Due to these reasons, many interesting qualities of firms have to be left out of the
final combined dataset, because there would be too few comparable observations
left. However, there are some very general accounts which are of interest. For
example, firms with machinery have to keep it on balance and deduct amortisation.
This can give a general idea about the reliance on capital goods within a firm.
Similarly, the Business Register is the only dataset which contains firm founding
date reliably.
4.5. Combined dataset
Data from previously described organisations has been merged based on business
identity numbers. Since CIS microdata is confidential and a representative sample
of the population, all other datasets must be about exactly the same sample or
whole population. Due to these reasons, all other datasets used are about the
whole Estonian firm population and have been merged with CIS data. Briefly, all
of the following datasets used in this thesis have been combined into one:
• CIS4 (2002-2004) (Eurostat, 2004)
• CIS2006 (2004-2006) (Eurostat, 2006)
• CIS2008 (2006-2008) (Eurostat, 2008)
• CIS2010 (2008-2010) (Eurostat, 2010)
• CIS2012 (2010-2012) (Eurostat, 2012)
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• Enterprise Estonia (2003-2015), public sector support data (Enterprise Es-
tonia, 2015)
• Agricultural Registers and Information Board (2001-2013), public sector
support data (Agricultural Registers and Information Board, 2016)
• Structural Funds (2004-2015), public sector support data (State Shared Ser-
vice Centre of Estonia, 2015)
• State Aid register (2007-2016), public sector support data (Ministry of Fi-
nance, 2016)
• Estonian Patent Office (1993-2015), intellectual property rights data (The
Estonian Patent Office, 2015)
• Estonian Business Register (1994-2014), annual report data (Centre of Reg-
isters and Information Systems, 2015)
Statistics Estonia conducted CIS3, which spans between 1998 and 2000 (Eurostat,
1998). However, CIS3 has been omitted from this analysis due to three reasons.
Firstly, CIS3 also included firms with less than 10 employees. This has never been
done again. Therefore, the sample in CIS3 is a bit different than in following CIS
waves. Secondly, there is a gap between CIS3 and CIS4. This creates an even
bigger unbalance in the panel dataset. Often we aim to calculate the percentage of
change from one stage to the next between two periods. We have no information
about the period between CIS3 and CIS4. Thirdly, the definitions of innovation
between CIS3 and CIS4 are different. CIS3 relies more heavily on technological
innovations, asking firms to consider innovations that are founded on technologi-
cal developments. CIS4 and subsequent waves are more alike in their definitions
and are therefore more comparable.
As is apparent, some datasets have gaps in their overlaps. This is because some
registers were founded in a latter date. Some registers were founded because these
funds became available at that time. Public sector support to private firms really
took off after 2007, when Estonia was fully part of the EU programme period
of 2007-2013. Before 2004, there were only brief and fairly small instruments.
However, the data about periods until 2004 is scarce to come by. Most agencies in
charge of instruments did not use fully digital application systems until later dates.
Therefore, data quality and completeness can be a problem around that time.
The combined dataset is based on CIS observations between 2002 and 2012. This
covers five waves of CIS. All other datasets have been merged with CIS data, in
belief that external datasets are full Estonian population datasets without missing
values. This combined dataset has 9155 observations. It is an unbalanced panel
dataset. Data descriptives are in Chapter 5.
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For ease of reading, a separate bibliography item refers to this combined dataset
(Innovation Data, 2018).
A final note before presenting descriptive data: since the CIS is the basis for
national data about innovative activities, it is a representative survey in regards
to firm size for firms with more than 10 employees. It is also representative of
sectors which it covers. To achieve this, Statistics Estonia uses survey weights to
obtain estimates of population parameters. However, these survey weights are not
designed to be representative for innovative strategies or the use of public sector
support. For these reasons, data presented in this thesis from the CIS survey
is unweighted. This also means that data and results presented here should be
indicative for the firms in the sample used.
The difference in results between weighted and unweighted data is not large. For
example, the share of innovative firms in Estonia differs by an average of 6.4%
in the CIS waves covered between the unweighted and weighted sample. The
unweighted sample has a higher share of innovative firms in every wave. On
average, the survey weights used for population estimates weight non-innovative
firms higher than innovative firms. However, since the main objective here is not
to analyse the macro estimates of Estonian firms, it is possible to proceed without
weighting the sample.
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5. OVERVIEW OF THE ESTONIAN CASE
5.1. Estonian business environment, 2000 - 2015
In this section, I will give a brief overview about the conditions in which Estonian
firms have been during the period of interest. When available, data is shown for
the years between 2000 and 2015, three years before and after the survey data
used in estimations. The macro context is relevant for understanding the rather
turbulent period Estonian firms have experienced for the past 20 years.
Estonia is a small open economy with a bit more than one million people. As a
former Soviet state, it was regarded as a transition economy in the 1990s. The
period of interest in this thesis corresponds to a different type of transition - ac-
cession to the EU, changes in regulations and access to the EU open market. EU
funds were gradually available to Estonia several years before the official acces-
sion date. Preparations for accession started in 1999.
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Figure 5.1: Estonian GDP.
Left: GDP chain-linked volume, change compared with same period of previous
year, percentages (seasonally and working day adjusted).
Right: GDP at current prices, in million euros (seasonally and working day ad-
justed).
Source: Statistics Estonia (2019e)
Between 2000 and 2015, Estonia’s GDP has grown more than threefold, as shown
in Figure 5.1. GDP per capita has grown more than fourfold during this period,
97
since the population has been in a slow decline. This has put pressure on firms to
increase productivity without access to extra labour. Wages in Estonia have been
smaller than in Western Europe during this period, and the pressure for migration
within the EU for workers has been mostly outward.
At the same time, Estonian firms, with the help of foreign direct investments and
EU funds, were transforming most industries to increase productivity. Figure 5.2
shows productivity per employee growth and nominal positions between 2000 and
2015. Overall, there is large growth visible in nominal position, as productivity
per employee is about three times higher in 2015 than 2000. However, there is
also a slowing trend visible in growth percentages. In general, during the period of
interest in this thesis, there has been a large growth in productivity per employees,
driven largely by investments in fixed capital.
Figure 5.3 shows the main categories of investments in fixed assets. Intangible
assets are also included in the other fixed assets category. The main investments
are related to investments goods, such as machinery, equipment and construction.
Estonian firms have been investing in fixed assets to close the gap with other Eu-
ropean firms with more modern technology. For comparison, firms were investing
more than one billion euros in fixed assets in year 2000 in Estonia. At the same
time, intramural and extramural investments in R&D for all Estonian firms totalled
11 million euros (Statistics Estonia, 2019i). Similarly with other investments,
R&D expenditure also increased to around 140 million euros in 2015 (Statistics
Estonia, 2019h). Productivity increase in Estonian firms has been driven mainly
by fixed assets, new machinery, new equipment and other investment goods. Until
2015 at least, R&D expenditure has played a minuscule role.
For large economies, the question can become whether firm innovation affects
business cycles (Jovanovic and Lach, 1997), or, even broader, whether new tech-
nologies with enough diffusion and productivity increase can create long positive
business cycles (Freeman and Perez, 1988). For small open economies, it is fairly
clear that firm behaviour is driven by outside influence. Similarly, on a micro
level, firm behaviour is influenced by its environment. How much business cycles
affect innovation strategies is not certain. There is some evidence that business
cycles affect performance in innovating firms less than in non-innovating firms
(Geroski and Machin, 1993). It is also evident that business cycles affect invest-
ments, but how much they affect other elements in innovation strategies, such as
cooperation, firm-specific capabilities or innovation culture, will be investigated
in this thesis.
The main contributors to Estonian GDP are manufacturing, trade and logistics
sector and real estate activities. Figure 5.4 shows the share of total value added
for different economic activities. Between 2000 and 2015, there is a slow upward
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Figure 5.2: Estonian firm productivity.
Left: Productivity per employee. Real indicator change compared with same pe-
riod of previous year (seasonally and working-day adjusted), percentages.
Right: Labour productivity per person employed on the basis of value added, in
thousand euros.
Source: Statistics Estonia (2019a,c,g)
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slope for scientific and technical activities, which consists of firms whose main
activity is R&D. For other activities, cyclical behaviour with recovery can be seen.
Large structural shifts between 2000 and 2015 are not visible. The economic
activities which contributed the most to Estonian GDP in 2000 have relatively
similar shares and ranking in 2015.
5.2. Innovative activities, 2002 - 2012
Descriptive statistics about innovative activities in Estonia are directly taken from
the CIS, unweighted, and other datasets combined. All are described in Chapter
4. The CIS covers three years, for example from 2002 to 2004, inclusive. The
data presented from the CIS has overlapping years between every wave. The
firms covered are referred to as the CIS sample, even though they are the basis for
population estimates and national statistics. The reasoning for this can be found
at the end of Chapter 4.1.
The five CIS waves used cover 10 years. Altogether there are 9155 observations
from 3502 firms. This means that the data used in this thesis is an unbalanced
panel dataset. Table 5.1 highlights the number of respondents in different CIS
waves. Note that in Estonia, there were about 7500 firms on average with 10 or
more employees during this period (Statistics Estonia, 2019c). The CIS surveys
roughly 46% of the whole Estonian population of firms with 10 or more employ-
ees.
Table 5.1: Number of CIS respondents by wave
CIS wave Number of respondents Firms with technological innovative activity
2002 - 2004 1747 903
2004 - 2006 1924 1068
2006 - 2008 2026 1134
2008 - 2010 1735 936
2010 - 2012 1723 770
Total obs. 9155 4811
Total firms 3502 2277
Source: Innovation Data (2018)
Firms demonstrating ’some’ innovative activity means that they answered posi-
tively to at least one of three questions. They had either: (a) new product in-
novations (goods or services); (b) new process innovations; or (c) ongoing or
abandoned innovation activities for process and product innovations. This is an
important caveat in the CIS. If the respondent answered no to all of these ques-
tions, they would skip several questions about their activities. Firms that did,
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for example, marketing or organisational innovations, could skip questions re-
garding cooperation partners, knowledge sources and so forth. Therefore, in all
descriptive statistics and in statistical modelling, there is data available from the
CIS about firms that had some technological innovative activities. Descriptive
statistics where n = 4811 applies to observations where firms had some innova-
tive activities and there is information. Descriptions where n = 9155 applies to
all observations in the CIS. This does not apply to all external data — it has been
matched for all firms — thus n = 9155 always and counterfactuals for innovative
activities also exist.
Another note on the difference between national innovation statistics and the data
presented here. Usually when population data about firms that had innovations
is presented in national statistics, it only refers to categories (a) and (b) in the
previous paragraph, i.e. firms that had technological innovations. In this thesis,
for continuity and brevity, firms with ongoing or abandoned innovative activities
are also included in the group of innovative firms. This is done for two reasons.
Separating these groups in different steps is difficult to follow, such as by us-
ing one definition for descriptive statistics and another for statistical modelling.
Secondly, in this thesis I analyse innovation strategies. Firms with ongoing inno-
vative activities or those that abandoned them for some reason also contribute to
our knowledge of innovation strategies. The fact, that they have not reached their
outputs, e.g. new products or services, does not mean their innovation strategies
are not similar to other firms. Therefore, they should be included in the models as
well.
Since this is an unbalanced panel, a brief description on how many observations
can be used to estimate dynamics. In the most simple case, we need only two
observations from a single firm to estimate dynamics, and it would be best if these
are two consecutive observations. Since the CIS is an anonymous survey which
aims to be representative of the whole population and, as it turns out, it covers a
rather large percentage of the population, there are smaller subpopulations in the
data where we can observe dynamics.
Table 5.2: Number of firms, grouped by observations per firm
Observations per firm Number of firms Cumulative share of all observations
5 654 35.7%
4 418 54.0%
3 546 71.9%
2 691 87.0%
1 1193 100.0%
Source: Innovation Data (2018)
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From Table 5.2, we can observe that there are 654 firms for which we have 5
observations in the data. This means full coverage between 2002 and 2012. In
observation terms, these firms constitute 3270 observations, around 36% of the
dataset. More than half of the dataset consists of firms which have been surveyed
at least four times. This does not mean that all observations have been consecutive.
There are gaps present for many firms.
Appendix II shows the most prominent panel data patterns. It is evident that we
can observe consecutive periods for most of the firms in the dataset. Around 27%
of all firms in the dataset have four or more consecutive observations recorded.
Around 43% of firms in the dataset have three or more consecutive observations
recorded. This means that for most firms, we can observe rather short periods of
consecutive innovative activities.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 both show firm innovativeness by categories. The former is
based on two larger categories: technological and non-technological innovations.
The latter show these categories when divided into subcategories: product, pro-
cess, marketing and organisational innovations.
It is evident that innovative activities do not follow similar cyclic trends as in-
vestments. Firms in the CIS sample show a relatively modest downward trend in
innovativeness in all categories. As far as I am aware, there has not been any re-
search done to explain this downward trend. It does not correlate well with fixed
asset investments nor with business cycles. When investigating firm innovation
strategies for this period, it is expected to witness more non-innovating strategies
appearing in later periods.
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show innovative firms with expenditures on some type of
innovative activities. Figure 5.7 shows the share of innovative firms engaged in
particular innovative activities. For example, about 85% of all innovative firms in
the period between 2002 and 2012 made some type of investments in machinery.
Unfortunately, there is no information about firms which were not innovative at
the time. The simple conclusion is that the innovative firms almost always had
investments in machinery, but we can not infer whether if non-innovative firms
were any different.
The other category here refers to activities which do not belong to any other cate-
gory. The 2010 CIS proposes this example: ”Other activities to implement new or
significantly improved products and processes such as feasibility studies, testing,
routine software development, tooling up, industrial engineering, etc” (Eurostat,
2010). The other category seems to be the only one which has a relatively large
drop in share of firms engaged between 2010 and 2012. The survey questions did
not go through any significant changes during this time which could explain the
drop.
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The CIS investigates whether innovative firms had any of these types of innovative
activities: in-house R&D; external R&D; acquisition of machinery, equipment
or software; acquisition of external knowledge; training for innovative activities;
market introduction of innovations; and other. CIS 2010 and CIS 2012 also sur-
veyed whether firms had any design related innovative activities. However, since
it is relatively new and can not be estimated for all observations, it has been omit-
ted.
What can be observed is that the share of firms which engaged in these activi-
ties does not imply cyclical behaviour. There is a small increase in R&D related
activities, both in-house and external R&D. Also, there is a moderate increase in
knowledge acquisition activities. It seems that the share of firms engaged in ma-
chinery and software acquisition has a relatively small downward trend, and firms
engaged in R&D related activities show a relatively small positive trend.
Figure 5.8 depicts expenditure on these innovative activities. However, the cate-
gories in the CIS are more narrow than the question related to engagement. Ex-
penditure sums are related to a more technological understanding of innovation
without training, marketing, design and other activities.
The total sum of innovation expenditures for the CIS sample looks fairly similar to
the whole Estonian population investments in fixed assets, depicted in Figure 5.3.
What is relevant is that only investments in machinery and other equipment show
a cyclical trend. Two major events happened at the same time as when this drop
occurred. Firstly, it was the global economic recession, now known as the Great
Recession. Secondly, 2007 was the end of the EU programming period 2004-2006
(from the Estonian accession perspective), and the start of the EU programming
period 2007-2013. This means that many instruments for public support also
ended, and it took some time for new ones to begin. In the latter part of this
chapter, descriptive statistics about public support is also shown for comparison.
The argument is that many firms could not rely on EU funded instruments for
investments in machinery.
The second very important aspect from Figure 5.8 is the moderate positive trend
of in-house R&D expenditures. It is not affected by business cycles. This implies
that there may be a structural shift in how innovative activities were conducted
between 2002 and 2012. At the beginning of the period, in-house R&D made up
about 21% of all innovation expenditures. In 2012, it was around 38%. Expendi-
tures on external R&D and knowledge acquisition have remained relatively stable
during this period.
When Figures 5.7 and 5.8 are contrasted, two trends are apparent. There is a
higher share of firms engaged in R&D activities, in-house or external, albeit the
share is not higher by multiples. Secondly, these firms spend much more on in-
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house R&D than they did before. The only thing we can not infer from these
graphs is whether they are the same firms that engaged in R&D.
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show firms use and the importance of information sources
while engaged in innovative activities. The sources of information are divided into
four groups: market sources, internal sources, research and education, and other
sources. Market sources are suppliers, clients, consultants and competitors. Inter-
nal sources are within the enterprise or within the group. Research and education
sources are universities or other higher education institutions and public or private
research institutes. Other sources are conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions, scien-
tific journals and other publications, professional and industry associations. In
Figure 5.9, the firm is considered to use any of the groups of information sources
when at least one of the subcategories has been used. This means that most firms
probably do not use all the information sources in a category simultaneously.
Almost all firms rely on some sort of information from market sources. The most
popular categories in this group are suppliers and clients. Less frequent categories
are competitors and consultants. Similarly, the other category is widely used by
firms in the CIS sample. The most popular is conferences, used by about 75%
of innovative firms. Journals and other publications are used by about half of the
firms. Also, internal resources within the firm or within the group are commonly
used as an information source.
Universities and public research institutes are used much less frequently as other
information sources. They both have a small positive trend since CIS 2006, but
there is a wide gap between these information sources and others. This small
positive trend coincides with Figure 5.8, where a small continous increase in R&D
budget can be seen.
There seems to be no cyclical behaviour in the use of information sources, which
is a major decision of management when forming the innovation strategy. The
macro trends indicate that these are not changed very often by firms. However,
this can be confirmed by micro-level analysis later in the thesis.
Figure 5.10 indicates the mean importance of these information sources as given
by the firms that used them. The mean of the group has been calculated as the
mean of all observations within the group without any weighting. This means that
the sources of information which were used more often are also represented more
in the mean calculation within group. Firms had a choice to rate the importance
of information sources as (1) low, (2) medium or (3) high importance.
Internal sources within the firm or within the group are considered to be the most
important sources of information while engaged in innovative activities. Firms
rely most on their own knowledge resources. The second most important group
is market sources. Within this group, suppliers are more important than clients,
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Figure 5.6: Firm innovativeness, by innovation type. n = 9155.
Source: Innovation Data (2018)
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followed by competitors and consultants. Firms in the CIS sample on the whole
regard suppliers as their second most important source of information. The third
most important category is clients.
There is a small difference in the order of use and importance of sources of in-
formation. Some sources are much more expensive than others. For example, ex-
tracting usable information from research institutes is more expensive and labour
intensive than visiting a conference or reading a publication. Universities are used
as a source of information less frequently than, for example, consultants and pub-
lications in the CIS sample. However, the importance of universities as a source
of information, on average, is higher than both consultants and publications.
On the whole, Figure 5.10 raises the question of why the firms in the CIS sam-
ple do not consider their sources of information very important. There seems to
be a small failure in the relationship. Firms do not consider the information they
receive to be very important to their innovation process. This is one specific ques-
tion that cannot be answered here but should merit an investigation in the future.
There may be a short-coming in the experiences of both partners in Estonia, where
learning-by-doing effects have so far not been enough. Unfortunately, there are
not any visible positive trends on Figure 5.10 that would indicate a change in the
near-term.
Figure 5.11 shows the share of firms that cooperated on innovative activities with
partners by partner type. The contrast with information sources is obvious. Firms
use many of these partners as information sources, but they do not engage in
cooperation activities.
The most popular partners are similar to information sources. These are suppli-
ers, internal, clients and the competition. However, there is no large difference
between cooperation partner types. Universities are partners less often than, for
example, clients, but the difference is much smaller when compared to informa-
tion sources.
The lowest level of public and private research organisations as partners in Estonia
can be explained by the lack of such organisations. There are not many possible
partners in Estonia in this category.
Similarly to other possible choices in the business innovation strategy, the choice
of partners on the macro levels seems to not be influenced much by business cy-
cles. The share of firms with cooperation partners are relatively stable on the
whole. For reference, the cooperation levels for Estonian firms are at the end
of the first quartile when rankings are compared with other EU Member States
(Eurostat, 2019).
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One indication of firm attitude towards innovation is innovation intensity, usually
defined as the share of turnover from innovations in total turnover. Figures 5.12
and 5.13 show innovation intensity of innovations that are new to the firm’s market
and new to the firm itself. Note that on both of those graphs, n = 3030. Innovation
intensity is asked only from firms with new products or services. If the firm only
had process innovations, innovation intensity is unknown. Firms without innova-
tions are naturally at 0. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 are kernel density plots, akin to a
smoothed histogram.
One caveat of the CIS is visible in innovation intensity graphs. When firms are
asked to estimate a share of something, human nature is to give rough estimates.
On graph 5.12, even with smoothing, there are visible bumps on round numbers.
Most firms answer this question in multiples of 10.
As seen on 5.12, innovation intensity for most firms is not high — less than 25%.
About half of firms declare zero innovation intensity. The innovation intensity for
new-to-firm innovations is higher, about 18% of firms declare zero. This can be
puzzling, since one of the important aspects of an innovation is commercialisation,
it is not an invention. If 18% of firms say they have new products or services, but
they receive zero turnover from these innovations, what are the qualities of these
innovations? These can be very new, at the early phase of commercialisation
or even prototypes. Unfortunately, it is not evident in the CIS which type of
innovations these are.
What is evident is that firms realistically estimate that turnover from new-to-
market innovations is harder to come by than new-to-firm innovations. For ex-
ample, about 3% of firms declare innovation intensity of new-to-market innova-
tions higher than 50%. The same estimate is about 14% of firms for innovation
intensity of new-to-firm innovations.
Innovation intensity is one aspect that indicates firm innovation strategy. As de-
scribed in Chapter 2.4, innovations are a possibility to create firm-specific com-
petitive advantages. Firms with high innovation intensity over a long period create
new innovations constantly. Their business strategy revolves around creating new
products or services. Firms with constant low innovation intensity aim for com-
petitive advantages in other aspects, such as minimising costs or opening new
markets.
There seems to be no indication that innovation intensity for both new-to-market
and new-to-firm innovations depends on business cycles when Figures 5.12 and
5.13 are compared. All CIS waves used in the analysis seem to be roughly at the
same position.
Figures 5.14 and 5.15 highlight the share of firms and mean importance of objec-
tives for product and process innovations. This aspect of firm innovation strategy
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has been rephrased several times between CIS2004 and CIS2012. However, three
main categories have been constant for innovative firms during this period. These
are the objectives to: (a) improve flexibility for producing goods or services; (b)
enter new markets or increase market share; and (c) widen the portfolio of goods
and services offered.
Figure 5.14 shows the share of firms that indicated that these objectives are at least
of low relevance. Only firms with innovations answered the question. The share
of firms that have an objective to open new markets is slowly decreasing. At the
same time, a wider portfolio is slowly increasing. Flexibility as an objective has
the highest share of them. Estonian firms are mostly relatively small compared
to any bigger nation. Flexibility is a known strategy for small firms, able to offer
custom products for their clients. Without other context, Figure 5.14 seems to
indicate that firms in the CIS sample are oriented towards creating new products
and services without entering new markets.
Figure 5.15 shows the importance of these objectives, only for the firms which
declared them as somewhat important. The graph presents the mean score of
respondents. When compared to results from Figure 5.14, the mean importance
of widening the portfolio objective is slowly decreasing. An increased number of
firms indicate it as an objective, but the mean score is getting lower. This indicates
that it might not be the most important part of firms’ objectives. Flexibility in
production is slowly becoming more important to firms overall. Entering new
markets has a relatively stable trend during these years.
Firms’ objectives are slowly changing over time. However, cyclical changes are
not visible on the macro level from firms in the CIS sample.
Table 5.3 shows the formal appropriation methods used by the firms in the CIS
sample. The calculation shows the rate per 1000 firms. These are based on the
official Estonian Patent Office data and are intellectual property rights awarded,
not applied. Description of these types is in Chapter 4.3.
Even though innovation output statistics show a relatively small decline over these
years for the same firms, there is a significant drop in years 2006-2010 for most
formal intellectual property rights. Trademarks show a small constant decline
over the years.
Patent awards have gone up in the last period. This is due to a few outlier com-
panies, two of which received seven patents each in the last period. This example
also shows the extent to which Estonian statistics on intellectual property rights
are affected by a few companies. All patents in the last period for firms in the CIS
sample are awarded to only ten firms. Similarly, industrial models and industrial
designs are awarded to about ten firms in every period.
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Because firms in the CIS sample are not patenting or using other methods more
apt in manufacturing industries to protect their intellectual property, a combined
variable for industrial models, industrial designs and patents is used, labelled as
formal appropriation methods. Trademarks are separate entities.
Based on these numbers, it is already certain that for almost all firms in the CIS
sample, patenting is not the choice of strategy considering appropriation methods.
CIS2012 has been the first CIS where a set of questions regarding competitiveness
of product and process innovations was asked. In the Estonian CIS sample, the
share of firms considering trademarks, lead time advantages and complexity to be
an important part of strategy was three times higher than for other forms of ap-
propriation. Other categories included patents, industrial designs, industrial mod-
els, copyrights and secrecy. For example, about 4% of firms (with innovations)
regarded patents to be important for the competitiveness of their innovations. Us-
ing external data from the Estonian Patent Office, about 1.3% of firms from the
CIS2012 innovative firms sample have been awarded patents. There is a small
mismatch. This may be because not all patents are awarded, there may be some
time-lags involved, and some patents are only applied in specific markets which
might not include the EU. Similarly, firms answering that trademarks are at least
somewhat important for their innovation competitiveness is higher in the CIS2012
survey than the result from the Estonian Patent Office data suggests. About 45%
of firms indicate trademarks to be at least of low level importance for their com-
petitiveness (as opposed to not having used them). However, the Estonian Patent
Office database of awarded trademarks reports roughly 19.5% for the same firms.
Unfortunately, this set of questions has been surveyed only once, in CIS2012, and
there are no other CIS samples for comparison. This is the first indication that
external data can and should be used with CIS data, since there might be some
discrepancies involved. Otherwise, at the very least, when firms respond that the
level of importance is high in their strategy options, it might not always mean that
they have managed to actually use these methods.
On the whole, firms in the CIS sample probably rely more on informal appropria-
tion methods in their innovation strategy, such as lead-time advantages, complex-
ity and hard to copy products, secrecy, know-how and other methods. Unfortu-
nately, there are no good ways to estimate these for the CIS sample using available
data. So far, data is only available for formal methods, which can only give half
of the picture.
Firms in the CIS sample tend to have some repetition. Already visible in Appendix
II, there is a subsample of firms on the whole for which there is information in
every CIS period. Figure 5.16 shows firm age in years at the end of the CIS period,
as calculated based on the founding date from the Business Register. There are
114
Table 5.3: Intellectual property rights use in the CIS sample over time, per 1000
firms.
CIS Industrial models Industrial designs Patents Trademarks
2002 - 2004 24.0 16.6 1.1 230.7
2004 - 2006 15.1 27.0 1.0 309.8
2006 - 2008 3.9 8.9 0.0 283.8
2008 - 2010 9.2 10.4 4.0 225.4
2010 - 2012 18.0 6.4 18.0 203.1
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 9155.
19 observations in the CIS sample for which there is no founding date available.
Some of them have not submitted their annual reports.
The average age of firms in the CIS sample is increasing in every CIS wave. This
is mainly because Estonian firms have been founded around 1991 at minimum.
The Estonian Business Register does not have continuity in firm age from the
Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic times, even if any of the planned economy
firms may have survived.
In the context of innovation strategies, if there is a difference for managerial
choices for older and younger firms, these can only become wider with each CIS
wave. In the early CIS waves, most firms were fairly young. By comparison, in
most European countries, firms are just as young in the later CIS waves. There are
no truly old firms in the Estonian CIS sample, simply because they do not exist in
Estonia. This must be taken into account.
Figure 5.17 shows fixed assets per workers on balance in log values. This is the
total count of observations, meaning that firms which have participated in the
CIS several times are counted several times. Log value is used because assets on
balance per worker have extremely long tails. For example, the median value of
tangible assets on balance per worker is 7844 euros for firms in the CIS sample.
The maximum value is more than five million euros per worker. The median for
intangible assets on balance per worker is 0 euros.
Figure 5.17 does not display firms which do not have any fixed assets on their
annual reports. Very few firms are missing for reasons unknown — altogether
128 observations. For 538 observations, there are no tangible assets or total fixed
assets, and for 6307 observations, there are no intangible assets on the statement
of financial position. The histogram does not display these firms, since they skew
the graph very high with 0 value on the left side, up the count of 6307.
The average position of tangible assets is much higher than intangible assets. The
firms investment position is clear. In most cases, tangible assets tend to be more
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expensive until enough brand equity or know-how has been acquired. For exam-
ple, tangible assets include construction, machinery, offices, etc. Intangible assets
include patents, brand value, development expenses, firm value, etc.
There are no trends visible when Figure 5.17 is plotted with five facets, each for
every CIS wave.
Annual report data about firm assets per worker represents stocks, not flows. In-
vestments are included in the CIS which are one side of the strategy position, the
types of investments firms do in their innovative activities. Stocks represent the
firm’s overall position, whether they are more reliant on capital or labour. Firms
with very high fixed asset stocks are typically manufacturing firms with expen-
sive machinery and facilities, whereas firms with high intangible assets rely on
knowledge or design stocks.
When business investment and innovation statistics are compared, there are some
important differences. Firm investments in R&D related activities are less cyclical
when compared to investments in machinery and other tangible assets. Firms
relying on these types of activities in their innovation strategy might be able to
shift their strategic choices more easily. Investments in R&D related activities
should entail more capability building — investments in human capital — and
firms might engage in more long-term projects.
Data described in this chapter is also used to estimate firm innovation strategies
and describe possible choices.
5.3. Public sector support, 2002 - 2012
This section describes public support given to firms in the CIS sample. The data
sources are described in Chapter 4.2 and the typology of instruments in Chapter
3.
Firms in the CIS sample were beneficiaries of 22 different paying agencies be-
tween 2002 and 2012. There were 3502 unique firms in the CIS sample, of which
1678 received some kind of public support. These 1678 firms received about 1.1
billion euros in public support altogether.
The full list of paying agencies handing out at least one instrument to at least
one beneficiary is in Appendix III. The table also highlights the number of instru-
ments, number of different policy types, number of beneficiaries and total sum
eligible for the beneficiaries included in this analysis in the period between 2002
and 2012. The full list corresponds only to firms in the CIS sample. Many of these
paying agencies have a much more extensive list of instruments and total sum of
euros delivered to beneficiaries than the CIS sample covers.
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Table in Appendix III highlights some important aspects about public support in
Estonia. There are paying agencies that deal with many beneficiaries and instru-
ments. These are the main paying agencies in Estonia, for example, Enterprise
Estonia, Agricultural Registers and Information Board, Environmental Investment
Centre and others. A brief description of these is in Chapter 4.2. These paying
agencies are responsible for instruments in entrepreneurship policy, environmen-
tal policy, rural life policies, social policies and regional policy. These agencies
have a wide selection of instruments for which they are responsible and are also
responsible for several different policy types when compared with the typology of
instruments developed in this thesis.
However, there are also paying agencies that cater to only a select few beneficia-
ries, but the total sum of support funds can be very large. This is not a coincidence,
such as that most firms catered to in this way are not covered in the CIS sample
because these paying agencies deal with either very large infrastructure projects,
such as regional airports or municipal infrastructure, or within a very specific
niche. One caveat of the CIS is that it does not cover firms with main economic
activities in the primary sector. Therefore, some paying agencies, e.g. Estonian
Private Forest Centre, are represented with very few beneficiaries.
In addition, some of these paying agencies hand out direct subsidies for very spe-
cific national services which are motivated by public goods rationales, hence they
have a very short list of beneficiaries. Examples of these are usually ministries.
Table 5.4: Total use of instruments by the CIS sample
CIS Firms Bene- Sum in Paying Instru- Instrument
ficiaries EUR agencies ments types
2002 - 2004 1747 200 22 319 850 3 19 4
2004 - 2006 1924 449 37 603 415 6 21 5
2006 - 2008 2026 408 198 153 861 11 39 8
2008 - 2010 1735 1032 549 465 443 16 51 10
2010 - 2012 1723 1154 299 505 738 20 70 10
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 9155.
Table 5.4 shows the main points about public sector support in the CIS sample.
The number of beneficiaries has been rising with every CIS wave, and the to-
tal sum that is eligible for beneficiaries has also increased. The peak in sum is
between years 2008 and 2010, which corresponds to some very large infrastruc-
ture projects financed by public money, the largest of which was in excess of 67
million euros.
Similarly, the number of instruments and instrument types is also increasing with
every CIS wave. Estonian policy domains have increased in width, as more in-
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struments can be found that aim public intervention toward private business. This
adds to the complexity in public policy analysis.
Figure 5.18 displays the number of beneficiaries per instrument over time. There
are two additional lines on the graph. A dotted line to display the total number of
unique firms which are beneficiaries in every period and a dashed line to display
the total number of firms in the CIS sample during this period. Firstly, it is obvious
that the average number of instruments among firms which are beneficiaries is
more than one and rises with every period. This means that in the CIS sample, it
is already observed that there can be additive effects for beneficiaries from several
instrument types.
Secondly, in the Estonian CIS sample, the share of firms who are beneficiaries is
rising rapidly. In the last period, the average use of instruments per firm, even for
the whole sample, is more than one. If the share of firms which are not beneficia-
ries is becoming closer to zero, there may not be any counterfactuals left for any
type of analysis.
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Figure 5.18 displays the use of instruments by firms. This means that for every
firm, there is a binary response, whether they were a beneficiary from a single
instrument type. Even if they were a beneficiary multiple times during a single
period, it would still count as one. Similarly, if they were a beneficiary to multiple
instruments within an instrument type, it is still counted as one.
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In the CIS sample, the most frequent instruments are dealing with labour support
and training and skill development. These are relatively cheap instruments where
cost per beneficiary is small. Marketing and export development, investments
and innovation and R&D instruments have been available as well for all periods.
Direct subsidies, collaboration instruments are relatively rare in the CIS sample.
These instruments are catered to firms with national goals or which are part of
international business and science networks. There are not many firms with these
objectives in the CIS sample. However, these instruments can be costly per firm.
Hence, the possibility to apply or be part of the financing scheme is also smaller.
Mixed support caters mostly to starting ventures, which are not the main focus of
CIS. The CIS sample consists of firms with more than ten employees, which may
cut off the majority of firms that receive mixed support or are part of incubators.
It is apparent that the Estonian policy instrument mix is becoming wider in every
period. There are more instruments available and more finances available. The
possible effects from public support to firms becomes more complex as well.
Figure 5.19 displays the same data, but with total sum per beneficiary over time.
Now the majority of Estonian instruments used becomes clear — it goes to invest-
ments. By ratio, it ranges between 65% and 95% of funding in the CIS sample.
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Figures 5.18 and 5.19 highlight also the difficulty for analysis. If the object of
interest is the use of instruments, the ratio between different instrument types is
much more even. The possible effect can stem from a variety of different in-
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struments. However, if the sum of finances is used in modelling, the variance is
large. The effect of one additional euro for investments is probably much less
than one additional euro for consulting. In addition, investments for small and
large firms also differ, depending on the amount of fixed assets already on balance
and possible financing capabilities. Most of these instruments are co-financing,
meaning that the firm has to finance the majority of the project from their own
funds. This sets limits for comparability between firms of different sizes. The use
of instruments does not have these issues. In essence, the difference is whether
the object of interest is participation in the instrument or the financing effect of
the instrument.
Some instrument types are very rare; collaboration instruments and direct subsi-
dies have less than 20 observations between them. Mixed support has also fewer
observations than other types. Due to scarcity of data points, these instrument
types are combined into a single category labelled as ’other’. Since there are no
exact limits on where to set the cutoff value on scarcity, these three have been
combined in the analysis based on subjective opinion. In the descriptive statistics
described here, they are individually presented as before.
Appendices IV and V are tables of the underlying data shown in Figures 5.18 and
5.19, respectively.
External data about public sector support illustrates the combined use of instru-
ments. If there are possible compounding or conflicting effects in the instrument
mix, they are not available in the original CIS.
Table 5.5: Combined use of instrument mix, number of beneficiaries by simulta-
neous participation in instrument types
Amount of simultaneous instruments
CIS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2002 - 2004 1547 165 33 2 0 0 0 0
2004 - 2006 1475 319 99 29 2 0 0 0
2006 - 2008 1618 315 74 19 0 0 0 0
2008 - 2010 703 558 282 124 53 14 1 0
2010 - 2012 569 545 281 179 95 44 9 1
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 9155.
Table 5.5 shows the combined use of instruments. The numbers in the header
are the sum of simultaneous participation in different instrument types within the
CIS period. This calculation is based only on the level of instrument types. If a
firm participated in two different types of instruments — for example, investment
instruments — it is counted as a single type. Therefore, there is a single firm
121
which managed to participate in seven different instrument types within a single
period.
The possibility for interactions between multiple instruments is high. In CIS2012,
35% of the firms were participating in more than one policy instrument as a bene-
ficiary. These cases are not rare, yet there is virtually no empirical literature about
possible policy effects in these cases.
The possible combinations of different instruments is also large. In this thesis,
instruments are grouped into ten instrument types. There are 45 possible two-way
combinations, 120 possible three-way combinations. It is not feasible to analyse
all combinations separately.
If policy instruments are becoming more popular, they are recognised as a tool
by both the public and government, this increase in instrument mix will continue.
Even in the CIS sample, there are very few beneficiaries in CIS2004, but there is
already a proportion of firms which are participating in more than one instrument
simultaneously.
A second effect might be that firms specialise in acquiring public support. If the
most prominent instruments lower the cost of investment or worker training, firms
might learn how to use these instruments to their advantage repeatedly, as a form
of extracting rents when policy instruments are widely available.
Table 5.6 shows the lower matrix and the diagonal of all two-way combinations of
simultaneous participation in different instrument types for the CIS sample across
all years. The diagonal represents the total use of these instruments, in combina-
tion or single. The lower matrix is the combined use of two corresponding instru-
ments. If a firm participated in three or more policy instruments simultaneously,
these are calculated as multiple sets of pairs.
There seems to be no distinct pattern of instruments being used hand-in-hand.
For most instrument types, there are beneficiaries who have been part of all other
instrument types as well. For example, there are no patterns for soft instruments
such as consulting or marketing support specifically catering to firms which are
also participating in investment instruments. Soft instruments are also combined
with others, as are other more investment and financing instruments.
This indicates that firms are varied in their choice of instruments. Firms are also
participating in instruments according to patterns which are not easily described.
Datasets where we only observe whether firms have participated in any type of
policy instruments without exact details in which policy instruments the firms
where actually beneficiaries of might lose some important effects.
In addition, empirical papers where public sector support is binary, or only one
type of instrument has been gathered, might severely underestimate possible in-
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Table 5.6: Lower matrix of two-way combinations of participation in different
instrument types across all years
Col. Con. Dir. Fin. Inn. Inv. Lab. Mar. Mix. Tra.
Collab. prog. 12
Consulting 2 390
Direct subsidy 0 2 5
Financial 2 32 0 143
Innovation 4 102 0 20 421
Investment 3 60 0 28 69 624
Labor support 4 193 4 78 119 134 1152
Marketing 4 159 2 50 159 149 238 761
Mixed support 0 11 0 6 4 1 15 7 35
Training 5 267 4 74 254 307 438 455 14 1913
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 9155.
teraction effects from other policy instruments. In this CIS sample, there are hun-
dreds of firms that have received support in some form of consulting and also
some investment aid. Which of these is causal to creating innovative activities is
difficult to infer.
There is also a question in the CIS survey about receiving public support. Table
5.7 is a comparison between CIS response to whether firms received public sup-
port during their innovative activities and external data. In the CIS, firms are asked
whether they received public support from the local government, national govern-
ment or EU level. All these categories have been combined, and the firm receives
a positive response if any of them applies. In the external data, all instrument
types have been combined together. In the CIS, firms that declared themselves as
not innovative did not have to respond to this question.
With external data, it is not always evident if these instruments actually support
innovativeness. This is also under analysis in this thesis, and some evidence can be
found in section 7. However, even if some of these instruments are not related to
innovativeness, there seems to be some under-reporting in the CIS. For example,
in the CIS2010, there is a difference of 400 firms which did not indicate receiving
any public support but can be found in the external data. The underlying causes are
not clear for inferring whether firms feel that public support has been irrelevant to
innovative activities or whether there are some other reasons for under-reporting.
To conclude, description of the past behaviour of firms in the CIS sample shows
some trends. Business statistics seem to be more affected by business cycles than
R&D statistics. Estonian firms overall have become more complex as they have
become more accustomed to competing with other EU firms. At the same time,
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Table 5.7: Comparison of CIS response to receiving public support and external
data
CIS Firm status observations CIS external data
2002 - 2004 not innovative 844 0 49
2004 - 2006 not innovative 856 0 114
2006 - 2008 not innovative 892 0 100
2008 - 2010 not innovative 799 0 378
2010 - 2012 not innovative 953 0 567
2002 - 2004 innovative 903 100 151
2004 - 2006 innovative 1068 127 335
2006 - 2008 innovative 1134 160 308
2008 - 2010 innovative 936 254 654
2010 - 2012 innovative 770 259 587
there is an influx of public policy instruments aimed at solving problems within
firms, whether it is human capital, lack of physical capital or increasing produc-
tivity. Descriptive statistics have been drawn from the dataset and used for the
rest of the analysis as well. As is clear, CIS data is not without faults. At the
same time, it is the most informative and comprehensive survey about innovative
activities available in the EU.
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6. DYNAMICS OF FIRM INNOVATION
STRATEGIES
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I explain the aim of this chapter,
the research questions and objectives and describe where they fit into the theory
provided in Chapters 2 and 3. Second, I explain the method used to reach the
objectives. Third, I estimate, interpret and discuss the results.
6.1. Objectives and motivation for estimations
The aim of this chapter is to estimate the dynamics of firm innovation strategies.
Information about firm choices while conducting innovative activities are aggre-
gated to create constructs of firm innovative behaviour. Firms are combined into
groups based on homogeneous innovative activities. These groups are called pat-
terns of innovation — combinations of the most prominent innovation strategies.
In the end, firms can have multiple innovation strategies concurrently, but they
belong to a single pattern of innovation.
The research questions in this chapter are the following. First, what simultaneous
firm-level choices in the innovation system create visible innovation strategies?
Second, what patterns of innovation exist when firms are clustered based on their
innovation strategies?
The objective of this chapter is to: (i) answer research questions one and two; (ii)
estimate innovation strategies and patterns of innovation for Estonian firms; (iii)
describe the dynamics of patterns of innovation; (iv) store estimates of patterns
of innovation for every firm to be used in the analysis of the effects of policy
instruments to patterns of innovation in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2 describes possible mechanisms for firms to reach their innovation strate-
gies. Technological regimes suggest that firms are influenced by their sector and
the underlying technological knowledge within this sector, creating a trajectory
for firms. This technological trajectory is available to most firms within the sec-
tor, since they rely on similar knowledge, technological advancements and de-
mand for innovations. This suggests that firms are free to choose actions within
some scope, but there should be prominent major strategies visible within sectors,
and successful firms remain broadly in these strategies for longer periods. Shifts
are possible when new technologies are invented and, in the end, a whole sector
slowly shifts toward this new technological trajectory. Detailed description is in
Chapter 2.1.
125
Another possible mechanism for firms to reach their innovation strategies is devel-
oped based on management choices, how firms are managed to be successful over
a long period. In short, firms need competitive advantages, something that makes
them more attractive on the marketplace. This is close to the notion of a Schum-
peterian entrepreneur who seeks monopoly rent on the marketplace based on in-
novations. Recent theories suggest that firms need dynamic capabilities, meaning
that they should reorient their strategies often, depending on their own capabili-
ties and market reactions. These theories would suggest that firms change their
innovation strategies as often as is necessary for them to be strong competitors.
Detailed description is in Chapter 2.4.
Both theories of the innovation process expect some path dependencies based on
best behaviour, hinting that there can be optimal strategic choices on the firm level.
However, it remains unclear how firms can figure out this optimal behaviour ex
ante.
The method section in this chapter describes in detail how dynamics are taken into
account in the estimation for innovation strategies in order to be comparable over
time. As described in Chapter 2.3, some dynamics of innovative activities and,
therefore, choices in the innovation system are to be expected for a single firm.
Firms get older, and there are learning-by-doing effects as successful firms have
more credibility and less credit constraints. These and other effects all influence
possible choices in the innovation system — what kind of capabilities the firm
can have, what kind of barriers to innovation the firm has, and other elements —
which evolve over time for a single firm.
Data used for the estimation of firm innovation strategies and patterns of innova-
tion is described in Chapter 4.
Patterns of innovation are relevant for policy making and have potential use in
industrial and innovation policy (Archibugi, 2001). Since patterns of innovation
aggregate firms into homogeneous groups based on innovative behaviour, they can
be more specific than policies based on sectors of economic activities. The latter
can be very heterogeneous in their actual activities. In Estonia, firms that develop
garden houses and modular wooden smart houses are in the same sector based on
economic activities, but their innovative behaviour can differ greatly.
The most prominent type of estimation for patterns of innovation is the OECD
high-tech-low-tech classification (Hatzichronoglou, 1997). It has been incorpo-
rated into national statistics and is a constant basis for policy making and indexing
of innovativeness. However, it relies on R&D intensity only.
The OECD classification has been criticised for arguably influencing policy mak-
ing too much to cater only to high-tech firms (Hirsch-kreinsen et al., 2003; von
Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005). Von Tunzelmann and Acha (2005) argue that low-
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tech firms have different innovative behaviour and contribute just as much to over-
all economic welfare. A search for specific low-tech firm based growth in Europe
has been without results (Heidenreich, 2009). However, results from Heidenreich
(2009) show that there are behavioural differences between high-tech and low-
tech firms, which is also under investigation in this thesis.
Patterns of innovation are, therefore, relevant for understanding the innovation
process. Patterns of innovation can be used to analyse key differences in de-
terminants of innovation, levels and types of innovative efforts and relationships
between performance, and technology and innovations (Bogliacino and Pianta,
2016). They provide one meaningful basis on how to create understandable groups
of firms, which share some underlying behavioural traits.
6.2. Two-step estimation with EFA and k-means
There are no agreed upon strict definitions on how innovation strategies and pat-
terns of innovation are estimated. Two fairly recent overviews of methods found
in the literature point to very different directions (see De Jong and Marsili (2006)
and Frenz and Lambert (2012)). De Jong and Marsili (2006) include a wider cat-
egorisation, where patterns of innovation range from Pavitt’s taxonomy (1984)
to the high-tech-low-tech categorisation used by the OECD (Hatzichronoglou,
1997). Methods include both quantitative and qualitative analysis, mean testing,
ANOVA testing of groups, etc.
Frenz and Lambert (2012) give an overview of a set of papers which rely on two-
step analysis, where relevant variables are first reduced in dimension with some
type of factor analysis and then clustered. They point out that even when similar
methods are applied, the comparability of results needs to take into account: (i)
the methodology; (ii) the measures or variables used in the analysis; and (iii) how
and where the data is gathered.
The most frequent approach is to build on two steps. First, relevant dimensions of
the innovation process within the firm are reduced in dimension to form coherent
innovation activities or innovation strategies. These are sets of actions which are
usually concurrent within the firm. These strategies are not exclusive. Firms may
use several strategies at the same time. Second, these strategies are then clustered
together in a way that some groups form. Now, we get a single estimate for a
firm of which group it belongs to. These groups are based on what strategies are
mostly applied together by firms. There is no specific rule or strict number of
strategies and groups that can be formed.
This thesis builds upon these two-step analyses and expands them to a dynamic
setting. The reasoning to adopt this approach is the following. First, without
presupposing innovation activities and forming factors, it is possible to build upon
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what firms are actually doing — a so-called data first perspective. Second, this
approach is more common to estimate patterns of innovation which rely on a
wider set of innovative activities. Third, this approach is more common in recent
empirical works. Fourth, there is an aspect of comparability with other papers.
However, as pointed out already, it has its dangers as well.
The first step of the method applied in this thesis is to reduce variable dimen-
sions with exploratory factor analysis (EFA). EFA is a method to construct latent
variables. With EFA, we believe that the variables used in the analysis are part
of some unobserved characteristics, each of them contributing to something mea-
sured indirectly. For example, we can measure if firms are spending on R&D,
cooperating with universities and hiring academics. The latent construct would be
how science based the firms’ behaviour is. There is no direct measurement to this
characteristic, but there are indirect proxies which can tell about the effect. With
EFA, some measurements can overlap; some variables can contribute to several
latent constructs at the same time.
Some researchers have opted to use principal component analysis (PCA) as the
first step (e.g. De Jong and Marsili (2006), Filippetti (2011), and Marsili and
Verspagen (2002). PCA is a variable reduction technique where observed vari-
ables are reduced to a smaller number of principal components which account
for most of the variance in the original observed variables. Principal components
are linear combinations of the original variables which maximise the variation.
In total, the same number of principal components can be extracted as there are
original variables. Then the principal components would account for all of the
variance in the data as well.
Principal components in PCA are linear combinations. The first principal com-
ponent accounts for the most amount of variance, the second less, and so forth.
This means that the first principal component is a linear combination in a pro-
jection in geometric space that finds the largest variance between n-number of
variables. Simply put, it finds two observations in the data, one with all variables
with minimum values and another with maximum values, and projects the first
principal component through these two points. This also means that on the princi-
pal scores, the minimum value is the firm which has the minimum value in every
observable characteristic, and, on the other end, the firm with the highest values.
The second principal component is orthogonal to the first one, the third one to the
second one, and so forth.
This creates problems in step two, where principal scores or factor scores are
clustered. If the first principal score accounts for enough variance, then clusters
are divided on that plane. Cluster one would be firms with the lowest observable
characteristics, and cluster n would be those with the highest. Simply put, we
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would order firms based on minimum and maximum values in the n-dimensional
plane.
EFA creates factor scores which do not have this property. In EFA, an observed
variable can influence several factors at the same time, accounting for more vari-
ance in both factors. Therefore, the estimates are more aligned in thinking with
latent constructs. These latent constructs are innovation strategies which rely on
several choices at the same time. EFA has been more common as the first step as
well, e.g. Camacho and Rodriguez (2008), Frenz and Lambert (2009, 2012), Hol-
lenstein (2003, 2018), Leiponen and Drejer (2007), and Srholec and Verspagen
(2008). At the end of the first step, there are factor scores available for every firm,
the exact number of which depends on the researcher. Each of these factor scores
represents a strategy which is the combination of choices for the firm, inputs and
outputs of innovative activities. Since firms can have multiple strategies at the
same time, all these constructs are taken into account in step two.
EFA has been carried out with polyserial correlations and OLS to find the min-
imum residual solution1. Some authors use the Pearson correlation matrix and
some polyserial, meaning that variables with less than ten units are calculated
with a polychoric correlation instead. Polychoric correlation treats variables as
latent continous variables and amplifies their correlation (Kolenikov and Ange-
les, 2004). A more recent study has shown that polychoric correlations might
not always be the best fit and ordinal PCA can work with discrete data as well
(Kolenikov and Angeles, 2009). With this dataset, I found that even though the
correlation matrix and the factor scores are different with polychoric correlations,
the clustering solution is similar. Factor scores calculated with a polyserial cor-
relation matrix significantly increased the cumulative variance accounted for by
factors with this dataset. Therefore, I opted for the polyserial correlation matrix.
Extracted factors are rotated with varimax rotation for easier interpretability. Fac-
tor scores are stored and used in step two.
Step two is a clustering exercise. The general idea is to combine firms into groups
based on the strategies found in step one. Firms which are similar in their innova-
tion strategies are combined into one group.
After the initial data reduction, k-means clusters are estimated. It is an iterative
clustering technique where the first cluster means are chosen at random, and then
all the variables are appointed to clusters and the means are re-calculated, iter-
atively reaching an optimal solution – within-group homogeneity and between
group heterogeneity are maximised (Hair et al., 2014). As opposed to hierarchical
1 Details in Psych package: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/psych/psych.pdf p.135 under
fa.
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clustering, k-means is better suited to deal with a large number of heterogeneous
data, but there are no visual aids for choosing the optimal number of clusters.
Clustering solutions with clusters between 3 and 6 are compared based on inter-
pretability and size of clusters. Solutions with very small clusters are not optimal,
since they rely on some very niche characteristics of the innovation process which
are unique to only a handful of firms. In the end, a clustering solution is chosen
by the researcher, and it is always subject to some criticism.
The k-means clustering solution is calculated by Hartigan and Wong’s (1979) al-
gorithm. Initial seeds are chosen as random (seed is set in programming for repli-
cability) and observations are distributed to clusters, maximising between cluster
heterogeneity. It is an iterative algorithm. After every round new means for clus-
ter centers are calculated and observations are distributed to their nearest cluster.
The iterative solution is found when it reaches a stable solution and changes in
observation distribution do not increase between cluster distance.
Papers cited here have all relied on cross-sectional data. Hollenstein (2018) has
estimated innovation strategies in a panel setting using the same methods as in an
earlier cross-sectional dataset (Hollenstein, 2003). He assumes that firms pursue
only one type of innovation strategy. I assume that firms pursue multiple strategies
simultaneously and they can change over time.
Methods for panel setting can use the same methods as in the cross-sectional data
in this case. Since reducing variable dimensions with either EFA or PCA loses
inevitably some variation in the original data, estimating new factors for every
period would make factor scores incomparable over periods. Factor scores would
retain information about different activities over time, based on general population
averages. This means that firms relying on exactly the same activities over time
could be classified into different clusters in the second step. This is not an ideal
solution.
Using EFA in a panel setting without specifying any time controls means that the
firm is entered into calculations multiple times. When all observable characteris-
tics are the same over time, the factor scores are also identical for the same firm.
Therefore, the firm would be perceived to have the same innovation strategies over
time, which aligns with our interest.
After the clustering solution, a discrete variable for every firm in every period is
available, describing the innovation pattern to which the firm belongs. This can
then be modelled as an ordinary discrete variable.
This two step estimation is presented in Figure 6.1.
Descriptive statistics about the clustering solution are presented graphically with
methods from discrete state analysis. Not very known for economists, these are
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Exploratory Factor
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Step 1 Step 2
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• Latent constructs of
innovation strategies
• 6 factor solution
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dominant strategy per firm
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K-means Clustering
Figure 6.1: Two step estimation technique to estimate patterns of innovation for
every firm.
helpful in plotting three-dimensional data where one dimension is discrete, mean-
ing no ranking is logically superior to another. Discrete states have properties that
shift from one state to another. I estimate state transition matrices for every pair of
observations. These are basically transitional probabilities to change states, also
known as Markov chains. Transition rates provide information about the most
frequent state changes in the data and the diagonals in the matrix about the prob-
ability to remain the same state. For calculation references, see Gabadinho et al.
(2011).
The solution from clustering is stored and used as an input in Chapter 8. Relevant
dimensions are both discrete states and state sequences.
6.3. Estimation of dynamics of firm innovation strategies
This section describes the dynamics of firm innovation strategies. The estimation
is a two-step analysis, described in Chapter 6.2.
The first step is EFA to reduce variable dimensions. Variables used to create the
factor constructs are in Table 6.1 with factor loadings. The number of factors to
retain is not exactly fixed. VSS test suggests three factors for maximum complex-
ity. Parallel analysis suggests 8 factors. Other tests suggests factors ranging from
2 to 13. Therefore, there are no uniform answers with formal tests.
The factors have diminishing returns in explaining variance. The general solution
is to retain factors if they have eigenvalues over 1, meaning they explain more
variance than a single variable would. A second important criteria is that they
are interpretable in some way. According to these criteria, 6 factors have been
retained in the factor analysis. I analysed solutions ranging from 4 to 8 factors, and
solutions above 6 created factor loadings which included uninterpretable results.
The Kayser-Meyer-Olkin index of sampling adequacy suggests that variables are
meritorious to use in the analysis (Kaiser, 1974). Table 6.1 shows variables used
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to create latent constructs of strategies, factor loadings and communalities for ev-
ery variable. Some variables have rather low communalities, such as the use of
trademarks or training as innovative inputs. This means that factors do not explain
most of the variance in this variable. Therefore, with this example, factors do not
explain the variation in the use of trademarks. Either there are some other strate-
gies that complement the use of trademarks, or they simply do not coincide with
other values. One possible mechanism for low communalities is the lack of vari-
ance in the variable itself. For example, the average value for use of trademarks is
high, but they have been used a lot by a small number of firms. Most firms in the
CIS dataset do not have any trademarks registered.
Table 6.1: Standardized factor loadings matrix
Varimax rotated factor loadings
Variable MR1 MR4 MR2 MR5 MR3 MR6 h2
sources: internal 0.08 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.01 0.55 0.43
sources: suppliers 0.15 0.06 -0.07 0.16 0.68 0.01 0.51
sources: universities 0.23 0.67 -0.08 0.32 0.08 0.10 0.63
sources: clients 0.14 0.11 0.30 0.53 0.06 0.08 0.41
sources: competitors 0.14 0.04 0.11 0.75 0.10 0.06 0.61
sources: conferences 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.40 0.30 -0.10 0.36
cooperation: suppliers 0.82 0.22 0.12 -0.04 0.38 0.12 0.90
cooperation: universities 0.62 0.65 -0.06 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.84
cooperation: competitors 0.86 0.10 0.08 0.32 0.05 0.10 0.87
cooperation: clients 0.79 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.79
cooperation: within group 0.44 0.07 0.11 -0.10 0.04 0.78 0.83
cooperation: consultants 0.73 0.41 -0.03 0.12 0.09 0.19 0.77
inputs: training 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.34 0.25 0.28
inputs: marketing 0.10 0.25 0.60 0.15 -0.04 0.11 0.46
inputs: outsourced R&D 0.28 0.60 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.24 0.53
inputs: internal R&D 0.20 0.64 0.19 0.17 0.01 0.19 0.55
inputs: acquis. machinery 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.68 0.01 0.46
inputs: acquis. knowledge 0.23 0.34 0.15 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.34
innovation intensity (to market) 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.13
innovation intensity (to firm) -0.04 -0.11 0.42 -0.02 0.01 0.13 0.21
goal: capture new markets 0.08 0.17 0.58 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.42
goal: widen product portfolio 0.08 0.21 0.76 0.15 -0.04 0.07 0.66
appropriation: trademark 0.05 0.28 0.15 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.10
appropriation: formal methods 0.02 0.55 0.14 -0.10 0.05 0.04 0.34
SS loadings 3.53 2.79 1.9 1.55 1.39 1.28
Proportion Var 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05
Cumulative Var 0.15 0.26 0.34 0.41 0.46 0.52
Cum. factor Var 0.28 0.51 0.66 0.79 0.9 1
Kayser-Meyer-Olkin MSA 0.82
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 4811.
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Six factors are shown to be constructs of the latent behaviour of firms, choices
that firms make which are relevant for their innovative activities and are taken at
the same time. These latent constructs can be considered operational strategies. In
Table 6.1, the factors are shown for each variable, which can be given interpretable
names as well. I will describe all six factors in turn.
MR1 describes choices in the open innovation paradigm, firms relying on cooper-
ation relationships with suppliers, universities, competitors and clients, internally
and with consultants. These are formal cooperations and partnerships in some
activities.
MR4 describes choices in a science-based strategy. Factors load on relationships
with universities, both formal and informal. Firms rely on internal and external
R&D, and acquisition of knowledge as inputs for innovative activities. They also
use consultants. This is the only strategy which relies on formal methods of ap-
propriation, such as patents, industrial designs and industrial models.
MR2 describes a marketing-oriented strategy. Firms rely on marketing as the most
important input. They have a high innovation intensity with innovations that are
new only to the firm. These choices coincide with goals that aim to capture new
markets geographically and widen the portfolio of products and services. Smaller
loadings are on formal and informal relationships with clients and, similarly, with
methods for appropriation, both trademarks and formal.
MR5 describes a copying strategy. The most important inputs are informal rela-
tionships on the market, especially with competitors. Firms rely on information
received from other sources, but these choices are not binding. There is some in-
dication of forming formal partnerships with competitors and even less with other
partners.
MR3 is a strategy reliant on suppliers. Firms use suppliers to create innovative
processes. The relevant inputs are training of employee skills and acquisition of
machinery.
MR6 is an internal strategy. Firms rely heavily on internal sources and work
within the group. This strategy depends on subsidiary relationships.
These 6 factors are used for the second step of the analysis — k-means clustering.
Solutions between 3 and 6 clusters were compared, and 5 was ultimately chosen.
Solutions with 6 clusters started creating very small clusters which did not have
very distinct diversity to justify the estimation.
The fewer clusters there are, the more variation is needed in its strategic behaviour
for the firm to be shifted into a new group. This means that if fewer clusters
are created, the level of change a firm needs to make in its innovative behaviour
is greater and the relative number of shifts should be lower. If possible, fewer
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clusters would make the threshold lower, which would be considered a strategic
change.
Using factors as a baseline for clustering yields possibilities that some clusters
will rely on two coinciding factors at the same time. However, most firms rely
heavily on a single strategy. A cross-table between clusters and factors is in Table
6.2. These clusters will be interpreted as patterns of innovation. The numbers in
the table are means of factor scores, and the underlying distributions are presented
in Appendix VI.
Table 6.2: Cross-table of clustering solutions with factor loadings
Factor scores
MR1 MR4 MR2 MR5 MR3 MR6
Pattern of innovation Open Science Marketing Copying Suppliers Internal
Open innovation 1 2.25 0.36 0.19 0.67 0.34 0.38
Science based 2 0.47 2.73 0.21 −0.29 0.12 0.13
Market oriented 3 −0.59 −0.05 0.56 0.33 −0.24 −0.34
Internal strategy 4 −0.05 −0.39 0.21 −0.52 −0.07 1.51
Supplier based 5 −0.33 −0.46 −0.86 −0.35 0.14 −0.5
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 4811.
There are some strategies which create more distinct patterns of innovations than
others. For example, open innovation and science based strategies are more sepa-
rate from other strategies. The internal pattern of innovation is also representative
of a very specific attitude. Market oriented and supplier based patterns of inno-
vations are more alike than others. They mostly are distinct based on two factor
scores, either marketing or suppliers.
The visual distribution seen in Appendix VI shows how these patterns of innova-
tions coincide. For example, for MR3, the supplier based strategy, most patterns
of innovations actually have fairly similar distributions. All firms rely on suppliers
to some extent.
For some strategies, such as MR2, the marketing oriented strategy, firms are di-
vided. Firms in the supplier based pattern of innovation rely less on this strategy
than all other patterns of innovations.
Firm specific descriptives are in Table 6.3. The two biggest patterns of innovations
are the market oriented and supplier based categories. They account for nearly
two-thirds of all observations. The smallest category is science based firms. Open
innovation and internal strategies are roughly the same size.
The factoring solutions did not include whether the firm was foreign-owned or
part of a group. However, from the behaviour alone, it was possible to induce an
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internal strategy pattern of innovation, out of which 99% of firms are part of a
group. This is a good indication that the clustering solution can create believable
constructs.
Table 6.3: Firm characteristics in patterns of innovations
Pattern of Obs Firms Workers Foreign Part of Tangible Intangible
innovation owned group assets assets
Open innovation 618 443 183.46 0.4 0.67 9 041 676 396 569
Science based 300 200 248.26 0.32 0.57 12 548 251 656 339
Market oriented 1699 1180 74.55 0.27 0.43 2 058 475 90 410
Internal strategy 699 503 128.75 0.6 0.99 6 155 868 138 349
Supplier based 1495 1043 72.61 0.23 0.41 2 845 135 86 079
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 4811.
There are some size differences between patterns of innovations. Bigger firms are
more likely to be science based or open innovation, smaller firms market oriented
or supplier based. The latter categories were characterised by lack of partnerships.
Perhaps smaller firms lack capabilities to establish partnerships and have to rely
on more informal relationships.
Table 6.3 also highlights fixed assets on balance for these firms. Mean values
for tangible and intangible assets are visible and correlate with firm size based
on employees. There are small differences between market oriented and supplier
based firms. The ratio between tangible and intangible assets is larger in supplier
based firms, more towards tangible assets, and in market oriented firms, towards
intangible. This aligns with strategies as well, as market oriented firms are more
likely to use trademarks and marketing as an input to innovative activities.
The characteristics shown in Table 6.3 are one indication that smaller and bigger
firms also have different decision making processes. The underlying variables
which were used to create constructs of innovative behaviour did not include any
variables that could be directly linked with firm size or industry, such as number
of workers or revenue. Because firms are not able to change their size or industry
quickly, this would create patterns of innovations based on fixed characteristics.
Firm strategic choices can change more quickly. If firms position changes from
one pattern of innovation to another in subsequent periods, it is based solely on
strategic choices.
The ratio between observations and firms shows how stable the clustering solution
to estimate patterns of innovation is. Firms have multiple observations in the
dataset. A perfectly stable firm would be counted several times within one pattern
of innovation. If the ratio between observations is close to one, it would mean that
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every firm would be within a pattern of innovation only once, a relatively unstable
position and a strategy that is not persistent.
Table 6.4: Innovation outputs in patterns of innovation. Share of firms with output,
in percentages
Type of innovation output:
Product Process Organisational Marketing
Open innovation 80 82 74 64
Science based 82 74 60 53
Market oriented 86 62 49 52
Internal strategy 70 77 55 40
Supplier based 23 80 37 27
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 4811.
Firms within different patterns of innovations also contrast in their innovative out-
put patterns. Table 6.4 presents the main innovation outputs within all patterns of
innovations. Other characteristics based on decisions are in Appendix VII. I will
briefly characterise all patterns of innovations.
Open innovation firms are most innovative of all patterns of innovations. They
rely heavily on partnerships and external knowledge and consider sources outside
of the firm to be important to their innovative activities. They rely less on uni-
versities and public research institutes and more on other types of sources, such
as suppliers, clients, competitors, consultants, conferences and so forth. Open
innovation firms fund inputs for innovative activities relatively more than other
patterns of innovations. However, R&D is not their main focus. Open innovation
firms aim to increase quality in production, increase productivity and flexibility,
widen their portfolio and find new markets. Open innovation firms can be consid-
ered active in their strategy with focus on different aspects and partnerships at the
same time.
Science based firms rely heavily on universities and public research institutes and
do the most in-house and outsourced R&D relative to all other patterns of inno-
vations. They have relatively low levels of partnerships with competitors. The
most important goals for science based firms are quality increases, new markets
and portfolio widening. At the same time, science based firms have the highest
values for use of different appropriation methods. They have the only patterns of
innovation which rely on patents, industrial models and industrial designs. They
also have the highest share of trademarks registered. Science based firms rely
most on technological knowledge, since their innovative output is focused more
on products than processes. This group is the smallest in the sample.
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Market oriented firms have the most product innovations and fewer process inno-
vations. Their strategy relies on outside sources of knowledge, such as competi-
tors, clients, suppliers and conferences, and less so with universities. However,
they have very little formal partnerships. If so, these are only with clients and
suppliers. At the same time, their goals are to widen their portfolios of products
and services, capture new markets and increase quality. The only appropriation
methods they rely on are trademarks. Market oriented firms rely on external infor-
mal knowledge. They have the highest share of relying on marketing funding as
an input to innovative activities. Other inputs lie in the relative middle, between
extremes. The market oriented pattern of innovation is the largest in this sample.
Internal strategy pattern of innovation is mainly based on within group relation-
ships. Firms in this group have both product and process innovations as outputs,
while the focus is on the latter. Their most important sources are internal or within
group, followed by suppliers. Virtually all firms are characterised by formal re-
lationships within the group as well. Around one quarter also have partnerships
with clients and suppliers. The most important inputs are machinery and worker
training. Acquisition of knowledge, internal R&D and marketing are also rele-
vant in this group. The main focus is on quality increases, followed by portfolio
widening and flexibility in production.
Supplier based pattern of innovation is the least innovative. These firms are fo-
cused on process innovations, while few also have product innovations. They have
virtually no formal partnerships with anyone except suppliers, and the most im-
portant source for innovative activities is also suppliers. The mean values for other
groups are lowest among patterns of innovations identified here. Their most im-
portant goal is quality increase, followed by productivity increase and flexibility
in production. Most supplier based firms rely on acquisition of machinery as an
input to innovative activities. The second most important input is worker training.
Supplier based pattern of innovation is the second biggest in the sample.
Firms that have multiple observations in the dataset can belong to any of these
patterns of innovations based solely on their choices and actions while doing in-
novative activities.
Since patterns of innovations are categorical values, I will use plots that describe
state sequences to visualise firm behaviour. These are not very known in eco-
nomics, but more in other sociological fields which deal with discrete state analy-
sis.
The dataset includes 3502 firms with 9155 observations. This is an unbalanced
dataset, where a lot of firms have few observations, some only one. Patterns are
described in Appendix II. However, there is a smaller balanced dataset within this
sample. This consists of 654 firms, all of which have been surveyed in every CIS
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included here. Altogether these 3270 observations account for 35% of the total
sample.
I believe that the plots are more understandable for the reader when the smaller
balanced dataset is used. Therefore, I will show the plots for the smaller balanced
dataset in the main text and the full sample plots are in the appendices. When
contrasted, they seem to indicate the same results which are also confirmed with
state transition matrices later on.
All firms which were included in the CIS but indicated that they were not innova-
tive were included in the analysis. They received a not innovative category, since
they did not have an innovation strategy. The CIS surveys whether firms had a
failed or continuing strategy, but these firms indicated that this was not the case.
This allows us to observe also the persistence of innovative behaviour.
Figure 6.2 in the text and in Appendix VIII show state distributions over time. The
state distributions indicate if major structural shifts occurred, such as firms tak-
ing up different behaviours. The not innovative category becomes larger in later
years. The only shift visible is that market oriented and supplier based patterns
of innovation become smaller and not innovative becomes larger. The rest remain
relatively the same over the period.
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Figure 6.2: Patterns of innovation states distribution plot over time. n = 3270.
Source: Innovation Data (2018)
Figure 6.3 in the text and in Appendix IX show the distribution of states for every
firm. This plot draws a single line for every firm that is included and plots its state
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Figure 6.3: Patterns of innovation state sequence plot over time. n = 3270 (obs.);
n = 654 (firms).
Source: Innovation Data (2018)
sequences in color. For example, the first line in Figure 6.3 is a firm that started as
a science based firm in 2004 and remained so until 2012. The plot is sorted from
period one for easier visualisation. These figures allow us to visualise the path for
every firm.
Figure 6.2 and Appendix IX show that firms are not very stable in their patterns
of innovation. There are very few firms which have managed to stay in the same
pattern of innovation for five periods in a row. The majority of these cases belong
to the not innovative category. This implies that the persistence of being not in-
novative is stronger than belonging to any single pattern of innovation. However,
firms are free to change between patterns of innovations as well.
Overall statistics about shifts between patterns of innovation are in Table 6.5.
The last column, where firms have participated 5 times, is the exact same smaller
balanced panel visualised in Figures 6.2 and 6.3.
From visualisations in Figure 6.3 and in Appendix IX and Table 6.5, it is evident
that firms change their behaviour quite often. For example, half of firms which
have participated twice in the CIS belong to different patterns of innovations the
second time. For firms with three and more observations in the dataset, the proba-
bility to remain in only one pattern of innovation is the smallest. Therefore, there
are considerable dynamic effects in firm innovative behaviour, constant changes
that are big enough that they are measurable with strategies constructed here.
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Table 6.5: Cross-table of CIS participation and pattern of innovation affiliation
Unique patterns of innovations CIS participations
per firm 1 2 3 4 5
1 1193 379 181 81 100
2 312 272 183 274
3 93 130 211
4 24 66
5 3
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 9155.
The largest variance can be seen for three firms which have belonged to five dif-
ferent patterns of innovations over the period, a relatively large shift in behaviour
during ten years. These three firms did not have a dynamic that could be ex-
plained with simple logic, starting from supplier based and ending with scientific
capabilities.
Table 6.6: State transition matrix for all firms for all periods, in percentages
To:
Not Supplier Internal Market Open Science
From: innovative based strategy oriented innovation based
Not innovative 74.0 12.7 3.6 7.3 1.9 0.6
Supplier based 35.1 34.8 6.8 16.8 4.5 2.2
Internal strategy 25.5 14.1 34.5 16.2 7.6 2.1
Market oriented 26.0 20.1 7.9 34.7 7.4 4.1
Open innovation 11.6 14.3 13.5 21.9 31.4 7.4
Science based 8.0 8.5 3.2 25.0 11.7 43.6
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 9155.
In Table 6.6, there is a state transition matrix for all observations. This is calcu-
lated for every observation pair, the transition probability to shift between states.
The diagonal is the measure of stability, the probability to remain in the same
state.
The highest probability is for not innovative firms to remain not innovative. The
second highest probability is for science based firms to remain science based. For
other categories, the probability to remain the same is around 35%. For supplier
based firms, there is slightly higher probability to be not innovative in the fol-
lowing period than remain in the same category. This is the only category where
change from the original state is less probable than shifting.
The first column in Table 6.6 is basically probabilities for firms to become not
innovative in subsequent periods. It is clear that the probability is low for science
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based firms and firms with open innovation strategies. For internal strategy and
market oriented firms, the probability to be not innovative in the next period is
around 25%. For supplier based firms, it is 35%.
The lowest probabilities are in the last column, the probability to become a science
based firm. If the firm was not innovative in the previous period, there is less than
1% probability that they opted for a science based strategy in the next. This is an
indication that capabilities are difficult to build. For other patterns of innovation,
the probabilities are less than 10% to become science based in the next period.
There is a full state transition matrix in Appendix X, where transition rates are cal-
culated between every period with missing values included. Similar conclusions
can be drawn from this transition matrix: the probability to become not innova-
tive increases over time. This could be deduced from descriptive statistics as well,
which show a downward sloping trend for innovativeness.
The highest probability to not be included in the next CIS is for market oriented
firms. It is not known whether it is because their business fails or because most
firms are market oriented and are substitutable in data gathering.
The relative stability of patterns of innovation gets smaller in every subsequent
wave. Firms are changing their strategies more often than in the beginning of
the period. The probability of shifting between different innovation strategies is
high, meaning firms change their attitudes towards innovative behaviour often.
They change partners for upgrading knowledge bases and cooperation networks
often. This result is similar to findings from Switzerland (Hollenstein, 2018),
where the high rate of transition is due to the pressures in a highly advanced
economy to increase innovation intensity. However, Estonian firms are not known
to be at the forefront of innovative activity, politely called moderate innovators in
the EU Innovation Scoreboard. There is a need for better understanding of the
determinants of shifting between patterns of innovation.
A variance based estimation of firm-level patterns of innovations gives robust re-
sults which are similar to cross-sectional studies done before. I have tested this
model with Pearson and polychoric correlation matrices as a baseline. I used these
as input for EFA and PCA and clustered the scores. Depending on the input vari-
ables, it is possible to create patterns of innovation that are more skewed towards
innovation, cooperation or fiscal attributes. These results remained the same when
all the variables used in the descriptive tables were included or other combinations
of them. In all tests, the overall structure across different years remained relatively
stable.
The patterns of innovation created here remain as a baseline for Chapter 8, where
one possible mechanism to induce dynamics is investigated. The next chapter es-
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tablishes the relationship between public sector support and innovativeness. These
patterns of innovations are stored for later estimations without changes.
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7. PUBLIC SECTOR SUPPORT AND FIRM
INNOVATION OUTPUTS
The structure of this section is as follows. First, I will explain the aim of this
chapter, the research questions and objectives. Second, I will describe where it
fits in the theory provided in Chapters 2 and 3. Third, I explain the method to
reach the objectives. Fourth, I estimate the results. Fifth, I interpret the results.
Sixth, I discuss how it relates to the rest of the thesis.
7.1. Subcategories of innovative outputs
The aim of this chapter is to investigate if policy instruments are related to inno-
vative activities. If the main aim of this thesis is to understand the possible effect
that policy instruments can have on the dynamics of firm innovation strategies,
then it must be established beforehand whether policy instruments are related to
innovation at all. To achieve this aim, I estimate the relationship between firm
innovation outputs and policy instruments.
At the end of Chapter 2, the innovation process of the firm is graphed. Policy
instruments can affect multiple parts of this process within the single firm, as
shown in Chapter 3. In this estimation, it is only possible to observe if there
are significant correlations between innovation outputs and policy instruments.
Innovation outputs are surveyed in the CIS. In Figures 5.5 and 5.6, innovation
outputs are shown in broad categories.
The distinction of innovation outputs is even more specific in the CIS. In Table
7.1, technological and non-technological innovation outputs are shown. The main
categories, technological and non-technological, are divided into four subcate-
gories: product, process, marketing and organisational innovations. Product and
process innovations also have subcategories.
The distinction and definitions are based on the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005),
which is the theoretical foundation for the CIS. Chapter 4.1 provides background
on the CIS, how the data is gathered, what type of questions are involved and the
possible setbacks. Here, I will provide brief descriptions of these categories based
on how they are defined in the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005)1.
1 The main types of innovation are defined in Chapter 3 and citations therein, which I recommend to
all interested readers if they wish to understand how innovation measurement is done in practice,
and how they are defined in the CIS.
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Table 7.1: Technological and non-technological innovation outputs with subcate-
gories, by year, in shares of survey population
CIS 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Firms in survey 1747 1924 2026 1735 1723
Technological 0.52 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.45
Product innovations 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.25
New products 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.18
New services 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.11
Process innovations 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.28
New process 0.25 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.20
New distribution 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.06
New support system 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.14
Non-technological 0.51 0.54 0.40 0.40 0.34
Marketing 0.26 0.34 0.27 0.28 0.24
Organisational 0.44 0.46 0.29 0.27 0.23
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 9155.
Product innovations are goods or services which are new or significantly im-
proved. Product innovations can include improvements in technical specifications,
materials, components, software, ease of use or other functional characteristics.
They can be combinations of existing knowledge or completely new knowledge.
An example of a combination of existing knowledge is the iPhone, where exist-
ing technologies were combined in a way to create a new innovative product. An
example of completely new technologies creating completely new products is the
first digital cameras.
New services can include new functions, improvements in means of provision,
some other characteristic improvements, or completely new services. An exam-
ple of a new service is ’click and collect’ package automation service, where
customers can pick up their packages from various locations instead of having
couriers reach their location. An example of an improvement is new functions
and ease of use in e-services such as banking, e-shopping, etc.
When Pavitt’s taxonomy (1984) (see Chapter 2.1) considers relationships between
firms on how innovations are produced, new products and services can be a simple
example. An example of ’click and collect’ automated package collection robots
was given as a new service. These machines are currently very popular in Esto-
nia. This is a new service to postal companies in how they deliver packages and
interact with customers. They offer significant improvements in comfort for some
customers, not mentioning a reduction in the cost and time it takes to reach cus-
tomers, if they do not have to visit everyone’s location. These machines are also
product innovations for the companies that invented them and are supplying the
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hardware. It includes process innovations for postal companies in how they have
to manage logistics, package tracking, customer relations and so forth. Deliver-
ing a new service to customers can be a combined effort, where innovations take
place in several companies which are all suppliers, providers, inventors, supply
chain managers and so on. In Pavitt’s taxonomy, the postal company can be a
supplier based innovative firm. Machine providers are either science based, when
they invest heavily in R&D and invent in broad categories, or specialised suppliers
that make tailored machines.
Process innovations are implementations of new or significantly improved produc-
tion or delivery methods. Improvements include changes in techniques, software
and equipment.
Subcategories include new processes for production, new or improved distribution
systems or new support systems. New production processes involve techniques,
equipment, machinery and software used to produce goods or services, for ex-
ample, new automated production lines, such as automated filling machines in
breweries. New distribution systems include logistics and components that deal
with logistics or delivery. Relevant improvements can be in similar aspects as in
production, new machinery, new techniques or software. The latter category, sup-
port systems, includes activities such as purchasing, accounting, maintenance or
computing.
Non-technological innovations are related to marketing and organisational inno-
vations.
Marketing innovations are new or significantly improved marketing methods, sig-
nificant changes in packaging or design, placement, production or pricing. The
latter four are known as the marketing mix or the Four P’s in marketing literature.
Marketing innovations should be distinguishable from a firm’s normal market-
ing instruments, either as new concepts or a new strategy. For example, regular
end-of-season sales are not marketing innovations.
Organisational innovations are related to new business practices, workplace or-
ganisation or external relations. It should be a result of strategic decisions by
management, not serendipitous. The general idea is that improvements are related
to increasing firm productivity by cost savings or worker satisfaction, gaining ac-
cess to new knowledge and new types of relationships.
The Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) has examples for subcategories for both mar-
keting and organisational innovations. However, these have been changed and
clarified several times during the five CIS waves that are in the dataset used in this
thesis. For this reason, subcategories for these innovation types are not used in the
analysis. There might be issues with comparability over the whole period.
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7.2. Generalised linear mixed model
The second estimation in this thesis estimates the relationship between innovation
outputs and public sector support. A taxonomy of public sector subsidies available
to the firm developed in Chapter 3 is used to distinguish between possible inputs
from the public for innovative activities. The novelty in this estimation is the
possibility to look at the relationship between different types of policy instruments
at a fine level and compare it between possible innovation outputs.
Innovation outputs are measured via output indicators of innovative activities such
as product and process innovations with subcategories. The description of the data
and available outputs is in Chapter 4.1. All output indicators are binary data for
the firm.
The model is specified as a random effects logit model. This is also known as a
generalised linear mixed model (GLMM) with a binomial link and both fixed and
random effects. The model is specified as a GLMM with random intercepts.
GLMM specifies fixed effects for controls, such as time and industry. Random
intercepts are estimated for every firm.
The model is specified as:
P (yij) =
exp
(
α+
K∑
k=1
βkXijk + uj
)
1 + exp
(
α+
K∑
k=1
βkXijk + uj
) (7.1)
where:
ij = ith observation for the jth firm
K = number of independent variables (fixed effects); 21 for the full model
X = independent variables
α = intercepts for whole model
β = coefficients
uj = intercept for every firm
The second most common alternative model for estimating logit models in a panel
setting is the fixed effects model, which is not feasible with this data. I will explain
this based on the sample used in this thesis. If there is a large number of firms,
but not many observations over time for every firm, there is no variation in the
outcome within a single firm. The advantage of fixed effects is that the model
compares the single firm against itself over time, meaning there is no need for
some of the control variables. The controls are unobserved characteristics that do
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not change over time within the firm, but they are very different when compared
between firms, such as the entrepeneurial culture near the firm’s location or the
strength of the financial system in a region. These are hard to control for, but they
remain relatively unchanged for the firm during the estimation. The weakness of
fixed effects is that there should also be some sort of variation in the outcome. If
the dataset is very unbalanced, there is just not enough variation in the outcome
for most firms. In the sample here, the firms are either innovative or not during
the whole period. Therefore, a random effects logit model specification is more
suitable in this case. For firms without variation in outcomes, mean variation is
used for estimating coefficients.
Since firms cannot be compared against themselves over time,the random effects
model should include control variables for firms. Table 7.2 highlights the descrip-
tive statistics for control variables. The full model specifies controls for firm size,
firm age, exporting status, foreign ownership, time and industry.
Table 7.2: Control variables in model, share of sample or mean, by year
Variable 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Observations 1 747 1924 2 026 1 735 1 723
Foreign owned firms 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.28 0.26
Exporting firms 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.79
Workers (mean) (log in model) 86.07 83.38 79.96 72.26 70.38
Age (mean) 9.16 10.26 11.47 12.99 14.02
Science based 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09
Scale-information intensive 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19
Specialised suppliers 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.14
Supporting infrastructure services 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08
Supplier dominated 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.49
Source: Innovation Data (2018)
Industry control is based on technological regimes, which are estimated using
NACE data. Technological regimes imply innovating activity characteristics which
are relevant or special for these industries. They are based on sources of techno-
logical opportunity, the appropriability conditions for rents, the cumulativeness
of innovations and the complexity of the knowledge base (Bogliacino and Pianta,
2016; Castellacci, 2008; Pavitt, 1984). A detailed description of technological
regimes is in Chapter 2.1. A NACE classification used in the estimation has been
reported in Bogliacino and Pianta (2016).
For calculation references, see Bates et al. (2015).
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7.3. Endogeneity in regression models and self-selection
We can observe in the Estonian data that innovative firms have higher rates of
being beneficiaries in innovation policy instruments (see Chapter 4.2). How-
ever, simple conclusions about the impact of these instruments cannot be inferred
from this data. Evaluating public support policy programs is notoriously diffi-
cult. “Evaluating such programs is an exercise in counterfactual analysis; neither
supported firms, nor firms not applying for funding can be treated as a random
sample” (Grilli and Murtinu, 2011, p. 3). This non-randomness creates an endo-
geneity problem. It is generally referred to as a selection bias.
Firms have observed and unobserved characteristics. Observed attributes are usu-
ally size, age, location, revenue, etc. These may imply something about the firm
as proxies or describe some of their characteristics in a straight-forward manner.
Unobserved attributes are trickier, since, well, they cannot be or are very difficult
to observe. Some examples are work-ethics and culture in the firm, management
capabilities and ambition, quality of ideas and vision for the future, and so forth.
It is easy to see that these matter a lot for the future success of the firm as well.
Selection bias takes place when firms in the treated group, i.e. who received
public support, and the untreated group, i.e. control group, are different in the
unobserved attributes. Two simple examples explain from where this selection
bias may arise. First, firms self-select into these programs. Therefore, there is
something innately different in the firms or their projects than their peers that
do not enter these programs. Second, public agencies also tend to cherry-pick
projects which they believe have a higher chance of succeeding. This can be
quasi-random, whereby all eligible firms are drawn from a lottery, but it is rarely
so. Most likely, public agencies look at the project itself and assess it on some
level, even if this assessment is purely subjective. Therefore, this characteristic of
beneficiaries is also very hard to observe and quantify.
If this characteristic of the firm that creates the selection bias is not observed
and it affects both the probability of becoming a beneficiary of policy support
instruments and the likelyhood of being more innovative or succesful, it creates
an empirical problem for estimation (Heckman et al., 1998). Simple regression
models are biased in this case. For example, Ordinary Least Squares will under-
estimate standard errors with selection bias and, therefore, overestimate statistical
significance (Heckman, 1979).
In his Nobel lecture, James Heckman referred to this estimation problem with
regards to evaluating the effects of public programs as the treatment effect problem
(Heckman, 2001). In essence, the question is “what is the effect of a program in
place on participants and nonparticipants compared to no program at all or some
alternative program?” (Heckman, 2001, p. 677). It also means that plausible
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counterfactuals have to be used when treatment effects are estimated. There are
many advances in estimation and identification techniques that try to minimise
potential selection bias in policy support programs (Brown et al., 1995; David et
al., 2000; Klette et al., 2000; Zu´n˜iga-Vicente et al., 2014).
I referred to these techniques as both estimation and identification techniques be-
cause some of them do not rely on better econometric approaches but rather on a
better study design that incorporates a good method for creating a control group
from the beginning, for example, randomised controlled trials (RCT). In the Mary-
land Scientific Methods Scale (SMS), there are five levels with increasing com-
plexity and accuracy (Petticrew and Roberts, 2008; Sherman et al., 1998; Welsh
and Farrington, 2007).
Most of our current academic discourse starts from level three with methods
such as Difference-in-Difference (DiD) estimators, General Linear Mixed Models
(GLMM) (which is also used in Chapter 7), matching procedures with Propen-
sity Score Matching (PSM) being most popular, and Heckman Selection Models
(Cerulli, 2010; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009)2. These methods rely on compar-
ing treated groups with counterfactuals with selection bias still in the data gener-
ation process. However, regression or matching methods on observed character-
istics are used to adjust for these differences, so that firms are compared to their
most similar peers. Therefore, some unobserved differences will probably remain
(Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013b, 2014).
Level four methods are more robust techniques, most popular being Instrument
Variable (IV) models or Regression Discontinuity Design (RD), both of which
use quasi-randomness to mimick experimental design. IV models are estimated
in a way that proper instruments are identified which only affect the independent
variable (in this case, the probability of obtaining the public support instrument),
but they have no effect on the outcome (firm performance) (Imbens and Angrist,
1994). Unfortunately, good instruments are very hard to come by. RD models are
estimated when there is a ranking in the selection process (Imbens and Lemieux,
2008). Samples are constructed in a way that only firms which are barely above
the threshold are compared to a control group just below the threshold. The gen-
eral idea is that these firms are so similar to each other, that receiving public
support was basically just pure luck, i.e. a random process.
The gold standard on level five would be RCT design. A large enough sample
permits treatment to be allocated randomly to participants, thereby removing se-
lection bias, since both groups end up being similar in observed and unobserved
characteristics (Duflo et al., 2006; Roper, 2018). RCT design has to be created ex
ante in the data generation process (Bakhshi et al., 2015; Burtless, 1995). There
2 Some examples of recent papers for all of these methods can be found in Zu´n˜iga-Vicente et al.
(2014)
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is a movement to promote more RCT based experimental policy for better under-
standing of the effects of public policy, such as the Innovation Growth Lab and
What Works centre in the UK3, the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation,
or the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL). However, there are sev-
eral features that make the use of RCTs difficult in business support programs,
and they might never reach to the same popularity as in medical science (Dalziel,
2018).
The methods used in this thesis would be qualified on level three of the Maryland
SMS scale. Firms are observed over several periods for before-and-after analysis,
and observable controls are used in modelling. Quasi-random and pure randomly
generated processes are not used in this thesis.
Since the final chapters of the thesis are more concerned with shifts between dif-
ferent states, Markov-Chain models are used for estimation. These models are not
very common in public support analysis and are rarely, if at all, mentioned in sur-
veys of methods and recent results cited here. Still, they provide valuable insight
in the context where there is a large number of choices for firms and possibilities
to change their strategies over time.
Most methods in surveys here deal with binary contexts whereby selection pro-
cesses are modelled for very specific instruments4. In this thesis, a much larger
variance is included in the models which restricts some of the possibilities. There-
fore, it is safe to say that some overestimation of statistical significance in regres-
sion models is highly likely due to selection bias into different business support
instruments.
7.4. Estimation of relationship between policy
instruments and innovativeness
The main results for technological innovations are in Table 7.3 and for non-
technological innovations in Table 7.4. I will introduce the model results for
technological innovations and subgroups first, and then for non-technological in-
novations and subgroups.
These models in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 are presented with subgroups. Estimates can-
not be compared between models, as in comparing the size of coefficients for in-
vestment instruments between new products and new process models. However,
estimates can be compared within the model, such as comparing investment in-
struments with consulting instruments in the new product innovation model. This
3 Innovation Growth Lab in the UK also hosts a database of recent RCT based trials worldwide
4 A good example of a Heckman selection model for multiple grant possibility is in Hottenrott et al.
(2017).
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refers only to coefficient size. The significance of the coefficient suggests that a
positive or negative relationship is not random.
Estimates for technological innovations suggest that investment, innovation and
R&D, marketing and export promotion, and training and skills development in-
struments are positively linked with technological innovation outputs. Consulting,
financial guarantees, mixed support and others are not.
Within product innovations and its subgroups, new products and new services,
some aspects are highlighted. For example, investments, training and skill de-
velopment, and marketing instruments are positively related with product inno-
vations. However, within this category, they are only positively related with new
products and not with new services. This suggests that firms with innovative ac-
tivities mainly related to the creation or improvement of services are not more
likely to be beneficiaries in these instruments.
Investment schemes usually consist of buying new machinery and other equip-
ment, which can provide some explanation to the link with new products and not
with new services. With marketing and export promotion instruments, it is dif-
ficult to ascertain. Firms with new products and services should both be equally
likely beneficiaries of these instruments. Similarly, training and skills develop-
ment instruments are often dealing with soft skills such as marketing, promotion
and management, which are not unique to either products or services.
Mixed support is a relatively rare instrument in this dataset, and it is positively
correlated with only new products in the product innovation categories. Most
firms in this instrument are part of early phase support programs, which might
explain the link with new products.
Other instruments, which are a combination of collaboration programs and direct
subsidies, are positively correlated with only new services in the product innova-
tion category. However, these instruments are very different from each other and
very rare. It is difficult to ascertain the exact relationship between the innovation
output and instruments.
Process innovations and its subgroups, new processes, new distribution systems
and new support systems, show similarly that policy instruments are not uniformly
related with firms. Innovation and R&D instruments are not related with any type
of process innovations at all. This suggests that firms that participate in these
types of instruments are more focused on developing novel products or services.
Investment instruments are positively related to new processes and new support
systems but not with new distribution systems. Investments are mostly acquisi-
tion of new machinery and equipment, which should almost always yield process
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innovations. The lack of effect on new distribution systems suggests that firms are
not seeking extra funding to create these innovations.
Marketing and export promotion instruments are positively correlated with all
types of process innovations. This suggests that firms actively seeking new mar-
kets or new methods for marketing their products are also actively developing
internal processes. The direction of causality is not established with this model.
Training and skills development instruments are positively correlated with new
processes and new support systems but not with new distribution systems. Train-
ing and skills development instruments are mostly soft instruments, so there should
not be any distinction here.
Estimation coefficient sizes in a random effects model, where dependent and in-
dependent variables are both binary, are log odds. Log odds are not very intuitive
to interpret. They can be transformed to probabilities, but it is not really neces-
sary. The coefficient estimate is not so exact that it could be interpreted as valid
for every situation. Log odds relate to probabilities in a s-curve relationship: log
odds 0 is 50 percent probability of the situation; above that is higher and negative
is less. A simple takeaway is that if the log odds (coefficient estimate) is positive,
there is a positive relationship and, if negative, vice versa.
It is interesting to note that coefficient estimates indicate that firms participating
in marketing and export promotion instruments have a higher probability to have
product innovations than firms participating in investment instruments. A con-
verse effect is seen for process innovations. If it would be clear that causality is
from instruments to innovation outputs, it would suggest that marketing instru-
ments are much more effective for creating product innovations, not to mention
the massive savings it could produce. However, this is a good example that causal-
ity can run both ways in this type of regression model.
Estimates for non-technological innovations suggests that innovation and R&D,
marketing and export promotion and training and skill development instruments
are positively related with non-technological innovation outputs. Other instrument
types are not. Since non-technological innovation subcategories were changed
several times between the five CIS waves used in this analysis, only wider cate-
gories for organisational and marketing innovations can be compared.
Innovation and R&D instruments, marketing instruments, training and skill de-
velopment instruments and mixed support instruments are positively correlated
with marketing innovations. Marketing innovations suggests that firms develop
new marketing strategies or significantly improve their design or packaging. A
direct relationship could be assumed from marketing and export promotion instru-
ments. For other instrument types, the relationship is less clear. Training and skill
development instruments are often for soft skills such as marketing, promotion
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and management, which could improve a firm’s choice of strategy. Mixed sup-
port instruments are mostly early phase development instruments meant for new
ventures, suggesting that young firms have to create new marketing strategies at
an early stage. However, firms participating in innovation and R&D instruments
could have an indirect link. They are also positively correlated with new products,
which might be linked with marketing innovations.
Training and skills development instruments are the only ones that positively cor-
relate with firms developing organisational innovations. These instruments are
mainly teaching new skills, managerial among them, which could help create or-
ganisational innovations.
In most cases, positive and significant relationships are logical, suggesting that
firms participating in certain instruments are also innovative in similar outputs.
Some instruments, such as consulting, labour support and financial guarantees are
not related with any type of innovation outputs at all. These instruments are either
not supporting any innovative activities, such as labour support, or non-innovative
firms self-select into these instruments. As mentioned before, this type of model
does not give any indication of causality.
Control variables for these models are mostly significant, and coefficients are logi-
cal. For example, as explained in Chapter 2, exporting firms and foreign firms tend
to be more innovative. Both Schumpeter Mark I and Mark II patterns of innova-
tion were introduced in Chapter 2.1. Mark I suggests that young, small firms are
more innovative, and Mark II suggests that older, larger, more corporation type
firms are more innovative. Control variables in models estimated here suggest
that, for Estonian firms, larger firms are more innovative on average. However,
firm age is negative and significant in all models, suggesting that older firms are
not more innovative.
Controls for technological regimes are compared to their base values for the scale
and information intensive technological regime. The values for control variables
are logical and aligned with concepts described in Chapter 2.1. Science based
firms are more innovative than scale and information intensive firms. Supplier
based and specialised suppliers are less innovative. For supplier based firms, it is
to be expected that they are relatively less innovative than other categories. How-
ever, specialised suppliers should not be less innovative. This might be a speciality
of Estonian firms, which could be investigated further in other research. Finally,
there is a group of firms supporting infrastructure, mostly municipal owned in-
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Policy instruments have less positive and significant relationships with non-techno-
logical innovations than with technological innovations. There are no significant
negative relationships for any type of policy instrument among these 11 models.
frastructure firms such as waste treatment plants or water providers. They are also
less innovative than scale and information intensive firms, which is to be expected.
The constant in the models is the mean intercept for every firm. The random
effects model estimates a separate intercept for every firm. The intercept in Tables
7.3 and 7.4 is the mean log odds based on all firms odds to be innovative when
all independent variables are zero. However, this is nonsensical, since firm age
or workers cannot be zero. The mean intercept for technological innovations is
log odds -1.477, which is roughly a 0.18 percent probability of a firm with zero
age, workers, instruments, etc. There are 3502 unique firms in the models, and all
intercepts are not printed in this thesis, since they add little value to understanding
the innovation process.
Technological and non-technological innovation output and policy instrument mod-
els suggest that there is some relevant variation in the relationships. Instruments
that support more acquisition of machinery and equipment are positively corre-
lated with innovative outputs, whereas instruments that support innovation are
with new products but not processes. Marketing and export promotion and train-
ing and skills development instruments — both more akin to soft skills develop-
ment — are very likely to have innovative firms participating. The question is
whether these relationships are causal in a way that turns non-innovative firms
into innovative ones.
Other investigations into the instrument mix should expect non-uniform relation-
ships between instruments and innovation outputs. Since this thesis is not mainly
focused on the effects of instrument mix, interaction effects are not investigated
further. These could be, for example, about firms with investments and marketing
and export promotion, together. This is one possible avenue for further research
based on the same dataset.
The models here also suggest that researchers should be cautious when modelling
innovation outputs. There is variation, even among technological innovations,
between new products and services. These should be taken into account, and
research hypotheses should be more exact.
Results suggest that there are instruments that are positively related with outputs
and instruments that are not. For example, firms participating in consulting instru-
ments display no positive or negative significant relationships with any innovation
output. With these instruments, no effect might be detected when investigating in-
struments with innovation strategies.
Innovation strategies also differ in terms of output, as seen in Chapter 6.3. The
anticipated effect from policy instruments to certain types of innovation strategies
is expected to be correlating with outputs. For example, firms with product inno-
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vations and more science based strategy are also expected to be more related with
investment or innovation and R&D instruments.
The overall impression from the models presented in this chapter suggests that
policy instruments and innovation activities can have significant positively corre-
lating relationships. This also suggests that policy instruments can have a possible
influence on the choice of innovation strategies. In the next chapter, 8, the rela-
tionship between the dynamics of innovation strategies and policy instruments is
investigated. If it would turn out that there are no significant relationships between
innovation outputs and policy instruments, it would be plausible to suggest that
they have no effect on innovation strategies as well.
These models indicate that policy instruments are related to innovative activities,
which was the aim of this chapter. Policy instruments, at least some of them, are
related to innovation outputs. In further chapters, the relationship between policy
instruments and strategies is tested.
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Table 7.4: Non-technological innovations. Model results.
Dependent variable:
Non-technological Organisational Marketing
innovations innovations innovations
GLMM with binary outcome and random intercepts
(1) (2) (3)
Consulting −0.053 0.128 −0.084
(0.143) (0.150) (0.151)
Financial 0.195 0.253 0.235
(0.208) (0.217) (0.217)
Innovation 0.270∗∗ 0.140 0.342∗∗
(0.135) (0.139) (0.140)
Investments 0.155 0.017 0.160
(0.112) (0.115) (0.117)
Labour 0.031 0.007 0.053
(0.094) (0.102) (0.102)
Marketing 0.497∗∗∗ 0.045 0.710∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.108) (0.106)
Training 0.432∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.075) (0.078)
Mixed 0.625 0.183 1.074∗∗∗
(0.410) (0.435) (0.415)
Other 0.340 0.311 1.005
(0.645) (0.631) (0.648)
Science based 0.120 0.215∗ −0.074
(0.125) (0.127) (0.130)
Specialised supplier −0.627∗∗∗ −0.325∗∗∗ −1.066∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.113) (0.125)
Supplier dominated −0.459∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗ −0.442∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.086) (0.088)
Supporting infras. −0.673∗∗∗ −0.445∗∗∗ −1.118∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.147) (0.166)
Exporter 0.312∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.077) (0.082)
Workers — log 0.404∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035)
Continued.
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Dependent variable:
Non-technological Organisational Marketing
innovations innovations innovations
GLMM with binary outcome and random intercepts
(1) (2) (3)
Firm age −0.031∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.013∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Foreign owned 0.224∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.067) (0.069) (0.072)
CIS2006 0.063 0.037 0.403∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.075) (0.082)
CIS2008 −0.538∗∗∗ −0.758∗∗∗ 0.031
(0.077) (0.079) (0.085)
CIS2010 −0.693∗∗∗ −0.975∗∗∗ −0.135
(0.090) (0.095) (0.100)
CIS2012 −0.983∗∗∗ −1.235∗∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.108) (0.113)
Constant −1.041∗∗∗ −1.421∗∗∗ −1.887∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.151) (0.159)
Observations 9,155 9,155 9,155
Log Likelihood −5,573.855 −5,156.260 −4,893.234
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,193.710 10,358.520 9,832.468
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 11,357.520 10,522.330 9,996.275
Source: Innovation Data (2018); ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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8. PUBLIC SECTOR SUPPORT AND DYNAMICS OF
FIRM INNOVATION STRATEGIES
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I explain the aim of the chapter,
the research questions and objectives. Second, I describe where it fits in the theory
provided in Chapters 2 and 3. Third, I explain the method to reach the objectives.
Fourth, I estimate the results. Fifth, I interpret the results. Sixth, I discuss how it
relates to the rest of the thesis.
8.1. Summary of relevant established results
The aim of this chapter is to estimate the possible relationship between public
support and dynamics of firm innovation strategies.
Sections 6 and 7 laid the foundation for this estimation. In the former, dynamics
of firm innovation strategies are estimated and described. Firms shift between
patterns of innovation often, changing their innovative activities in relatively short
periods. In the latter section, there is evidence that there is a positive or negative
relationship between some public support instruments and innovative activities.
In this section, this relationship is under deeper scrutiny. I estimate whether firms
are more likely to belong to any pattern of innovation when they receive public
support. The estimation method is described in Chapter 8.2. The fit between
public support and innovative activities is described in Chapters 2 and 3.
Results from Chapter 6.3 show that there are five distinct patterns of innovation:
science based, open innovation, internal strategies, supplier based and market ori-
ented. In addition, a sixth category is available when firms indicated no innovative
activities during the period.
Every pattern of innovation is characterised by strategic choices while doing in-
novative activities. Firms rely on different inputs, sources of information, cooper-
ation networks and appropriation methods and generate different innovative out-
puts. Every pattern of innovation describes a possible path in reaching innovation
outputs.
Public support has been categorised into ten groups based on supported activities.
These are collaboration programmes, consulting, training and skills development,
marketing and export promotion, innovation and R&D support, investments sup-
port, mixed support, labour support, financial guarantees and direct subsidies.
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Results from Section 7.4 show that there is significant variation between different
types of innovative outputs and public support. The main goal of innovation re-
lated public support is to increase firm innovativeness and, therefore, to increase
economic activities. Public support related to innovation and R&D, investments,
marketing and export promotion and training and skills development is indeed
positively related with technological innovations.
Some other policy instruments, such as consulting and financial guarantees, are
not related with innovativeness.
Therefore, it is expected that there are some differences in the relationships be-
tween the ways of innovating, i.e. innovation strategies and policy instruments.
For example, R&D instruments should be more likely to enhance firm engagement
in cooperation with universities or in-house R&D efforts.
The research question is then whether firms that are beneficiaries of public support
policy instruments are more likely to be in certain patterns of innovation than firms
that are not.
8.2. Multinomial logit model
I estimate the probability model for any firm to belong to any pattern of inno-
vation, conditional on public support policy instruments. It is based on the six
possible categories of innovation strategies: not innovative, internal strategies,
market oriented, open innovation, science based and supplier based. I estimate
four multinomial logit models with increasing levels of sophistication.
Multinomial logit models are suitable to estimate from revealed preferences data,
i.e. the observed choices of firms.
There are three types of possible variables which can affect the choice of firms
to choose any of the alternatives. First, there are individual specific variables,
such as firm characteristics. They are the same no matter which alternative is cho-
sen. Second, there are alternative specific variables, such as costs. In the current
context, these could be costs associated with reaching any pattern of innovation.
Unfortunately, these are not currently observed. Third, there are alternative spe-
cific variables with alternative specific coefficients. These are cases where utility
from costs differs for alternatives. For example, time and labour costs can have
different utilities in different scenarios. In the current context, if we know that it
takes six months to become a science based firm (time cost), it might be different
from taking six months to become a supplier based firm. The level of sophistica-
tion and capabilities are not the same.
In the models presented here, only individual specific variables are observed.
There are costs available as inputs to innovative activities. However, patterns
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of innovation are more diversified in their strategies to include single costs to any
specific pattern of innovation. For example, there is not enough information to
divide training costs based on how much they aid the firm’s specific strategy. One
possible future research avenue would be to estimate costs in reaching patterns of
innovation and, from there, to estimate the probabilities of shifting based on these
alternative specific costs.
The four models with increasing sophistication are the following: (i) the base
model, with only the relationship between policy instruments on the dynamics of
firm innovation strategies; (ii) the base model with time controls; (iii) the base
model with time and firm specific controls; (iv) the base model with time and firm
specific controls and state dependency.
The full model equation in general form is the following:
P (yi = j) =
exp(αj +
K∑
k=1
βjkXik)
1 +
J∑
h=2
exp(αh +
K∑
k=1
βhkXik))
(8.1)
where:
j = 2, ..., J (6)
K = 22 (in the full model)
X = independent variables
α = intercepts
β = coefficients
For the reference category, the model simplifies to:
P (yi = 1) =
1
1 +
J∑
h=2
exp(αh +
K∑
k=1
βhkXik))
(8.2)
The first three models — the base model and with time and firm controls — all
estimate firm preferences to choose certain patterns of innovation for their innova-
tive activities, without taking account the unobserved preference of choosing any
alternative. This is not logical, as firms have path dependency and some prefer-
ences for their actions. Without state dependency, this would mean that firms are
free to choose any alternative without any constraints in every period.
To account for path dependency, previous behaviour is taken into account. The
fourth model is conditional on the initial value on the dependent variable in the
previous period.
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The full model controls for time, firm specific characteristics and state depen-
dency. Firm controls are the same as in Section 7 and shown in Table 7.2.
For calculation references, see Croissant (2017).
8.3. Estimation of the relationship between dynamics of
innovation strategies and public sector support
The base model is in Appendix XI, the base model with time controls is in Ap-
pendix XII, the base model with time and firm specific controls is in Appendix
XIII and the full model with all controls and state dependency is in Table 8.2.
The reference category in each model is not innovative, i.e. firms not having any
innovative strategies and not belonging to any pattern of innovation. Therefore,
the interpretation of model coefficients becomes comparative to not belonging to
any pattern of innovation.
The interpretation of coefficients is therefore the log odds of belonging to a pattern
of innovation compared to not belonging to any conditional on receiving public
support, all else being constant. In the base model, the first significant positive
coefficient is 0.398 for market oriented patterns of innovation. It means that firms
have positive and significant log odds of 0.398 to belong to the market oriented
pattern of innovation, in comparison to being not innovative. Log odds of 0.398
is about 60% probability.
The comparison with logit models presented in Chapter 7 is apparent. In the
random effects logit models, the dependent variable is binary, whether firms are
innovative or not. Here, the dependent variable can take six possible states, of
which five are a variation of innovative and one is not innovative. Therefore, it
is a special case of the model presented in Chapter 7, where innovativeness is
divided into groups based on strategies.
The Akaike information criteria and Log likelihoods become smaller when mod-
els are controlled for time, firm and state dependency. The latter especially seems
to describe the underlying data better. Both these statistics suggest that the model
with state dependency is more appropriate to describe the process.
The coefficients of the models cannot be compared directly between models, be-
cause the variance of the error term is different. Coefficients within a model can
only be compared with each other.
Lastly, this model is currently a pooled multinomial logit model, where the as-
sumption is that standard errors of each observation are uncorrelated. However,
since it uses panel data where many firms are represented multiple times, this is
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clearly violated. Therefore, the standard errors in these models are clustered based
on firms.
In general, the results here support the results from Chapter 7, that there is sig-
nificant variation between different public support policy instrument types and
innovative activities. Here, the general result would be that there is significant
positive and negative correlation between some policy instruments, and some pol-
icy instruments seem to have no relationship with innovative firms.
The results are interpreted by policy instrument type in detail. The results from
the full model with state dependency is considered to be superior to base models.
Consulting instruments are not related with changes from the not innovative state
to any pattern of innovation. Firms that are beneficiaries of consulting instruments
are not more likely to be part of any pattern of innovation. The results from the
model in Table 8.2 and Tables 7.3 and 7.4 in the previous chapter suggest that
firms participating in instruments which are providing consultancy are not more
likely to be innovative or to engage in any innovation strategies.
The base models in Appendices XII and XIII show some significant positive cor-
relations with the market oriented pattern of innovations and others, but the results
disappear when state dependency is taken into account.
Financial guarantees also have very weak relationships with innovative activities
in the models presented here. There are no significant correlations in the base
models. In the full model, there is positive significant correlation with market ori-
ented strategies, suggesting that firms that are beneficiaries of instruments based
on state financial guarantees are more likely to engage in market oriented innova-
tion strategies than to be not innovative. However, there are no significant results
with any other pattern of innovation.
Innovation and R&D based policy instruments show positive and significant rela-
tionships with three patterns of innovation throughout all models. The results sug-
gest that firms participating in innovation and R&D instruments are more likely to
belong to market oriented, open innovation and science based patterns of innova-
tion than to be not innovative. However, there is no significant relationship with
internal strategy and supplier based patterns of innovation.
The coefficients in all models are highest for science based models, followed by
open innovation and then market oriented patterns of innovation. The likelihood to
belong to the science based pattern of innovation, which is defined by the highest
share of R&D within the firm, outsourced R&D and partnerships with universities,
has the biggest probability. The results suggest that firms participating in innova-
tion and R&D based policy instruments truly exhibit traits in their behaviour that
are related with more science based activities.
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Policy instruments based on investments are positively and significantly corre-
lated with four patterns of innovation — market oriented, open innovation, sci-
ence based and supplier based — in all models. Firms that are beneficiaries in
investment based policy instruments are more likely to belong to these patterns of
innovation than to be without innovative activities.
The coefficient is highest for the supplier based pattern of innovation, meaning
that the probability of belonging to a supplier based pattern of innovation is largest
compared to being not innovative when firms are beneficiaries of investment in-
struments. This is intuitively correct. Investment instruments are usually public
support for firms to acquire new machinery or technology with some discount,
without any specific R&D or other activities included. For example, new ventures
can purchase new machinery for their manufacturing that increases their produc-
tivity without any modification to the machinery itself. This indicates that the
main sources of innovation are suppliers and arise from partnerships with them.
The only pattern of innovation without any significant relationship with invest-
ment instruments is internal strategies. These are mostly firms which are sub-
sidiaries and belong to a group. One possibility is that they have other possible
sources for financing their innovative activities, so there is no relationship with
investment instruments.
Labour support instruments show no relationship with patterns of innovation and a
weak relationship with the open innovation pattern of innovation. The coefficient
is negative, suggesting that firms participating in labour support instruments are
less likely to belong to the open innovation pattern than to be without innovative
activities. From estimates in Chapter 7.4, it is already clear that labour support
instruments are not related with innovative outputs for firms.
In general, there seems to be a very weak relationship between labour support
instruments and innovative activities, especially when combined into patterns of
innovation. This suggests that firms participating in labour support instruments
are not more likely to be innovative or exhibit certain defined innovative strategies.
If the only significant relationship between labour support instruments and the
open innovation pattern of innovation is taken at face value, it seems that firms
participating in labour support instruments become less innovative in the end.
Labour support instruments are basically policies to induce firms to hire certain
unprivileged labour groups or create jobs in special areas that usually have high
unemployment or a lack of opportunities. Firms receive a discount for a specific
period to hire such labour or create such jobs. One possibility is that firms partic-
ipating in these instruments are not looking for innovation, but rather aim for the
cheapest labour possible, thus reducing labour costs within the firm. However, in
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models here, the only significant relationship is with one type of pattern of inno-
vation and not with others. I remain unconvinced that the result is not spurious.
Marketing and export promotion instruments show a positive and significant re-
lationship with three patterns of innovation — market oriented, open innovation
and science based. There are positive relationships with the supplier based pattern
of innovation as well, but the effect disappears when state dependency is taken
into account. Results from models suggest that firms participating in marketing
and export promotion instruments are more likely to belong to these three pat-
terns of innovation compared to being without innovative activities, even when
their previous states are taken into account.
The coefficients are highest for the science based pattern of innovation, yet the
differences are small. Marketing and export promotion instruments deal with
possible market penetration assistance, such as teaching skills, developing export
plans, visiting new markets, presenting at trade fairs, etc. One indication is that
these three patterns of innovation are also with emphasis more on product innova-
tions as outputs and with higher shares of marketing innovations, shown in Table
6.4. I would like to emphasise that innovation outputs were not included in the
estimation of patterns of innovation, only inputs and management choices. The
results here confirm that instruments which are supposed to provide for certain
outputs are indeed positively correlated with the activities they are supposed to
benefit and their outputs. I cannot claim that this is a direct causal relationship,
but it is one indication that policy instruments at least provide some evidence that
they are linked with stated goals.
Internal strategy and supplier based patterns of innovation are not more likely than
being without innovative activities, if firms receive marketing and export promo-
tion instruments. This is in line with the statement from the previous paragraph,
that firms receiving this type of support are already belonging to other patterns of
innovation that exhibit evidence from supported activities.
Training and skill development instruments are positively and significantly related
with all patterns of innovation. The first note is that firms that are beneficiaries of
such instruments are more likely to be innovative, in general, as seen in Chapter
7.4. These instruments are mainly aimed at workers to get training or retraining
or to develop new skills at workshops. Firms with workers or managers partici-
pating in these programs are more likely to be innovative than without innovative
activities, even when the previous state is taken into account. The highest proba-
bility corresponds with being in the open innovation or internal strategy patterns
of innovation.
Results for mixed policy instruments and other policy instruments are not signif-
icant in any category. There are very few observations in these policy instrument
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types, which makes the results less credible as well. Some coefficients are very
large and have very large standard errors, and there are not enough observations
to estimate probabilities at all.
There is a small downward trend in the data, shown in Figure 5.5. Time constants
are all significant and with negative coefficients, since the base category is the
earliest for every model.
Firm specific controls become mostly not significant in the full model. Firm age
in years has very small coefficients and is significant for only the internal strat-
egy and supplier based patterns of innovation. It seems that firm age is not a
very relevant characteristic to differentiate between possible shifts in patterns of
innovation.
Exporting firms are more likely to be in the internal strategy or market oriented
patterns of innovation than without innovative activities. There is no significant
difference when other patterns of innovations are compared with firms without
innovative activities.
Larger firms are more likely to be in the internal strategy, open innovation or sci-
ence based patterns of innovation than without innovative activities. They are
more likely to be market oriented and supplier based as well than without inno-
vative activities. However, the probabilities for the latter are smaller than for the
former categories. In general, larger firms are more likely to be innovative and
exhibit certain behavioural traits.
Open innovation and science based firms have the most formal partnerships with
other participants in the innovation system, such as clients, suppliers, competitors,
universities, etc. It takes more capabilities to manage these relationships. Larger
firms have the advantage of dedicating special staff to these strategic choices.
The internal strategy pattern of innovation is largely shown through subsidiary
relationships. They are more likely to be larger than average firms in this dataset.
The internal strategy pattern is also positively and significantly related with being
foreign owned. In brief, holding all else constant, being foreign owned increases
the likelihood of belonging to the internal strategy pattern of innovation when
compared with being without innovative activities.
Foreign ownership is also negatively correlated with the supplier based pattern
of innovation. Firms are less likely to be supplier based than without innovative
activities when they are foreign owned. This means that for foreign owned firms,
this pattern of innovation is even less likely than being not innovative at all. The
supplier based pattern of innovation is not very likely for subsidiary relationships
and is not relevant for firms with group partnerships.
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All previous states are relevant for every category. The base reference for previous
states is being without innovative activities. The coefficients are therefore a bit
comical to interpret. For example, firms that were in the internal strategy pattern
of innovation in the previous period, compared to firms that were not innovative
in the previous period, are more likely with log odds of 2.63 to be in the internal
strategy pattern of innovation compared to firms that are not innovative in the
current period. This is about 93% probability, which is rather high.
The next column is the market oriented pattern of innovation. The interpretation
is that firms in the internal strategy pattern of innovation in the previous period,
compared to firms without innovative activities, are more likely with log odds of
1.718 to be in the market oriented pattern of innovation in the current period, when
compared to being without innovative activities.
Positive coefficients for lagged states mean that firms that were within any pattern
of innovation in the previous period are more likely to be in any pattern of inno-
vation in the cuerrent period as well. This is innovation persistency, as firms that
innovate continue to do so.
The highest persistency is mostly in the same pattern of innovation that the firm
was in during the previous period. The simple transition pattern matrix was al-
ready presented in Chapter 6.3, which shows underlying transition probabilities
without taking any additional information into account. For most patterns of in-
novation, the most probable course is the same pattern of innovation in the next
period. However, the probabilities are less than 50% in all patterns of innovation,
meaning that shifting between states is likely.
Table 8.1 highlights results described here.
The next chapter describes another estimation of the same concept with a differ-
ent technique. Results from this chapter show that not all policy instrument types
should be included in further models. Multi-state Markov models used in the
next chapter use innovation and R&D instruments, training and skill development
instruments, investment instruments, and marketing and export promotion instr-
ments as covariants, since they showed the most significant relationships with firm
innovation strategies.
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Table 8.1: Relationship between public support and dynamics of patterns of inno-
vation
Policy instrument Relationship with patterns of innovation
Consulting no significant relationship
Financial guarantees no significant relationship
Innovation and R&D positive relationship with shifting to market oriented,
open innovation and science based pattern of innova-
tion; highest for science based
Investments positive relationship with shifting to all patterns of in-
novation, except internal strategy; highest for supplier
based
Labour support no significant relationship; weak negative relationship
with open innovation
Marketing and export
promotion
positive relationship with shifting to market oriented,
open innovation and science based pattern of innova-
tion; highest for science based
Training and skill devel-
opment
positive with shifting to all patterns of innovation;
highest for open innovation
Mixed support no significant results
Other no significant results
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Table 8.2: Public support and patterns of innovation. Full model with time and
firm specific controls and state dependency estimates.
Multinomial logit. Ref. category: not innovative
Internal Market Open Science Supplier
strategy oriented innovation based based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Consulting −0.434 0.334 −0.097 −0.102 0.043
(0.278) (0.204) (0.287) (0.354) (0.218)
Financial −0.214 0.574∗∗ 0.460 −0.216 0.341
(0.490) (0.288) (0.417) (0.630) (0.308)
Innovation and R&D −0.073 0.647∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 1.599∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.298) (0.192) (0.246) (0.264) (0.220)
Investments 0.413∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 1.143∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.168) (0.228) (0.259) (0.149)
Labour −0.298 0.028 −0.432∗∗ −0.190 −0.096
(0.184) (0.136) (0.206) (0.264) (0.135)
Marketing 0.279 0.616∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.196
(0.206) (0.151) (0.201) (0.239) (0.162)
Training 0.593∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.110) (0.149) (0.198) (0.105)
Mixed −5.295 −1.319 −5.202 −3.868 −0.488
(9.892) (0.886) (9.846) (9.596) (0.869)
Other −2.665 0.490 2.328 1.554 1.739
(9.892) (1.699) (1.561) (1.655) (1.395)
CIS2006 −1.236∗∗∗ −0.587∗∗∗ −1.118∗∗∗ −1.204∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗
(0.130) (0.093) (0.136) (0.182) (0.081)
CIS2008 −0.774∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.872∗∗∗ −1.187∗∗∗ −0.407∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.090) (0.135) (0.190) (0.085)
CIS2010 −1.090∗∗∗ −0.843∗∗∗ −1.291∗∗∗ −1.784∗∗∗ −0.748∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.093) (0.137) (0.195) (0.088)
CIS2012 −1.163∗∗∗ −1.407∗∗∗ −1.756∗∗∗ −2.093∗∗∗ −1.304∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.114) (0.169) (0.239) (0.108)
firm age −0.056∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.009 −0.007 0.023∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.009)
firm exporter 0.383∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.244 0.421 0.051
(0.174) (0.118) (0.185) (0.272) (0.100)
Continued.
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Multinomial logit. Ref. category: not innovative
Internal Market Open Science Supplier
strategy oriented innovation based based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
firm log worker 0.622∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.050) (0.065) (0.082) (0.047)
firm foreign owned 0.928∗∗∗ −0.188∗ 0.260∗ −0.001 −0.200∗∗
(0.124) (0.104) (0.140) (0.191) (0.100)
lag strategy Internal 2.630∗∗∗ 1.718∗∗∗ 1.969∗∗∗ 1.957∗∗∗ 1.202∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.183) (0.262) (0.459) (0.181)
lag strategy Market 1.586∗∗∗ 2.409∗∗∗ 2.087∗∗∗ 2.629∗∗∗ 1.410∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.119) (0.205) (0.331) (0.116)
lag strategy Open 2.741∗∗∗ 2.731∗∗∗ 4.152∗∗∗ 3.886∗∗∗ 1.819∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.200) (0.235) (0.374) (0.208)
lag strategy Science 1.489∗∗∗ 3.066∗∗∗ 3.236∗∗∗ 5.742∗∗∗ 1.540∗∗∗
(0.509) (0.315) (0.386) (0.411) (0.373)
lag strategy Suppliers 1.184∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗ 1.797∗∗∗ 1.630∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.129) (0.226) (0.364) (0.103)
Constant −4.263∗∗∗ −3.090∗∗∗ −5.036∗∗∗ −6.268∗∗∗ −2.622∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.178) (0.271) (0.400) (0.166)
Observations 5344
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,940.120
Log likelihood -6,359.991
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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9. UNDERSTANDING DYNAMICS OF FIRMS
INNOVATION STRATEGIES
In this chapter, the emphasis is on the dynamics side of firm innovation strategies.
To understand how often firms shift between their strategies, results from previous
estimations are taken into account and a new model is estimated. Markov chain
models are estimated to investigate the intensity with which firms transition from
one strategy to another and how much these intensities are influenced by policy
instruments.
Compared to some more traditional regression model methods (see Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009) and Zu´n˜iga-Vicente et al. (2014) for some examples), Markov
models have the advantage of estimating a complex set of possible trajectories
over time. With more traditional regression methods, this becomes problematic
for estimation. When previous results are taken into account, firms in the dataset
used here can have six different innovation strategies (including the not innovative
state) over a ten year period in two year increments. This results in a total of 7776
different combinations of trajectories for a firm.
Naturally, a set of different trajectories as large as this is not feasible for humans
to comprehend. To understand the dynamics of innovation strategies, all possible
trajectories are taken into account, but results are based on shifts between different
trajectories. The probabilities of choosing another trajectory next and which one
it would be is the object of interest.
This type of modelling is more popular in health-related fields, but there are ex-
amples from economics as well, e.g using Markov transition models to investigate
labour force transitions (Joutard et al., 2012), financial time series (Nystrup et al.,
2015) or, more aligned with this thesis, R&D persistency (Rammer and Schubert,
2018).
A related stream of literature has used Markov models or transition probability
matrices to investigate the persistency of innovations (Antonelli et al., 2013; Ce-
fis, 2003; Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001; Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2008). In this
case, Markov models are used to investigate whether firms are more likely to be
innovative in the next period or what type of innovations are more likely. The
emphasis is on the output side of innovations and whether they have innovations
or not.
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The investigation here differs somewhat from the above example. I investigate
how firms are innovating currently and in the next period. This is closely related
to the work of Hollenstein (2018), based on the Swiss example.
Results from Chapter 6 already show a simple transition probability matrix. From
this, it is reasonable to expect that firms have a tendency to shift between different
strategies. Markov models allow covariates. Therefore, estimations in this chapter
are mostly concerned with how much these transition probabilities are increased
or decreased when firms receive public support from policy instruments.
I will describe the method first in Section 9.1 in detail, since multi-state Markov
models are not very common in policy support analysis. In Section 9.2, I will esti-
mate several sets of models to describe the dynamics of firm innovation strategies
in detail.
9.1. Multi-state Markov models with continuous time
Multi-state models or Markov transition models have often been used with panel
data to describe and analyse the movement of individuals or firms between differ-
ent stages. In the models, these stages are usually referred to as states.
Markov transition models estimate transition probabilities if they are modelled in
discrete time and transition intensities if they are modelled in continuous time. A
discrete time Markov-chain is a system where transitions between states happen
only on discrete time intervals. In the example of firm innovation strategies, it
would mean that all firms shift between their chosen strategies at specific time
intervals simultaneously, usually at the time of measurement. This assumption
is unlikely to be realistic. Discrete state Markov chains are often used for their
easier interpretability, even though the underlying data is most likely continuous.
I estimate transition intensities (defined later) in a continuous time Markov chain
setting. Even though it is more complex, this type of modelling is more in line
with the underlying process of shifting between strategies.
Markov chain models are used to describe how observed units move between a
set of discrete states whereby the number of states in the analysis is fixed. States
used in this analysis are based on patterns of innovation estimated in Chapter 6.
Figure 9.1 describes the possible transitions in a three-state Markov model. The
arrows represent possible changes between states. Notice that this example model
allows transitions between all states. This type of model can estimate transition
intensities between states, i.e. the instantaneous risk of moving from one state to
another. The general formula for estimating transition intensities is in Equation
(9.1). Markov models are covered in depth in Cox and Miller (2001).
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Figure 9.1: Multi-state model for innovation strategies.
Suppose a firm is in state S(t) at time t. The movement between states 1, ..., R
is governed by transition intensities qrs(t, z(t)), whereby r, s = 1, ..., R. These
depend on time t and on a set of explanatory variables z(t). In the end, the qrs or
intensity represents the instantaneous risk of moving from state r to state s 6= r
qrs (t, z (t)) = lim
δt→0
P (S (t+ δt) = s | S (t) = r) /δt (9.1)
The continuous Markov model assumes that the underlying Markov process is not
happening strictly at the times of our measurement but can also evolve between
those times. In the case of this thesis, it means that this model adds flexibility,
so that firms can change their strategies at some random time t that is between
surveys.
If we take the example from Figure 9.1, then there are r = 3; s = 3 possible
movements between states, so qrs forms a r × s matrix Q with rows that sum to
zero, so that the diagonal entries are by definition qrr = −
∑
s6=r qrs. An example
of matrix Q in a three-state case where all movements are allowed is in Equation
(9.2).
Q =
q11 q12 q13q21 q22 q23
q31 q32 q33
 (9.2)
The off-diagonal elements in matrix Q (in eq. (9.2)) represent the transition inten-
sities of moving from one state to another. The diagonal elements represent the
intensity of persistence, such that the firm will remain in its current state. This
is not very intuitive with transition intensities, since they show the instantaneous
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risk. Also, since continuous time Markov models show transition intensities at δt,
which is asymptotically negligible, these should be converted to transition proba-
bilities for easier interpretation. However, with continuous time Markov models,
the time δt can be chosen arbitrarily. I will present some probability matrices as
well having δt with different year values, which will represent the probability that
firms shift between different states at some point during this time.
The likelihood to estimate the transition intensities are calculated from the transi-
tion probability matrix P (t). It is possible to show that the transition probabilities
can be calculated from the exponent of the transition intensity matrix (eq. (9.3)).
Where the exp(Q) is the matrix exponential, not the exponent of individual ele-
ments. Difficulties in calculating this matrix exponent are discussed in Moler and
Loan (2003).
P (t) = exp(tQ) (9.3)
The panel data setting for continuous time Markov models deals with observa-
tions that are gathered at fixed time intervals in this case. The observations are
gathered at irregular time intervals for specific subjects, and some firms did not
respond to the survey in every wave. The full likelihood function is then the prod-
uct of probabilities of transition between observed states, over all individuals i
and observation times j:
L(Q) =
∏
Li,j =
∏
i,j
PS(tij)S(ti,j+1) (ti,j+1 − tij) (9.4)
Each component Li,j is the entry of the transition matrix P (t) at the S(tij)th row
and S(ti,j+1)th column, evaluated at t = ti,j+1 − tij . The full likelihood L(Q) is
the product of all terms Li,j over all individuals and all transitions.
For models with all six states, a simplification has to be made for likelihood cal-
culations. An assumption is made that firms have remained in the same state for
the whole duration between two measurements. In the case of this thesis, it would
mean that firms would be in the same pattern of innovation for the whole dura-
tion between two survey waves and would only shift once between measurements.
This simplification take the form of:
Li,j = exp
(
qS(tj)S(tj) (tj+1 − tj)
)
qS(tj)S(tj+1) (9.5)
since the state S(tj) is assumed to be the same for the whole interval between tj
and tj+1 with a known transition to state S(tj+1). This would be the contribution
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to the full likelihood L(Q). This type of model is called continuous time Markov
model with exact times in this thesis. Simplification is needed to reduce the com-
plexity of calculations when all six states in patterns of innovation are included in
the model.
However, it is not true that the likelihood function shown in Equation (9.4) with
more flexibility estimates the model without any bias. This type of function as-
sumes that the data is collected intermittently but as snapshots describing the state
of the observation at a fixed point in time. However, the data used in this thesis is
collected in a way that describes the state for the whole period, before the obser-
vation time. As described in Chapter 4.1, innovation survey questions are about
activities that may have happened at any time during the observed period that is
covered in the survey. This means that the data used in this thesis is not exactly
describing the current state at a fixed time point, but rather the whole period be-
fore this time point. However, the function for the exactly observed model with
the likelihood function shown in Equation (9.5) assumes that the observation was
in the described state for the whole period between two observations, which also
may not be true. The firm might have created their innovative activities in the last
year of the observed period and shifted their innovation strategy at some point
between two observation periods. In the exactly observed model, this flexibility
is lost.
Therefore, it is likely that the intermittently observed model overestimates the
transition intensities in the model, and the exactly observed model underestimates
the transition intensities. For these reasons, both of these model types are pre-
sented for the three-state model. Due to calculation complexity, only the exactly
observed models can be estimated and presented for the six-state model.
The calculations of the above described likelihoods are performed with the msm
package in R, see Jackson (2011) for further details.
Covariates are introduced to the model to estimate its relation with transition rates
qrs. The transition intensity can be modelled as a function of these variables (Mar-
shall and Jones, 1995). In the model described in Equation (9.1), the transition
intensity matrix elements are replaced by:
qrs (zi (t)) = q
(0)
rs exp
(
βTrszi (t)
)
(9.6)
whereby zi(t) is the covariate vector for every ith individual at time t. q
(o)
rs is
the baseline for the transition r − s, and βTrs is the estimator associated with the
variable zi(t) for the transition r − s. q(o)rs is the expected value of the intensity
function when the covariate vector is zero. exp(β) is a rate ratio or hazard ratio,
which represents the percentage increase or decline of the baseline intensity. If
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the hazard ratio is less than 1, the covariate has a negative effect on the baseline
transition intensity. If it is more than 1, then the covariate has a positive effect on
the baseline intensity. If the hazard ratio is 1, then there is no effect. For example,
a hazard ratio of 1.5 means that the transition intensity is 1.5 times larger for the
group where the covariant applies.
In this thesis, baseline transition intensities, hazard ratios for covariates and transi-
tition probability matrices in fixed time intervals are reported for different models.
9.2. Multi-state dynamics of firm innovation strategies
and public sector support
All states analysed in this chapter are based on patterns of innovations estimated
in Chapter 6. All covariates used in this chapter are based on the same policy
instrument data used in Chapters 7 and 8. Transitions between different states are
analysed in three- and six-state settings.
In the three-state analysis, three states can take values of not innovative, simple
innovation strategies and complex innovation strategies. These are a combination
of patterns of innovation that have the most similar attitudes. For example, sim-
ple innovation strategies are a combination of internal strategies, supplier based
strategies and market oriented strategies, all of which rely less on cooperation,
have less partnerships and knowledge sources outside of the firm than the remain-
ing two patterns of innovation. Complex innovation strategies are, therefore, open
innovation strategies and science based strategies. These rely more heavily on
cooperation, outside knowledge sources and more diverse set of inputs. Simple
descriptive statistics in Chapter 6.3 showed that these strategies are also harder to
be attained and have more persistence, indicating it is more costly to build these
capabilities.
Table 9.1 describes all states used in the analysis and how three-state and six-state
analyses correspond with each other.
Six-state analysis is done with the full range of patterns of innovation available,
where each state is described as one pattern of innovation.
Covariates included in the analysis correspond to four different types of innova-
tion policy instruments. Based on estimations in Chapters 7 and 8, innovation and
R&D instruments, investment instruments, training and skill development instru-
ments, and marketing and export promotion instruments are of the most interest.
These instruments showed significant positive correlations with both innovation
outputs and choices to shift to certain strategies. Markov models estimated in this
chapter are a step further to understanding how these instruments are related with
possible shifts between different strategies.
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Table 9.1: State-space for Markov models, three-state and six-state comparison of
patterns of innovation.
Three-state analysis Six-state analysis
State 1 Not innovative Not innovative State 1
State 2 Simple innovation strategies
Internal strategy State 2
Supplier based State 3
Market oriented State 4
State 3 Complex innovation strategies Open innovation State 5Science based State 6
For both three-state and six-state analysis, all transition paths are possible for the
firm. They are already present in the data, and there is no theoretical justification
to limit some transitions. These possible transition paths with their respective qrs
elements are pictured in the figures in Appendix XIV.
With the full dataset, only those firms can be used to model Markov chains that
have at least two observations. In the dataset used in this thesis, it amounts to
7962 observations. In addition, I will show results from similar models with the
smaller balanced dataset, where every firm has observations for every available
period — that is 654 firms with 3270 observations. As it was in Chapter 6. The
small balanced panel has more observations per firm, which should yield similar
results as the full model if it is representative. However, confidence intervals are
expected to be larger due to a smaller total number of observations.
A minimum of two observations per firm is needed for modelling multi-state
Markov models because they rely on the assumption of first order Markov chains.
First order Markov chains assume that all information needed to predict future
states are present in the current state. In other words, the current state holds all in-
formation about past behaviour, and no extra information is needed about previous
states. In the context of this thesis, it would mean that the current state holds all
firm experiences, capabilities and possibilities for searching for innovation, and
we do not need any additional information about past states to look at possible
future states. If all transition paths are available to the firm as described in the
figures in Appendix XIV, it also means that firms in the current state are free to
choose any possible future strategy in the future without any constraints. I would
like to point out that being free to choose and being able to succeed in choices are
not synonymous in this case. Firms might not have enough capabilities to choose
any strategy they wish, or some strategies may be too costly.
Table 9.2 is a frequency table of state transitions in the three-state Markov model.
There are very few pairwise observations going from ‘not innovative’ to ‘complex
strategies’ and vice versa. These shifts are difficult to model, since they represent
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a very low share of all shifts which lead to very large confidence intervals. They
also indicate that firms are not able to create complex innovation strategies very
easily, most likely due to the costs and capabilities involved. Most shifts happen
between ‘not innovative’ and ‘simple strategies’ and between simple and complex
strategies.
Table 9.2: Frequency table of state transitions in three-state Markov model. n =
7962 obs.
To:
From:
Not innova-
tive (1)
Simple innov.
strategies (2)
Complex
innov. strate-
gies (3)
Not innovative (1) 1778 575 66
Simple innov. strategies (2) 778 1563 243
Complex innov. strategies (3) 73 294 273
Table 9.3 describes the use of policy instruments by the full sample used in the
Markov models. These policy instruments have been chosen to investigate their
relationship with shifting between different innovation strategies as the most prob-
able covariants based on estimations done in Chapters 7 and 8.
Table 9.3: Use of instruments in the three- and six-state Markov models. n = 7962
obs.
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Observations 1449 1745 1784 1581 1403
Innovation & R&D 10 32 23 122 186
Investments 55 110 102 187 129
Marketing & export promotion 43 104 73 263 218
Training & skills development 113 336 278 545 500
The same descriptive statistics are availabe for the balanced dataset in the three-
state Markov model in Appendix XV.
In the Markov model with continuous time, the estimates are transition intensities
which represent the instantaneous risk of transitioning from one state to another.
In Figure 9.2, there is a graphical representation of transition intensities between
different states for the three-state models. There are four different versions. An
intermittently observed model which allows for most flexibility and an exactly
observed model, which assumes that firms were in their observed state for the
whole duration between two observations. Both models are presented for the full
dataset and the smaller balanced dataset. Plots for the balanced data models are
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in Appendix XVI. The underlying data of the transition intensity matrices are
available in Appendix XVII.
It is evident that more flexible models which assume that firms might have tran-
sitioned into some other states, also between two observations, have larger confi-
dence intervals and larger transition intensities. In essence, these models predict
that firms are more likely to transition, and we should expect more shifts between
strategies in time. These are so-called intermittently observed models.
Exact models show smaller transition intensities and also narrower confidence
intervals. As mentioned earlier, the constraint is that firms are assumed to be in
the observed strategy for the whole duration between two measurements. For the
balanced dataset, it is easier to acknowledge that firms might have had the same
innovation strategy for the two years between two measurements. However, for
the full dataset, this assumption means that the firm might have been up to eight
years in the same innovation strategy if we only observed them in the first and last
period. This is not a very prevalent case in the data (see Appendix II), yielding
only five firms with such a pattern. The gaps in other pattern combinations can
still be from two to six years long.
The balanced dataset models show very similar transition intensities with only
minor increase in confidence intervals. The full dataset with gaps is sufficient
for the analysis here. Therefore, I will describe transition intensities only from
the full dataset model with intermittently observed transitions as the base model.
Diagonals in the transition matrices in Appendix XVII describe the intensities of
staying in the same state as before. These are the negative values in Figure 9.2.
Transition intensities for not innovative firms are the smallest, meaning they have
the highest probability of not shifting to any other state. The simple strategies
intensities are 1.8 times larger than not innovative firms (−0, 340/− 184). These
firms are 1.8 times more likely to shift from their current strategy.
The transition intensities are highest for complex strategies, meaning these firms
are most likely to transition from their current state. This is an indication of persis-
tence. It is clear that the highest persistence is for not innovative firms to stay not
innovative. Markov models show that firms with complex innovation strategies
are 1.3 times more likely to shift from their current strategy than simple innova-
tion strategy firms. This indicates that simple strategies have higher persistence
than complex innovation strategies.
Building collaborative capabilities and R&D strategies is costly and difficult for
firms (Ganter and Hecker, 2013; Swink, 2006). As already described in Chapter
2, it takes a lot of effort for some sectors to shift from their current technological
trajectory and, consequently, change their innovation strategies.
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Figure 9.2: Three-state Markov model transition intensities. Upper: Full data,
intermittently observed model; lower: Full data, exactly observed model.
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All four models show similar results, and the intensities have different magni-
tudes. Models with exact transition times show smaller intensities, but relations
between diagonals are almost the same.
Turning to off-diagonals, firms in the not innovative state are about 35 times more
likely to transition to the simple innovation strategy state than the complex one.
It seems that the probability to transition to the complex strategy state is less
than one percent for not innovative firms. There are very few cases for firms to
transition between these states, and this jump seems unattainable.
Firms in the simple state are about 3.5 times more likely to become not innovative
than transition to the complex state. Since this state has less persistency than the
not innovative state, firms then spend less time in this state and are more likely to
become not innovative again.
Firms in the complex state have almost zero probability to transition to the not
innovative state. This transition is too rare, and the intermittently observed model
cannot estimate the intensity properly. The exact model indicates that the transi-
tion intensity is about 0.062.1 As there are so few observations, the confidence
intervals are large. Still, all models indicate that this transition has a very low
intensity compared to any other, indicating that this shift is not very probable.
Firms shift very often from the complex to the simple innovation strategy state.
It is also possible to interpret this transition intensity as one that it is so rare that,
in practice, we do not observe firms transitioning from complex strategies straight
into not having any innovation strategy at all.
Another way to investigate the persistency of states is to look at mean sojourn
times. This can be calculated with −1/qrr. Sojourn time is the mean expected
time that is spent in one state. In the full model with intermittently observed
transitions, the mean sojourn times are 5.4 years for the not innovative group,
2.9 for the simple innovation strategies and 2.1 for the complex strategies. The
discrepancy between not innovative state and other states is rather large, indicating
that there is persistency of innovativeness. It has been previously shown that there
is more persistency in product innovations than process innovations (Antonelli et
al., 2012; Tavassoli and Karlsson, 2015).
Complex innovation strategies here should yield more product and process inno-
vations than simple innovation strategies. The latter is mostly only process inno-
vations. Frenz and Prevezer (2012) point out that persistency is more linked with
firm-level heterogeneity instead of sector-level. Results here show that firm-level
may also arise from their innovation strategy which leads to possible differences
1 The model with intermittently observed states converges on its likelihood better without any co-
variants. The change in transition intensities is less than 10 percent for all other intensities. Then
the transition intensity is 0.003 with 95 percent confidence intervals 0.000; 0.158.
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in persistency of outputs. Persistency itself is also aligned with resource-based
theories introduced in Chapter 2, where systematic capability building leads to
long-term positive effects.
Figure 9.3 shows the hazard ratios for covariates used in the Markov models for
the full data model. The balanced data model plots are in Appendix XVIII. The
results for both models are also in tables in Appendix XIX. A hazard ratio of
1.5 means that the transition intensity is 1.5 times larger for firms that participate
in policy instruments. Similarly, a hazard ratio of 0.5 means that the transition
intensity is halved for firms participating in policy instruments. If hazard ratio
confidence intervals cross the value level 1, then results are insignificant.
All models in Figure 9.3 and Appendix XVIII show fairly similar results. There
are not many transitions where policy instruments are significant. In general, I
will describe examples based on the full data model with intermittently observed
transitions. I will mainly describe significant results, i.e. hazard ratios which do
not cross the value 1 with their confidence intervals.
From not innovative to simple innovation strategies, investments are the only pos-
itive covariate. The hazard ratios are around 1.59, meaning they increase the
probability to transfer from not innovative state to the simple innovation strate-
gies about 1.59 times. Other instruments showed no significant relationships in
increasing or decreasing the probability of transition. Chapters 3 and 5 describe
how in the Estonian case there was emphasis on building new capabilities by sub-
sidising the acquisition of physical capital. The results here seem to confirm that
there is indeed some increased transitioning to supplier based strategies with in-
vestment instruments.
From not innovative to complex strategies, marketing instruments show a positive
relationship with transitioning. The hazard ratios are rather large, with very large
confidence intervals ranging from 2.8 to 8.9 in full dataset models. There are
very few cases observed for these transitions, so these results should be seen as
preliminary. More observations are needed to pinpoint the relationship between
marketing and export development instruments and dynamics from not innovative
and complex innovation strategies.
From simple strategies to not innovative, training and skill development instru-
ments and investment instruments show negative relationships with transitioning.
This means that these instruments reduce the probability of transitioning. Invest-
ment instruments have hazard ratios of around 0.58, so firms are 58 percent less
likely to become not innovative if they have simple innovation strategies when
they receive investment instruments. Training and skill development instruments
have hazard ratios of around 0.77, a slightly smaller decrease in transition prob-
ability than investments. These results suggest that these instrument types may
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Figure 9.3: Hazard ratios for innovation policy instruments in the three-state
Markov models. Upper: intermittently observed model; lower: exactly observed
model.
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keep firms from not becoming not innovative if they have simple innovation strate-
gies.
From simple to complex innovation strategies, training and skill development in-
struments and innovation and R&D instruments increase the probability of transi-
tioning. Training and skill development instruments have hazard ratios of around
1.8, and innovation and R&D instruments have hazard ratios of around 2.4 (2.8 in
the exact model). Firms that receive innovation and R&D instruments are more
than 2.4 times as likely to transition from simple to complex innovation strategies.
This is the largest covariate effect in all models presented here.
From complex to not innovative or simple innovation strategies, there are no sig-
nificant effects from covariates. Only marketing instruments show a reducing
effect from complex to not innovative transition, but these cases are very rarely
observed in the data, and the models presented here are not the best ones for in-
terpreting this relationship.
There are many transitions where some policy instruments do not have any sig-
nificant effect. It is therefore plausible that there is heterogeneity in how policy
instruments incentivise firms to take up new innovation strategies or change their
current one. The transition from simple to complex innovation strategies is un-
likely to take place with all policy instruments in isolation.
Next, I will present the six-state Markov model. In this model, all states that are
estimated in Chapter 6 are included. Since there are six patterns of innovation
possible, the transition matrix is much more complex. An illustration is in Ap-
pendix XIV. However, this complexity takes into account all 65 = 7776 possible
transition trajectories for five observed periods, which is usually not available with
typical regression models.
Table 9.4 is a frequency table of state transitions in the six-state model. As is
apparent, some transitions are very rare. For example, between science based
and internal strategies, there are only 15 transitions between both ways. Because
some of these transitions are so rare, it is only possible to estimate Markov mod-
els where it is assumed that transitions are observed exactly and firms do not shift
into other strategies between two observations. These are the same type as the
exactly observed models presented for the three-state Markov models before. As
was clear from previous results, exactly observed models estimate smaller tran-
sition intensities with smaller confidence intervals. It is likely that these models
underestimate true transition intensities.
The frequency table for the use of innovation policy instruments is provided simi-
larly as for the three-state models and is presented in Table 9.3. Same descriptive
statistics are available for the balanced dataset model in Appendix XX and XV.
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Table 9.4: Frequency table of state transitions in a six-state Markov model. n =
7962 obs.
To:
From Not innov. Internal Supplier Market Open Science
Not innovative 1778 86 303 186 50 16
Internal strategy 119 151 64 74 35 9
Supplier based 364 69 347 175 47 22
Market oriented 305 85 217 381 85 45
Open innovation 54 58 64 99 134 31
Science based 19 6 18 49 23 85
Base estimates for transition intensities are in Figure 9.4 for the full dataset model
and in Appendix XXI for the balanced dataset model. Transition intensity matri-
ces for both models are in Appendix XXII.
The results in the full dataset and the balanced dataset are fairly similar. Therefore,
I will describe the results from the full dataset as the model of interest here. The
balanced dataset has larger confidence intervals due to a lower observation count.
Estimates themselves are similar.
First, the diagonals in the intensity matrix estimate the probabilities of transition-
ing from the current state. The not innovative state has the lowest absolute value,
which means that has the lowest probability of transitioning from the current state.
These results are similar as in the three-state models, and the persistency of being
not innovative is highest.
However, when innovation strategies are compared, the lowest value is found for
science based innovation strategies which have the highest persistency. Open
innovation and other innovation strategies share very similar values, especially
when confidence intervals are taken into account. In the three-state model, the
open innovation and science based strategies were combined, but there seems to
be some discrepancy between them, although their confidence intervals overlap
a bit. Firms are more apt to transition out of an open innovation strategy than
from a science based strategy. It may be that open innovation strategies need less
long-term commitments than science based strategies.
Off-diagonals in the transition matrices are on the right side of Figure 9.4. The
six-state model shows that there are probably complementary strategies in the
model. These are logically successive states. For example, firms are more likely
to transition from a not innovative state to a supplier based strategy than to es-
tablish an internal strategy. From supplier based strategies, firms are most likely
to go back to either a not innovative state or market oriented strategies. During
these transitions, the likelihood to transition to open innovation strategies or sci-
187
N
otinnov.(S1)
Internal(S2)
Supplier(S3)
M
arketing
(S4)
O
pen
(S5)
Science
(S6)
-0.50 -0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50
S1 to S6
S1 to S5
S1 to S4
S1 to S3
S1 to S2
S1 to S1
S2 to S6
S2 to S5
S2 to S4
S2 to S3
S2 to S2
S2 to S1
S3 to S6
S3 to S5
S3 to S4
S3 to S3
S3 to S2
S3 to S1
S4 to S6
S4 to S5
S4 to S4
S4 to S3
S4 to S2
S4 to S1
S5 to S6
S5 to S5
S5 to S4
S5 to S3
S5 to S2
S5 to S1
S6 to S6
S6 to S5
S6 to S4
S6 to S3
S6 to S2
S6 to S1
Transition intensity
Figure 9.4: Six-state Markov model transition intensities. Full dataset model with
exact transitions.
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ence based strategies also increases. For example, the probability to transition to
science based strategies is twice as large for open innovation firms than they are
for market oriented firms.
Internal strategies seem to be a special case. Firms from other simple innovation
strategies are not likely to transition to this type of strategy any more than they
are likely to take up complex innovation strategies. As shown in Chapter 6, firms
that chose this strategy are almost always foreign-owned and with subsidiary re-
lationships. It seems that this type of innovation strategy which relies heavily on
internal relationships can be estimated from data about innovative activities and it
is separate from other innovation strategies.
Open innovation and science based firms also show the highest persistency of
staying innovative. They are the only innovation strategies where the highest like-
lihood to transition is not into a not innovative state. These firms are most likely
to transition into market oriented strategies first.
It also seems that open innovation strategies and science based strategies are not
successive, but rather distinct. Firms are not very likely to transition between
these two strategies, but rather into some other strategies. It seems that capa-
bilities, choices and costs involved do not make these strategies interchangeable.
Therefore, there are probably different learning-curves for both of these strategies.
Figure 9.5 shows hazard ratios for the full dataset six-state model with exact tran-
sitions. The balanced dataset model is in Appendix XXIII. Underlying data for
these graphs are in Appendix XXIV.
Since there are 120 hazard ratios in Figure 9.5 and most of them are not signifi-
cant, there is a cleaner version of the same figure with only significant results in
Appendix XXV. Of these 120 hazard ratios, 16 are significant results. Some of
the significant results have very large confidence intervals, suggesting that there
are not enough observations to estimate possible effects with a precision that is
interpretable.
Firms with investment instruments have a higher probability of transitioning from
the not innovative state to the supplier based strategy. This is exactly the change
that should follow based on supported activities. Firms with investment instru-
ments also have a smaller probability of shifting from a supplier based strategy to
the not innovative state, meaning that this type of instrument is also linked with
increases in innovation persistency for supplier based strategies. Firms with in-
vestment instruments also have a smaller probability of transitioning from market
oriented strategies to internal strategies.
Firms with innovation and R&D instruments have a higher probability to tran-
sition from the not innovative state, from internal strategy and from the market
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oriented strategies to the science based strategies. Since not innovative and inter-
nal strategy estimates to the science based have very large confidence intervals,
these results should be interpreted with caution. However, results suggest that
innovation and R&D instruments are also linked with a higher probability of tran-
sitioning from the market oriented strategy to the science based strategy with four
times larger probabilities and a lower probability of transitioning from a science
based to market oriented strategy a bit less than four times. Firms with innovation
and R&D instruments also have a higher probability of transitioning from market
oriented strategy to the open innovation strategy, suggesting that this instrument
type captures some activities beyond R&D activities as well.
Firms with marketing and export promotion instruments have a higher probability
of transitioning from a not innovative state to the science based strategy. However,
as mentioned already, the shift from not innovative to science based is observed so
rarely that all effects have very large confidence intervals. Firms with marketing
and export promotion instruments have a higher probability of transitioning from
open innovation strategies to market oriented strategies. This result suggests that
firms are able to reduce their partnerships when they are participants of this instru-
ment type. However, it remains unclear whether this shift is positive in general,
as shifting from complex to simple innovation strategies might not be a desired
result. It might be possible that these shifts align with some specific period in
the firm’s product life-cycle, described in Chapter 2. For example, when earlier
product development efforts needed the input from many partners and the firm
is slowly shifting towards more cost-based strategies to maximise profits. Turn-
ing from open innovation strategies to marketing based strategies aligns with this
attitude.
Firms with training and skills development instruments have a higher probabil-
ity of transitioning from not innovative state to open innovation strategy. Firms
with training instruments also have a higher probability of transitioning from the
market oriented strategy to open innovation. However, there are also results sug-
gesting training instruments are linked with higher probabilities of transitioning
to an internal strategy as well. These might not be the shifts that are intended,
especially for more complex strategies.
Firms with training and skills development instruments have a lower probability
of transitioning from a supplier based strategy to the not innovative state. This,
alongside with investment instruments, suggests that some instruments can keep
firms from becoming not innovative. If these effects are compounding, then it
might be possible to reduce probabilities of firms transitioning to the not innova-
tive state to very low levels. This raises the question of whether these effects are
necessary and how firms would react. It seems that it would be an ideal case for
cost displacement to public funds.
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The results here are more complex than presented in Chapter 8. With Markov
models, the effects of innovation policy instruments are a lot less significant than
with multinomial models. At the same time, Markov models are better for tak-
ing the complexity of dynamics of innovation strategies into account. The results
here and from previous chapters also suggest that some innovation instruments
are positively linked with shifts between strategies. Results from Markov models
and multinomial models presented in the last chapters point towards similar di-
rections. Investment instruments lead to supplier based strategies and innovation
and R&D instruments lead to science based strategies. However, the dynamics
suggest that this is not a straightforward path, and firms are not easily jumping
from not innovative state to complex innovation strategies.
To show the possible effect of innovation policy instruments, there are three sets
of probability matrices in Appendix XXVI. These matrices show probabilities
estimated based on the three-state Markov model with the full dataset and ex-
act transitions in different time periods. Since transition intensities estimate the
instantaneous risk, it might be better to look at probabilities in a given period.
Matrices show the probability of transitioning from and to any state in two years,
six years and ten years. The first set shows the probability for any firm without
any innovation policy instruments; the second set with innovation and R&D and
training and skills development instruments given only on years three and four;
and the third set with firms participating in the treatment every year. The last is
an approximation if the effect of the treatment in the first year would be fully ab-
sorbed by the firm and would cumulatively add to its performance or choice of
strategy every year.
These probability matrices show that firms are not very likely to take up complex
innovation strategies in a very short time. However, in ten years, the probabilities
are a bit higher than over shorter periods. The models estimate that, if given
more time, firms step out of the not innovative state at some point. However, the
likelihood of remaining in the original state is smaller with each passing period.
Therefore, Markov models suggest that firms end up shifting from their original
strategies more often than not, except for not innovative firms. Even in ten years,
there is about a 58 percent probability that if a firm started as not innovative, it
will stay that way.
The second set shows probability matrices for firms that received innovation and
R&D instruments and training and skills development instruments in years three
and four. These are simulated results based on the Markov model. The first prob-
ability matrix at year two is same as before, since the firms are not treated. At
year six, a few years after the treatment, firms are much more likely to end up in
complex strategies compared to the non-treated group. However, the effect largely
wears off by year ten, where the probabilities of ending up in complex innovation
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strategies are not very different from the non-treated group. Results here show
that with Markov models, the effect of treatment is not persistent. If it is assumed
that treatment wears off for firms, e.g. it is only monetary without any learning
effects, then long-term results will not change much.
The third set shows probability matrices for firms that received innovation and
R&D instruments and training and skills development instruments every year in
this ten year period. These are also simulated results based on the Markov model.
The assumption here is that the treatment effect of instruments is persistent, i.e.
firms participating in instruments absorb this new knowledge or other effects in
full, and these persist in the firms for the whole simulated period.
The effects of just these two instruments would be quite large in this case. The
not innovative state is no longer the most likely state for any group. Also, the
probabilities of taking up or staying in complex innovation strategies are at least
four times larger than for other simulated sets.
It seems that it matters a lot if firms only participate in instruments which shift
their innovation strategies at some point, or if the effects of these shifts are persis-
tent for firms. This begs the question of whether the change in firm behaviour is
permanent when they participate in instruments. Unfortunately, this question can
not be answered sufficiently with the models presented here.
There are 4×4 = 16 combinations of probability matrices available for simulating
with the covariates used here. The example in Appendix XXVI shows just one for
brevity and illustration.
This chapter introduced multi-state Markov models for estimating the dynamics
of firm innovation strategies. Results from this chapter and previous estimations
are analysed and explained in the Discussion section of the thesis.
193
10. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
10.1. Discussion
The main findings of this thesis will be discussed in a slightly different order
compared to first appearance in the main text. I have classified Estonian public
support to firms into a taxonomy for use in empirical modelling. The analysis of
participation rates in policy instruments revealed two important themes.
First, there is plenty of variety in supported activities. Almost all possible el-
ements of the innovation process within the firm have some policy instruments
targeted towards them. Yet, in most EU countries, policy mixes are a result of
incremental extension of instruments rather than a deliberate result of policy de-
sign (Nauwelaers et al., 2009). A policy mix per se is not the goal, but rather a
coordinated set of instruments to tackle complex issues while taking their possi-
ble interactions into account. It has already been noted in Estonia that a lack of
coordination in governance is a threat to realising policy goals, even though there
is a broad set of instruments supporting R&D and innovation (Ma¨nnik, 2007).
Considering future plans, the next Estonian R&D, innovation and entrepreneur-
ship strategy is a joint work between the Ministry of Education and Research and
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications1. This is a step forward in
policy-making. However, R&D and innovation issues in regards to agriculture or
environmental issues still remain in separate domains.
With variety, there are possible interaction effects between policy instruments.
There are already some attempts to investigate and disentangle the possible mech-
anisms of the policy mix (e.g. see Cunningham, Edler, et al. (2016) and Flanagan
et al. (2011)). With the data and taxonomy created in this thesis, it was possible
to show that, indeed, there are a lot of occurrences of simultaneous use of policy
instruments (see Chapter 4.2). Cunningham, Edler, et al. (2016, p. 531) bring out
the complexity involved succinctly: “The most problematic issues for quantita-
tive analysis of interplay concern interactions over time and system complexity.
The data required to establish causality and sequentiality over time, in the face of
random external events, can be excessively challenging.”
I would like to point out that the descriptive statistics provided in this thesis make
up one of the first examples of providing evidence of the policy mix in such wide
1 There are only draft documents currently, but it will be available sometime in spring 2020 and
the strategy is in place until 2035. This will be a longer period compared to previous separate
strategies in R&D and entrepreneurship covering seven year intervals.
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categories of policy instruments on the firm level. Data gathered in this thesis
provides a comprehensive overview of all policy instruments where firms could
participate. Evidence provided here shows that, indeed, the possibility of interac-
tion and interplay is high, and the policy mix needs further investigation as a very
relevant concept in policy analysis. Most studies tend to take only one instrument
into account (Martin, 2016), but there are some rare exceptions, e.g. Guerzoni and
Raiteri (2015) and Hottenrott et al. (2017). This is especially relevant for empir-
ical investigations, since without checking for treatment from other instruments,
possible effects of cross-treatment can create bias in the results.
One caveat in this thesis is that EU level innovation policy instruments are not
included in the data. These include direct business support from the Framework
Programmes for Research and Technological Development, colloquially known
as framework programmes. Recent framework programmes have been named as
well: Horizon 2020 is within the period from 2014 to 2020; the latest, Horizon
Europe starts from 2021 and lasts until 2027. Data in this thesis covers the periods
of the sixth (2002-2006) and seventh (2007-2013) framework programmes.
Similarly, the CIS does not cover all economic activities equally. Some major
omitted economic activities are agriculture, forestry, construction, parts of retail,
hospitality, real estate, some creative industries, and some health-care industries.
Even though the CIS is representative of the population in its industries, it does
not cover the whole range of economic activities we see in society. The results
discussed here should take this into account.
Descriptive statistics in Chapter 5 showed some discrepancies between externally
added data about use of policy instruments and what was surveyed in the CIS.
There is a general question in the CIS about the use of policy instruments without
any added detail. Still, there is a large gap on what was reported and what can
be shown with external data. It seems that firms underreport the use of policy in-
struments heavily in the CIS. Studies, such as Czarnitzki and Delanote (2015) and
Szczygielski et al. (2017), depend only on the CIS survey to investigate the pos-
sible effects of policy instruments. Descriptives shown in this thesis indicate that
they might seriously understate the role of policy instruments when no external
data is used.
Researchers rely on CIS data anonymously by national statistics offices to protect
the respondents. However, some further investigation into underreporting of pol-
icy instruments is warranted in the future. Whether it is because firms feel that
some policy instruments are not relevant or unrelated to any innovative activities
is currently unknown.
The taxonomy created in this thesis covers many different policy fields, at least
when viewed from the governing side. Thus, the instruments included fall under
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many different ministries. However, firms have no fealty to any ministry. There
is a further need for better coordination between policies and ministries. As men-
tioned, the next strategic plan for entrepreneurship, R&D and innovation is joint
work between two ministries. Still, innovation policy is wider in scope, and even
this strategic plan leaves agriculture, energy and many other economic activities
out in full.
The complexity of the policy mix is also wider than what was analysed in this
thesis. The interplay between direct support to business, regulations, tax systems
and more, all influence innovativeness in firms. There are positive steps towards
better coordination, but there is still much more to do.
The relationship between policy instruments as an input to innovative activities
and innovations as outputs is varied. Policy instruments support certain activities,
such as developing marketing plans or co-financing investments in new machin-
ery. The innovation processes described by policy instruments included in this
thesis are shown in Chapter 3.5. It is to be expected that these instruments can
yield different results.
The results of this thesis show that, in general, policy instruments demonstrate the
expected output behaviour. For example, there is a positive relationship between
instruments that support R&D and the creation of new products and services, but
not with new processes. However, some policy instruments such as consulting,
financial guarantees and labour support instruments have no significant relation-
ship with any innovation output. This is relevant to policy makers and analysts
when evaluating the efficacy of STI policies in general. If we do not see any sig-
nificant relationship with innovation outputs while taking other possible policy
instruments into account, are these instruments justifiable as a public expense?
The analysis in this thesis showed that the variety in the input-output relationship
between STI policies and innovation outputs should be taken into account. Nev-
ertheless, expectations from policy instruments should be differentiated into finer
detail than just being innovative. If wider taxonomies of policy instruments are
used in empirical analyses, there is a possibility for misinterpretation of results.
A more positive aspect is that most categories of STI policies did indeed show a
positive relationship with innovation outputs. Even though the results in this the-
sis cannot prove a causal relationship, they still point away from the most bleak
conclusions.
There are five distinct innovation strategies visible for Estonian firms. These
are supplier based, market oriented, open innovation, science based and inter-
nal strategies (see Chapter 6). Many of the characteristics already described in
the original Pavitt’s taxonomy (Pavitt, 1984; Pavitt et al., 1989) can be seen here,
showing how versatile this taxonomy really is.
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Review of the literature revealed comparable estimations from Denmark (Jensen
et al., 2007; Leiponen and Drejer, 2007), Finland (Leiponen and Drejer, 2007),
Sweden (Sellenthin and Hommen, 2002), Spain (Camacho and Rodriguez, 2008),
Netherlands (De Jong and Marsili, 2006; Marsili and Verspagen, 2002), Switzer-
land (Hollenstein, 2003, 2018), UK (Battisti and Stoneman, 2010; Pavitt, 1984;
Pavitt et al., 1989) EU wide (Castellacci, 2008; Frenz and Lambert, 2012; Srholec
and Verspagen, 2008). Nevertheless, differences in estimation methods and vari-
ables considered make comparisons between results from other countries difficult
(Frenz and Lambert, 2012). Some similarities can be pointed out. The science
based cluster is very small in Estonia, totalling about 6% of all observations. How-
ever, Scandinavian countries report between 15 and 21 percent of the population
(Leiponen and Drejer, 2007), Switzerland around 18 percent (Hollenstein, 2018),
Netherlands around 25 percent among SMEs (De Jong and Marsili, 2006), and
Spain around 15 percent (Camacho and Rodriguez, 2008). Unfortunately, there
are not many studies among other Central and Eastern European countries that can
be used for comparison. If this finding is not an artefact of incomparable meth-
ods, it could explain some of the gap in value added between Estonia and other
Western European countries. There are just not enough firms with R&D based
strategies for innovation in Estonia. Mu¨rk and Kalvet (2015) gave an overview
of firms that report R&D activities in Estonia. The whole population totals about
250 firms. Over the 10 years of CIS data used in this thesis, about 200 firms with
science based innovation strategies were identified, an example of the permeating
effect of industrially representative nation-wide sampling in small countries.
Another contrasting aspect of Estonian firms is their reliance on supplier based
innovation strategies. Here, contrarily, the group of firms is larger than in other
comparable European studies. In Estonia, this is about a third of all observations.
In other countries, it seems to be one of the smaller groups (De Jong and Mar-
sili, 2006; Leiponen and Drejer, 2007). Supplier based innovation strategies are
linked with lower opportunities and lower innovative outputs than other strategies
(Castellacci, 2008; Pavitt, 1984).
One distinguishing characteristic of Estonian firms seems to be the existence of
an internal innovation strategy. This moderately sized group of firms with dis-
tinct innovative activities, mostly relies on within group exchange of information
and cooperation with external training and acquisition of machinery. Data added
after estimation revealed that more than 99 percent of firms in this category are
part of a group. Regrettably, other studies have not included descriptive statistics
about firm ownership in their papers. Foreign ownership is an important source
of technology for small countries, a mechanism for technology transfer (Keller,
2004). In addition, there is evidence that foreign ownership differs in management
techniques, mostly with higher quality (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). However,
firms in Central and Eastern Europe tend to have more subsidiary relationships
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towards parent companies. Those which are considered high-tech and R&D in-
tensive, tend to only be production facilities in reality (Havas, 2005; Radosˇevic´,
2002). A question of mandate and local independence remains.
Previous investigations with similar objectives were exclusively done with cross-
sectional data. To my knowledge, there has been only one study with panel data
so far, such as in this thesis. Hollenstein (2018) analyses innovative behaviour
with Swiss data — also innovation survey results, but not harmonised with the
CIS, so the results are not exactly comparable. Still, some results from the Swiss
analysis on the dynamics of innovation strategies are similar.
Dynamics of firm innovation strategies showed that firms are able to shift their
innovation strategies often and in relatively short time periods. This means that
firms are able to reorient their choices while doing innovative activities within a
few years. These could be their potential cooperation partners, sources of new
knowledge, other inputs like machinery or training, and so forth. Hollenstein,
2018 describes this as a necessity for Swiss firms, due their highly advanced and
competitive environment, and views this as external confirmatory evidence of his
results. I do not believe that the same argument could be applied in full to the com-
petitive environment where Estonian firms operate. Estonian firms on average are
laggards by every measurable dimension to Swiss firms (see the regional EU inno-
vation scoreboard for comparison of a compendium of indicators by Hollanders,
Es-Sadki, and Merkelbach (2019)). Yet, the dynamics of innovation strategies
show strikingly similar behaviour.
I consider results from the Hollenstein (2018) paper as a confirmation that the
results here are credible. However, I disagree on the mechanisms that drive this
behaviour. To sum up this argument, evidence from multiple firm-level studies
show that firms often change or reorient their innovation strategies within short
time frames. This is a combination of their choices while doing innovative ac-
tivities, showing that firms are able to switch to an appropriate strategy relatively
quickly (within a few years). Unfortunately, there is no clear explanation about
what the drivers of these shifts may be. It is possibly a combination of changes
in both the external environment (market demand, response to competition, le-
gal environment, etc) and internal choices (market choices, capabilities, resource
availability, etc) (Geels and Schot, 2007; Poel, 2003). Disentangling this combi-
nation on the firm-level is a challenge in itself.
The results of this thesis indicate that some capabilities are harder for firms to
obtain than others. Shifts between strategies happen more often between those
that rely less on R&D capabilities. If firms develop these capabilities once, then
they are more likely to rely upon R&D based strategies more often in the future
as well. Results show that persistence of different strategies is not uniform. One
explanation is that it depends on the type of costs associated with attaining these
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strategies (Ganter and Hecker, 2013). Unfortunately, the true costs of shifting
between strategies are unobserved in the data. Still, it can be assumed that to rely
more heavily on R&D requires more high-skilled personnel, even if R&D itself is
outsourced. There are different types of R&D investment which can have different
returns on investment (Cassiman et al., 2002; Griffith et al., 2004). Firms’ internal
capabilities need to be able to appropriate this inflow of knowledge (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990). Mean sojourn times for different strategies show that many of
the cooperative relationships and behavioural rigidity cannot be assumed to persist
over time. It takes more time to develop complex innovation strategies, and, when
these strategies are developed, firms are more likely to stay innovative for the next
period as well.
The results of this thesis also suggest that there is little interchangeability be-
tween R&D based innovation strategies and open innovation strategies. Firms
that develop either rather transition to some other innovation strategies than be-
tween these two complex innovation strategies. Conditions for choosing either
a make-it-yourself or a buy-in strategy depend both on firm size and capabilities
(Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999), market conditions (Cruz-Ca´zares et al., 2013),
organisational structure and ownership (Cefis and Triguero, 2016), and appropri-
ation conditions (Drechsler and Natter, 2012). Heavy dependance on partners for
core products can be a risky strategy (Fine and Whitney, 1996). In the Estonian
case, firms seem to embrace either science based or open innovation strategies
but do not move from one to another often, suggesting that these two innovation
strategies are not on a continuum of strategy evolution.
Finally, the relationship between policy instruments and firm innovation strate-
gies show some credible relationships. Only investment, R&D and innovation,
marketing and export promotion, and training and skills development instruments
were modelled because they showed the most potential in Chapters 7 and 8. At
the more detailed level with five different innovation strategies, Markov models
show only a handful of statistically significant relationships out of 120 tested.
It is evident that there are inconsistencies in proposed dynamics of innovation
strategies for different policy instruments. In addition, there are also separate
layers of results depending on whether different policy instruments are compared
or the mechanism of dynamics is under investigation.
The results of this thesis suggest that policy instruments do not increase the proba-
bility of a firm attaining complex innovation strategies if they have been not inno-
vative before. Suggesting that there are so-called learning effects within the firm,
firms learn to walk before they learn to run. Learning from previous R&D experi-
ence and from collaborations on previous projects leads to better management of
innovation strategies (Clarysse et al., 2009). Innovation policy instruments might
increase this learning process (Autio et al., 2008).
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These results imply that if innovation policy encourages firms to take up more
complex innovation strategies like open innovation and science based strategies,
the target audience is firms with some experience in creating innovations before-
hand. These can be firms with more simple innovation strategies, such as supplier
based or internal strategies.
Results indicate that reaching complex innovation strategies can be a step-wise
process. First, firms reach simpler innovation strategies and then more complex
ones. Results also indicate that policy instruments that might increase the proba-
bility of transitioning to these innovation strategies differ for simple and complex
strategies.
Policy instruments that support innovation activities, i.e. they finance the creation
of new products or services and provide support for R&D activities, also show
the highest probability for the firm to take up a science based innovation strat-
egy. However, results from Markov models suggest that this is only relevant for
firms that already have simpler innovation strategies. Firms are more than twice
as likely to take up complex innovation strategies if they already have simple in-
novation strategies when they are part of R&D and innovation instruments.
Results from different OECD countries also indicate that, without R&D policy in-
struments, a significant share of firms would not initialise R&D activities (OECD,
2006). This relationship might exist also for R&D tax credits (Neicu et al., 2016).
To promote more complex innovation strategies, direct R&D promotion efforts
might be better allocated to firms with some experience, but not to already R&D
intensive firms (Wanzenbo¨ck et al., 2013). In addition, results in Chapter 9 sug-
gest that R&D and innovation instruments keep firms from transitioning out from
science based strategies.
There is some evidence that R&D subsidies can also induce firms to take up more
cooperative strategies among SMEs in EU peripheral areas (Orlic et al., 2019).
Results in this thesis also suggest that R&D and innovation policy instruments
increase the probability of transitioning from market based strategies to open in-
novation strategies. However, similar results were not relevant from any other
innovation strategy.
Investment instruments are usually combined with R&D and other innovation pol-
icy instruments in analysis (Cunningham, Go¨k, et al., 2016). In Estonia, they have
been so influential that they merit a separate category. Investment instruments
have been relevant for technology catch-up and usually do not include any R&D
funding whatsoever (see Chapter 3). These instruments are meant for acquiring
new machinery or other forms of physical capital, with some part co-financed by
the state.
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Results indicate that firms with investment instruments are 50 percent more likely
to transition from the not innovative state to simple innovation strategies. Results
suggest that they are more likely to have a supplier based innovation strategy. The
results also indicate that firms do not have more complex innovation strategies
afterwards. Firms that participate in investment instruments do not exhibit any
additional strategic behaviour besides the one directly funded, i.e. acquiring ma-
chinery or technology from suppliers. These results indicate that, at the very least,
the supported behaviour is observed for the firms. However, nothing additional is
detected. Therefore, investment instruments might be a good start for firms who
otherwise would have no innovative activities whatsoever. It is difficult to esti-
mate the return on investment for these instruments, but if some of these firms
go from simple innovation strategies to more complex ones later, it might have a
cascading effect.
Previous research suggests that business advisory services, such as programmes
for managers to enhance their skills, marketing advisory, export planning, and
technology advisory services are beneficial to firm outcomes (Cumming and Fis-
cher, 2012; Shapira and Youtie, 2016). Marketing capabilities are fundamental
to firm innovation strategy (Weerawardena, 2003). Firms with marketing and ex-
port promotion instruments also show higher rates of innovativeness in this thesis.
However, firms with marketing and export promotion programmes showed very
little relationship with shifting their innovation strategies. Evidence from other
countries shows that SMEs themselves find benefits from business advisory ser-
vices, yet marketing and export planning are not the most sought after (Boter and
Lundstro¨m, 2005).
There are reports from other countries showing that publicly offered business
advisory services have a very low uptake (Boter and Lundstro¨m, 2005; Curran,
2000). This is not observed in the case for Estonia. Marketing and export promo-
tion programs, along with consulting and other possible business advisory services
are among the more widely used policy instruments (see Chapter 5). Curran and
Blackburn (2000) bring out several reasons for low uptake of business services,
such as low confidence of the supplier, lack of awareness, high prices, mismatch
with demand, and lack of quality. The Estonian case shows that use of policy
instruments similar to business advisory services have seen an upward trend, at
least in the sample under analysis in this thesis, indicating that firms see at least
some value in such services. Uptake itself is no measure for quality or fulfilment
of policy objectives (Storey, 2008)
Training and skill development policy instruments show a positive relationship
with transitioning from simple to complex innovation strategies. However, the
results are not totally uniform when estimated at a finer level for all five strategies
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together. There seems to be a positive relationship with keeping firms from not
transitioning to the not innovative state, i.e. keeping them innovative longer.
Competences and skill development itself is a vital part of innovation policy, and
most economies have deficiencies in the level of competences and a too short
perspective on reconciling them (Borra´s and Edquist, 2015). An overview of re-
cent research highlights three findings on the relationship between training and
skill development and innovativeness (Jones and Grimshaw, 2016): first, there
seems to be a positive relationship between skill development and innovativeness;
second, organisations benefit from developing their internal knowledge pool; and
third, a mix of different skills is needed. Results of this thesis also show a positive
relationship between training and skill development instruments and firm inno-
vativeness. However, these are most likely biased upwards. If these instruments
also help firms to attain more complex innovation strategies and to refrain from
becoming not innovative, they merit their place in the policy mix in Estonia.
10.2. Limitations
The research done in this thesis must be considered with taking some limitations
into account. Limitations are based on the methods and data chosen to carry out
this research.
The true question in policy evaluation is about how firms would behave if they
had not received any intervention. Unfortunately, we can not observe this case
because there are no do-overs with firms. Therefore, the only possibility is to
compare firms that received some intervention with firms that did not. If these
two groups are different from each other in any way, besides the intervention
itself, the effect of policy intervention is difficult to estimate. Common estimation
techniques are biased in this case (see Chapter 7.3 for a lengthier description of
this issue).
The methods used in this thesis do not fully overcome the issues of selection
bias. There is a trade off in how wide the scope is with policy analysis and how
carefully the identification method can be constructed. In this thesis, I have opted
to analyse a wide range of different policy instruments in a single setting, which
in turn has reduced the possible methods available. Due to these limitations, true
causal effects of policy intervention to output or behavioural additionality are not
known.
Data used in this thesis is collected on the firm level. However, many innova-
tion strategies can be on the product level. Firms have multiple products concur-
rently in production, with different time horizons, different innovative activities
involved, and different strategies. Some are more experimental, user-driven inno-
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vations with more radical innovation based strategies, and some are so-called cash
cows with only incremental improvements and cost-cutting strategies.
In this thesis, firms received a single strategy as their pattern of innovation to
characterise their whole behaviour. Even though this pattern of innovation was
a combination of different activities, it still cannot differentiate between product
lines. Therefore, for some firms, there may be more shifts within the firm than
it is possible to observe with the data provided. Product level and firm level data
should be collected for the same firms at some point to compare their possible
outcomes. Unfortunately, there are no large-scale surveys that collect information
about innovative activities on the product level available.
There are also some gaps in the data about innovative activities. CIS data has been
provided by Statistics Estonia, and they assure it is representative of the population
of Estonian firms in every period. Gaps originate from two main mechanisms.
First, some firms just go out of business. Second, some firms choose not to reply
in every period2. These gaps create an unbalanced panel which might create some
problems with representability if omissions are not random. Since the CIS is
confidential, I cannot verify with firms directly why they are not represented in
some periods and cannot ask these questions from them directly. This limitation
is acknowledged.
10.3. Future work
Several possible further research paths are available. I would like to divide them
into two different sets - policy instruments and dynamics of innovation strategies.
With policy instruments, the most interesting questions raised in this thesis deal
with the policy mix. The data gathered for this thesis have opened up a possibility
to investigate firms based on all instruments where they have been beneficiaries.
There is a lack of firm level studies where the innovation policy instrument mix is
larger than only R&D, as it was here (Cunningham, Edler, et al., 2016). Therefore,
one possibility is to start disentangling the policy mix to see what types of inter-
action effects exist, whether policy instruments and their combinations support
or hinder each other, create synergy or are independent. One may also question
whether a right combination in the policy mix exists that maximises innovative-
ness in the innovation system.
With dynamics of innovation strategies, there should be further investigation of the
shifts. In this thesis, the main investigation was whether policy instruments are
one driver. However, a more widespread research to pick apart firm specific and
2 My conversations with officials at the Statistics Estonia lead me to believe that they send the
survey to all possible candidates.
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industry specific effects should be of interest — whether innovation policy should
be at the industry or firm level in its design. Similarly, exogenous shocks are
of interest. The role of business cycles for innovation strategies is one example.
The model presented in this thesis is a good starting point to pick apart these
challenges.
10.4. Conclusion
The main theme of this thesis was to investigate whether firms change their inno-
vation strategies when they receive public support for executing certain strategies.
From this question of interest, the main aim was put forward as to estimate the
possible effects of STI policy instruments on firm innovation strategy.
To fulfil this aim, several research questions have been proposed. I will not reiter-
ate them all in full, but will describe the cumulative nature of this thesis. I showed
how the innovation process can be modelled within the firm; what are the possi-
ble justifications for interventions and instruments with which the public sector
can support firms; how firm innovation strategies reorient over time; how pub-
lic support instruments are related with firm-level innovation outputs; and finally,
how public support instruments are related with firm-level changes in innovation
strategies.
This thesis aimed to connect two themes, one dealing with patterns of innovations
for firms and the other with possible effects of STI policies. Patterns of innovation
are a summary of firms’ strategic and operational choices for activities while cre-
ating innovations. These are choices such as: what kind of inputs to purchase for
innovative activities; if and what partnerships to form; what type of appropriation
methods are used for intellectual property; and so forth. A combination of these
choices forms the innovation strategy.
The main aim of this thesis was to analyse the relationship between innovation
policy support to firms and how it might change their innovation strategies. Data
for estimations comes from Estonia between 2002 and 2012.
STI policy instruments have been categorised into a taxonomy. There are ten
different kinds of policy instruments available for firms as direct business sup-
port. These are support for R&D and innovation, investments, collaboration pro-
grammes, consulting, direct subsidies, financial guarantees & sureties, labour
support, marketing & export promotion support, training & skills development
support, and mixed support. Some of these policy instruments have been more
popular and important than others. For example, investment support, R&D and
innovation support, marketing & export promotion, and training & skills devel-
opment support have been more closely related with innovative firms. In the end,
these instruments were under closer investigation as well.
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The results of this thesis indicate that firms are quick to react with changes in their
innovation strategies. It follows that they are able to quickly deploy their capabil-
ities or create new ones to fulfil some goals. Firms can change their innovation
strategies often and in a relatively short time, over a few years. These results sug-
gest that STI policy can also expect rapid changes from firms if proper stimuli is
applied.
In addition, there is a step-wise logic to changes in innovation strategies. Not in-
novative firms develop simple innovation strategies first and more complex ones
later. It takes time, experience and learning to develop and fulfil complex inno-
vation strategies. These results suggest that STI policies should also adapt to the
proper target audience. Leap-frogging might have limits if firms are very inexpe-
rienced.
Finally, some STI policy instruments do show a positive relationship with changes
in innovation strategies. Firms with investment instruments are more likely to take
up simple innovation strategies based on supplier relationships. Firms with R&D
and innovation instruments are more likely to take up more complex innovation
strategies, based on cooperation with research facilities and universities and with
more open innovation overall. Firms with training and skill development instru-
ments are less likely to stop being innovative at all.
It seems that many of the relationships and activities that STI policies wish to
promote can be seen in firms’ activities and in their strategies. However, how
lasting these effects are needs more scrutiny in the future. Results here suggest
that policy instruments can be demanding for firms. Innovation policy instruments
should be challenging enough to create strategies that we wish to promote in the
innovation system — cooperative, open and R&D intensive — for they will create
capabilities that persist.
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II. CIS panel data patterns
Data patterns
Pattern Firms Percent Cum. share
of firms
1 2004 - 2006 - 2008 - 2010 - 2012 654 18.68% 18.68%
2 NA - NA - NA - NA - 2012 320 9.14% 27.81%
3 2004 - NA - NA - NA - NA 298 8.51% 36.32%
4 2004 - 2006 - NA - NA - NA 250 7.14% 43.46%
5 NA - NA - 2008 - NA - NA 242 6.91% 50.37%
6 2004 - 2006 - 2008 - NA - NA 210 6.00% 56.37%
7 NA - NA - 2008 - 2010 - 2012 182 5.20% 61.56%
8 NA - 2006 - NA - NA - NA 179 5.11% 66.68%
9 NA - 2006 - 2008 - 2010 - 2012 177 5.05% 71.73%
10 NA - NA - NA - 2010 - 2012 163 4.65% 76.38%
11 NA - NA - NA - 2010 - NA 154 4.40% 80.78%
12 2004 - 2006 - 2008 - 2010 - NA 135 3.85% 84.64%
13 NA - 2006 - 2008 - NA - NA 102 2.91% 87.55%
14 NA - NA - 2008 - 2010 - NA 68 1.94% 89.49%
15 NA - 2006 - 2008 - 2010 - NA 65 1.86% 91.35%
16 2004 - NA - 2008 - 2010 - 2012 48 1.37% 92.72%
17 NA - NA - 2008 - NA - 2012 41 1.17% 93.89%
18 2004 - 2006 - 2008 - NA - 2012 40 1.14% 95.03%
19 2004 - NA - 2008 - NA - NA 27 0.77% 95.80%
20 NA - 2006 - 2008 - NA - 2012 21 0.60% 96.40%
21 2004 - 2006 - NA - 2010 - 2012 18 0.51% 96.92%
22 2004 - 2006 - NA - 2010 - NA 18 0.51% 97.43%
23 NA - 2006 - NA - 2010 - NA 15 0.43% 97.86%
24 2004 - 2006 - NA - NA - 2012 14 0.40% 98.26%
25 NA - 2006 - NA - 2010 - 2012 14 0.40% 98.66%
26 NA - 2006 - NA - NA - 2012 12 0.34% 99.00%
27 2004 - NA - 2008 - 2010 - NA 8 0.23% 99.23%
28 2004 - NA - NA - 2010 - 2012 8 0.23% 99.46%
29 2004 - NA - NA - 2010 - NA 8 0.23% 99.69%
30 2004 - NA - 2008 - NA - 2012 6 0.17% 99.86%
31 2004 - NA - NA - NA - 2012 5 0.14% 100.00%
Source: Innovation Data (2018)
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III. Paying agencies in Estonia
Paying agencies in Estonia with beneficiaries and total sum (2002 - 2012)
Paying agency Instruments Instrument Beneficiaries Total sum
types
EAS 42 6 1239 170 243 554
Eesti To¨o¨tukassa 3 1 762 4 287 080
Sihtasutus KredEx 6 2 111 2 829 795
PRIA 21 5 97 55 454 237
SA KIK 11 2 89 490 622 906
Tallinna Ettevo˜tlusamet 6 3 81 775 324
Sihtasutus Archimedes 8 4 35 2 030 849
Sihtasutus INNOVE 2 1 13 2 322 839
Elering AS 4 1 10 51 432 024
Keskkonnaministeerium 3 1 7 1 837 749
SA Erametsakeskus 3 1 7 21 662
Maaelu Edendamise SA 4 2 6 29 997
Rahandusministeerium 6 2 5 13 308 016
Tehnilise Ja¨relevalve Amet 3 1 5 204 748 317
MKM 5 2 4 81 660 437
Eesti Filmi SA 3 1 3 2 530 044
Siseministeerium 1 1 3 331 032
Kultuuriministeerium 2 1 2 121 342
Sihtasutus Eesti Teadusagentuur 1 1 2 7 669
Aktsiaselts Tallinna Lennujaam 2 1 1 20 486 550
Narva Linna A. ja O¨. Amet 1 1 1 49 540
Veeteede Amet 1 1 1 1 917 348
Source: Innovation Data (2018)
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IV. Beneficiaries use of instruments
Use of policy instruments by firms in the CIS sample by instrument type (2002 -
2012)
Instrument type 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Collaboration programmes 0 0 2 6 4
Consulting 0 0 0 31 359
Direct subsidy 0 0 1 2 2
Financial guarantees 0 0 0 62 81
Innovation & R&D 11 33 25 130 222
Investments 60 114 107 196 147
Labour support 0 0 2 490 660
Marketing & export promotion 45 108 79 279 250
Mixed support 0 3 6 9 17
Training & skills 121 354 298 577 563
Source: Innovation Data (2018)
238
V .
To
ta
ls
um
al
lo
ca
te
d
to
be
ne
fic
ia
re
sb
y
in
st
ru
m
en
tt
yp
e
To
ta
ls
um
al
lo
ca
te
d
to
fir
m
s
in
th
e
C
IS
sa
m
pl
e
by
in
st
ru
m
en
tt
yp
e
(2
00
2
-2
01
2)
In
st
ru
m
en
t t
yp
e
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
C
ol
la
bo
ra
tio
n
pr
og
.
0
0
29
97
7
31
2
53
1
23
5
99
4
C
on
su
lti
ng
0
0
0
1
96
6
68
6
3
39
4
01
4
D
ir
ec
ts
ub
si
dy
0
0
86
20
45
1
72
8
60
02
9
72
8
Fi
na
nc
ia
lg
ua
ra
nt
ee
s
0
0
0
1
39
0
16
3
1
40
7
85
9
In
no
va
tio
n
&
R
&
D
1
12
9
41
3
3
89
3
11
1
2
40
8
88
7
9
95
1
30
6
16
26
0
53
7
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
18
95
2
55
2
25
37
4
30
4
18
7
59
9
81
1
49
2
58
4
47
2
19
4
77
1
11
2
L
ab
ou
rs
up
po
rt
0
0
1
91
7
3
32
7
06
8
3
99
7
45
4
M
ar
ke
tin
g
&
ex
po
rt
1
85
0
86
7
5
23
0
98
4
5
20
0
35
8
15
30
4
21
6
14
60
6
88
8
M
ix
ed
su
pp
or
t
0
27
62
7
57
66
5
14
2
85
5
48
9
93
1
Tr
ai
ni
ng
&
sk
ill
s
38
7
01
8
3
07
7
39
1
2
85
5
15
9
4
03
4
41
7
4
31
2
22
2
So
ur
ce
: I
nn
ov
at
io
n
D
at
a
(2
01
8)
239
VI. Factor loadings matrix plot with clusters
240
VII. Innovative activities by pattern of innovation
Open Science Market Internal Supplier
innovation based oriented strategy based
Mean importance of sources, 0-3
sources: internal 2.29 2.25 1.94 2.60 1.27
sources: suppliers 2.18 1.77 1.48 1.58 1.79
sources: clients 2.05 1.57 1.83 1.30 0.93
sources: competitors 1.84 1.00 1.43 0.95 0.78
sources: consultants 1.26 1.05 0.63 0.64 0.42
sources: universities 0.82 1.66 0.33 0.23 0.14
sources: public research inst. 0.51 0.62 0.22 0.12 0.10
sources: conferences 1.70 1.62 1.40 0.97 1.02
sources: magazines 1.37 1.33 0.90 0.68 0.58
sources: trade associations 0.86 0.68 0.46 0.38 0.31
Funding for inputs, share of sample
inputs: outsourced R&D 0.57 0.72 0.24 0.29 0.14
inputs: internal R&D 0.76 0.92 0.55 0.47 0.22
inputs: machinery 0.93 0.88 0.81 0.85 0.91
inputs: knowledge 0.72 0.64 0.44 0.49 0.25
inputs: training 0.75 0.63 0.55 0.64 0.41
inputs: marketing 0.56 0.59 0.60 0.42 0.05
Cooperation with partners, share of sample
coop: within group 0.57 0.30 0.01 0.99 0.01
coop: suppliers 0.93 0.48 0.08 0.30 0.15
coop: clients 0.90 0.44 0.13 0.25 0.05
coop: competitors 0.89 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.03
coop: consultants 0.62 0.32 0.01 0.07 0.03
coop: universities 0.43 0.70 0.00 0.01 0.01
coop: public research inst. 0.25 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.00
Mean importance of goals, 0-3
goal: portfolio widening 2.12 2.17 2.42 1.94 0.69
goal: new markets 2.18 2.13 2.20 1.83 1.11
goal: quality increase 2.44 2.26 2.06 2.08 1.84
goal: flexibility in production 2.20 1.86 1.79 1.86 1.53
goal: productivity increase 2.20 1.86 1.71 1.82 1.60
goal: lower labour cost 1.90 1.51 1.45 1.55 1.26
Use of appropriation methods, share of sample
appr: industrial models 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00
appr: patents 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
appr: industrial designs 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00
appr: trademarks 0.51 1.01 0.45 0.25 0.22
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 4811.
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VIII. Pattern of innovation state distribution for full
panel
Not innovative
Supplier based
Internal resources
Market oriented
Open innovation
Science based
missing
Fr
eq
.(
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0
Patterns of innovation state distribution plot over time. n = 9155 (obs); n = 3502
(firms).
Source: Innovation Data (2018)
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X. Full sample state transition matrix
State transition matrix, full sample, with time and missing states, in percentages.
To:
End Not Supplier Internal Market Open Science
From: Period innov. based strategy oriented innov. based Missing
Not innovative 2006 49.9 13.3 3.2 5.8 1.5 0.6 25.7
Supplier based 2006 22.9 30.7 6.7 12.7 3.8 1.9 21.4
Internal strategy 2006 20.9 17.9 16.4 11.9 4.5 0.0 28.4
Market oriented 2006 21.2 20.4 4.9 23.9 6.0 2.7 20.9
Open innovation 2006 11.4 15.4 8.1 14.1 24.8 5.4 20.8
Science based 2006 5.8 11.5 0.0 15.4 5.8 48.1 13.5
Missing 2006 14.9 4.6 3.5 7.1 2.7 0.6 66.7
Not innovative 2008 48.3 9.4 2.3 5.7 1.3 0.5 32.6
Supplier based 2008 24.0 25.8 6.4 17.1 4.4 2.3 20.0
Internal strategy 2008 15.7 15.7 29.3 14.3 6.1 1.4 17.7
Market oriented 2008 12.4 13.0 8.4 27.4 8.4 1.8 28.6
Open innovation 2008 8.2 11.1 11.9 20.0 23.0 5.2 20.7
Science based 2008 6.4 4.8 3.2 28.6 3.2 31.8 22.2
Missing 2008 19.4 4.6 4.1 8.6 1.9 0.8 60.6
Not innovative 2010 44.0 5.6 1.9 4.3 1.2 0.2 42.8
Supplier based 2010 26.0 27.8 3.3 11.2 3.9 1.2 26.6
Internal strategy 2010 17.6 7.5 29.2 10.6 7.0 1.0 27.1
Market oriented 2010 16.4 15.0 4.4 26.2 3.4 3.9 30.6
Open innovation 2010 7.0 12.5 8.6 18.0 27.3 5.5 21.1
Science based 2010 11.5 6.6 3.3 18.0 11.5 31.2 18.0
Missing 2010 13.6 2.7 2.6 6.3 1.1 0.6 73.0
Not innovative 2012 56.6 5.8 2.1 3.6 1.1 0.3 30.5
Supplier based 2012 35.7 22.5 4.3 8.9 1.4 1.1 26.1
Internal strategy 2012 24.4 7.1 23.7 12.8 4.5 3.2 24.4
Market oriented 2012 26.6 10.0 5.7 24.2 4.2 3.3 26.0
Open innovation 2012 10.9 5.5 16.4 19.1 26.4 8.2 13.6
Science based 2012 1.7 5.1 3.4 17.0 17.0 30.5 25.4
Missing 2012 14.8 3.2 1.4 4.2 1.3 1.0 74.0
Source: Innovation Data (2018), n = 9155.
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XI. Public support and patterns of innovation. Base
model estimates.
Multinomial logit. Ref. category: not innovative
Internal Market Open Science Supplier
strategy oriented innovation based based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Consulting 0.103 0.167 0.171 0.214 −0.024
(0.217) (0.151) (0.200) (0.233) (0.177)
Financial −0.371 0.223 0.130 −0.170 0.194
(0.421) (0.257) (0.377) (0.448) (0.262)
Innovation and R&D −0.374 0.398∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 1.716∗∗∗ −0.240
(0.263) (0.159) (0.195) (0.214) (0.201)
Investments 0.213 0.814∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.143) (0.179) (0.228) (0.135)
Labour −0.397∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗ −0.760∗∗∗ −0.598∗∗∗ −0.298∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.097) (0.161) (0.206) (0.103)
Marketing 0.460∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 1.161∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.132) (0.180) (0.207) (0.146)
Training 1.081∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.086) (0.119) (0.151) (0.090)
Mixed −0.548 1.111∗∗∗ 0.173 0.061 0.717
(1.093) (0.448) (0.830) (0.971) (0.558)
Other −8.506 −0.444 2.213∗∗∗ 2.683∗∗∗ 0.954
(0.524) (1.084) (0.655) (0.676) (0.441)
Constant −2.031∗∗∗ −1.161∗∗∗ −2.292∗∗∗ −3.288∗∗∗ −1.233∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.042) (0.068) (0.109) (0.041)
Observations 9155
Akaike Inf. Crit. 25,824.620
Log likelihood -12,862.31
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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XII. Public support and patterns of innovation. Base
model with time controls estimates.
Multinomial logit. Ref. category: not innovative
Internal Market Open Science Supplier
strategy oriented innovation based based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Consulting 0.317 0.656∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗
(0.231) (0.167) (0.232) (0.275) (0.188)
Financial −0.301 0.430∗ 0.386 0.106 0.377
(0.415) (0.237) (0.342) (0.446) (0.256)
Innovation and R&D −0.279 0.668∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 2.056∗∗∗ −0.021
(0.255) (0.152) (0.184) (0.196) (0.190)
Investments 0.220 0.855∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗∗ 1.213∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.124) (0.171) (0.194) (0.120)
Labour −0.263∗ 0.239∗∗ −0.217 −0.029 0.109
(0.146) (0.105) (0.168) (0.211) (0.111)
Marketing 0.444∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.114) (0.153) (0.183) (0.132)
Training 1.034∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 1.232∗∗∗ 1.218∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.081) (0.108) (0.146) (0.083)
Mixed −0.586 1.177∗∗∗ 0.264 0.138 0.759
(1.056) (0.436) (0.800) (1.089) (0.504)
Other −9.142 −0.531 2.188∗∗∗ 2.676∗∗∗ 0.877
(121.470) (1.170) (0.774) (0.804) (0.831)
CIS2006 0.655∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗ −0.324∗∗ −0.128 0.280∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.091) (0.131) (0.199) (0.094)
CIS2008 0.955∗∗∗ −0.021 −0.349∗∗∗ −0.095 0.117
(0.150) (0.087) (0.132) (0.198) (0.096)
CIS2010 0.672∗∗∗ −0.543∗∗∗ −0.874∗∗∗ −0.855∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗
(0.162) (0.101) (0.152) (0.225) (0.108)
CIS2012 0.302∗ −1.166∗∗∗ −1.420∗∗∗ −1.347∗∗∗ −0.697∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.116) (0.178) (0.255) (0.120)
Constant −2.616∗∗∗ −0.919∗∗∗ −1.886∗∗∗ −2.996∗∗∗ −1.236∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.063) (0.091) (0.145) (0.071)
Observations 9155
Akaike Inf. Crit. 25,566.690
Log likelihood -12,713.35
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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XIII. Public support and patterns of innovation. Base
model with time and firm specific controls
estimates.
Multinomial logit. Ref. category: not innovative
Internal Market Open Science Supplier
strategy oriented innovation based based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Consulting 0.054 0.564∗∗∗ 0.371 0.383 0.223
(0.246) (0.170) (0.236) (0.280) (0.189)
Financial −0.316 0.334 0.411 0.127 0.350
(0.429) (0.237) (0.345) (0.449) (0.257)
Innovation and R&D 0.004 0.724∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗ 2.168∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.263) (0.154) (0.188) (0.201) (0.191)
Investments 0.326 0.909∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.128) (0.176) (0.200) (0.123)
Labour −0.400∗∗ 0.129 −0.403∗∗ −0.270 −0.005
(0.155) (0.107) (0.172) (0.214) (0.113)
Marketing 0.280 0.902∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.116) (0.157) (0.186) (0.134)
Training 0.686∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.083) (0.112) (0.151) (0.085)
Mixed −0.618 0.936∗∗ 0.618 0.659 1.113∗∗
(1.065) (0.441) (0.806) (1.089) (0.510)
Other −5.006∗∗∗ −0.386 2.285∗∗∗ 2.660∗∗∗ 0.959
(0.003) (1.194) (0.832) (0.865) (0.847)
CIS2006 0.838∗∗∗ −0.149 −0.215 0.002 0.295∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.093) (0.135) (0.202) (0.095)
CIS2008 1.377∗∗∗ 0.130 −0.147 0.101 0.120
(0.157) (0.090) (0.137) (0.204) (0.098)
CIS2010 1.284∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.500∗∗∗ −0.433∗ −0.165
(0.172) (0.105) (0.161) (0.236) (0.113)
CIS2012 1.054∗∗∗ −0.857∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.819∗∗∗ −0.644∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.121) (0.187) (0.268) (0.127)
firm age −0.110∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007)
firm exporter 0.365∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.170 0.456∗∗ 0.066
Continued.
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Multinomial logit. Ref. category: not innovative
Internal Market Open Science Supplier
strategy oriented innovation based based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.124) (0.077) (0.121) (0.190) (0.073)
firm log worker 0.688∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.033) (0.045) (0.060) (0.034)
firm foreign owned 1.378∗∗∗ 0.091 0.560∗∗∗ 0.171 −0.049
(0.093) (0.071) (0.098) (0.141) (0.077)
Constant −5.138∗∗∗ −1.976∗∗∗ −4.422∗∗∗ −6.152∗∗∗ −2.581∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.141) (0.210) (0.316) (0.147)
Observations 9155
Akaike Inf. Crit. 24,391.190
Log likelihood -12,105.59
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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XIV. Three-state and six-state Markov models for
innovation strategies.
Three-state Markov model for innovation strategies.
Six-state Markov model for innovation strategies.
249
XV. Frequency tables for use of instruments and state
transitions for balanced dataset in the three- and
six-state Markov models
Frequency table of state transitions in three-state Markov model with balanced
dataset. n = 3270 obs.
To
From
Not innova-
tive (1)
Simple inno-
vation strate-
gies (2)
Complex
innovation
strategies (3)
Not innovative (1) 745 260 25
Simple innovation strategies (2) 345 789 116
Complex innovation strategies (3) 27 146 163
Use of instruments in the three- and six-state Markov models with balanced
dataset. n = 3276 obs.
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Observations 654 654 654 654 654
Innovation & R&D 7 18 13 55 92
Investments 32 55 57 92 73
Marketing & export promotion 23 43 31 117 106
Training & skills development 60 137 101 255 262
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XVI. Three-state Markov model transition intensities,
balanced data model plots
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Upper: intermittently observed model; lower: exactly observed model.
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XVII. Transition intensity matrices for three-state
Markov models
Transition intensity matrix. Three-state Markov model with full dataset and inter-
mittently observed transitions. Intensities with 95% confidence intervals.
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative -0.184 (-0.202; -0.167) 0.179 (0.160; 0.199) 0.005 (0.001; 0.019)
Simple 0.266 (0.244; 0.290) -0.340 (-0.37; -0.313) 0.075 (0.061; 0.092)
Complex 0.000 (0.00; 1.27e+117) 0.464 (0.401; 0.536) -0.464 (-0.536; -0.401)
Transition intensity matrix. Three-state Markov model with full dataset and ex-
actly observed transitions. Intensities with 95% confidence intervals.
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative -0.118 (-0.129; -0.109) 0.108 (0.098; 0.118) 0.011 (0.008; 0.014)
Simple 0.160 (0.148; 0.173) -0.194 (-0.208; -0.181) 0.034 (0.028; 0.040)
Complex 0.062 (0.048; 0.082) 0.211 (0.183; 0.244) -0.274 (-0.311; -0.241)
Transition intensity matrix. Three-state Markov model with balanced dataset and
intermittently observed transitions. Intensities with 95% confidence intervals.
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative -0.205 (-0.236; -0.177) 0.195 (0.167; 0.229) 0.009 (0.003; 0.03)
Simple 0.239 (0.209; 0.273) -0.305 (-0.344; -0.27) 0.066 (0.049; 0.087)
Complex 0.001 (0; 5335.987) 0.371 (0.301; 0.457) -0.372 (-0.456; -0.304)
Transition intensity matrix. Three-state Markov model with balanced dataset and
exactly observed transitions. Intensities with 95% confidence intervals.
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative -0.138 (-0.157; -0.121) 0.125 (0.109; 0.143) 0.012 (0.008; 0.019)
Simple 0.152 (0.134; 0.171) -0.189 (-0.210; -0.169) 0.037 (0.029; 0.047)
Complex 0.047 (0.030; 0.073) 0.205 (0.166; 0.252) -0.252 (-0.304; -0.208)
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XVIII. Three-state Markov model hazard ratios,
balanced data model plots
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Upper: intermittently observed model; lower: exactly observed model.
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XX. Frequency table for state transitions with balanced
dataset in the six-state Markov model
Frequency table of state transitions in a six-state Markov model with balanced
dataset.
To:
From Not innov. Internal Supplier Market Open Science
Not innovative 745 44 142 74 21 4
Internal strategy 48 59 28 29 20 4
Supplier based 178 38 198 95 19 10
Market oriented 119 38 112 192 39 24
Open innovation 19 30 27 49 77 16
Science based 8 3 10 27 14 56
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XXI. Six-state Markov model transition intensities for
the balanced dataset with exact transitions
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XXIII. Hazard ratios for innovation policy instruments
in the six-state Markov model with balanced
dataset and exact transitions
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XXV. Significant Hazard ratios for innovation policy
instruments in the six-state Markov model
Internal (S2)
Open (S5)
Science (S6)
0 2 4 6
S1 to S6
S1 to S5
S1 to S3
S2 to S6
S3 to S2
S3 to S1
S4 to S6
S4 to S5
S4 to S2
S5 to S4
S6 to S4
Hazard ratio
Instrument innovation investment marketing training
Supplier (S3)
Not innov. (S1)
Marketing (S4)
Significant hazard ratios for the six-state Markov model with the full dataset with
exact transitions.
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XXVI. State transition probability matrices for
three-state Markov models
State transition probability matrix in 2, 6 and 10 years. Three-state Markov model
with full dataset and exactly observed transitions. No covariates. Probabilities
with 95% confidence intervals.
t = 2 years; no covariates
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative 0,82 (0,8; 0,83) 0,16 (0,15; 0,18) 0,02 (0,02; 0,02)
Simple 0,24 (0,23; 0,26) 0,71 (0,7; 0,73) 0,05 (0,04; 0,05)
Complex 0,13 (0,11; 0,15) 0,28 (0,25; 0,31) 0,59 (0,55; 0,62)
t = 6 years; no covariates
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative 0,65 (0,62; 0,67) 0,31 (0,29; 0,33) 0,05 (0,04; 0,06)
Simple 0,45 (0,43; 0,47) 0,48 (0,46; 0,5) 0,07 (0,06; 0,08)
Complex 0,35 (0,32; 0,38) 0,42 (0,39; 0,45) 0,24 (0,19; 0,28)
t = 10 years; no covariates
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative 0,59 (0,56; 0,61) 0,36 (0,33; 0,38) 0,06 (0,05; 0,07)
Simple 0,52 (0,49; 0,54) 0,41 (0,39; 0,43) 0,07 (0,06; 0,09)
Complex 0,46 (0,43; 0,49) 0,41 (0,39; 0,44) 0,12 (0,1; 0,15)
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State transition probability matrix in 2, 6 and 10 years. Three-state Markov model
with full dataset and exactly observed transitions. Innovation and R&D, and train-
ing and skills development instruments given on years 3 and 4. Probabilities with
95% confidence intervals.
t = 2 years; innovation and training instruments on t = 3 and 4
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative 0,82 (0,8; 0,83) 0,16 (0,15; 0,18) 0,02 (0,02; 0,02)
Simple 0,24 (0,23; 0,26) 0,71 (0,7; 0,73) 0,05 (0,04; 0,05)
Complex 0,13 (0,11; 0,16) 0,28 (0,25; 0,31) 0,59 (0,55; 0,63)
t = 6 years; innovation and training instruments t = 3 and 4
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative 0,62 (0,52; 0,68) 0,29 (0,25; 0,37) 0,09 (0,06; 0,14)
Simple 0,39 (0,34; 0,44) 0,45 (0,41; 0,49) 0,15 (0,12; 0,2)
Complex 0,29 (0,25; 0,34) 0,39 (0,35; 0,43) 0,32 (0,26; 0,37)
t = 10 years; innovation and training instruments t = 3 and 4
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative 0,57 (0,52; 0,6) 0,36 (0,33; 0,39) 0,07 (0,06; 0,1)
Simple 0,49 (0,46; 0,52) 0,41 (0,39; 0,44) 0,1 (0,08; 0,12)
Complex 0,43 (0,4; 0,47) 0,42 (0,39; 0,44) 0,15 (0,12; 0,18)
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State transition probability matrix in 10 years. Three-state Markov model with full
dataset and exactly observed transitions. Innovation and R&D, and training and
skills development instruments given on every year (fully absorbed). Probabilities
with 95% confidence intervals.
t = 2 years; innovation and training instruments fully absorbed
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative 0,81 (0,63; 0,9) 0,13 (0,06; 0,25) 0,06 (0,03; 0,19)
Simple 0,15 (0,09; 0,23) 0,62 (0,51; 0,71) 0,23 (0,15; 0,32)
Complex 0,06 (0,03; 0,17) 0,19 (0,12; 0,28) 0,75 (0,62; 0,84)
t = 6 years; innovation and training instruments fully absorbed
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative 0,59 (0,3; 0,75) 0,23 (0,12; 0,39) 0,19 (0,1; 0,41)
Simple 0,27 (0,15; 0,4) 0,37 (0,25; 0,49) 0,37 (0,24; 0,49)
Complex 0,17 (0,09; 0,34) 0,29 (0,19; 0,41) 0,53 (0,34; 0,66)
t = 10 years; innovation and training instruments fully absorbed
To:
From: Not innovative Simple Complex
Not innovative 0,47 (0,22; 0,7) 0,26 (0,15; 0,42) 0,27 (0,13; 0,48)
Simple 0,31 (0,17; 0,49) 0,31 (0,21; 0,44) 0,38 (0,23; 0,53)
Complex 0,25 (0,13; 0,45) 0,3 (0,2; 0,43) 0,45 (0,26; 0,6)
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN - KOKKUVO˜TE
Ettevo˜tete innovatsioonistrateegiate du¨naamika ja seosed
avaliku sektori toetustega
Innovatsiooni peetakse lahenduseks majandusraskustega vo˜itlemisel ning on
seeto˜ttu olnud juba pikemat aega poliitikakujundamise ta¨helepanu objekt. Eu-
roopas toetatakse eraettevo˜tlusest avaliku rahaga nii keskvalitsuste kui kohalike
tasandite poolt. Eesma¨rk on kiirendada majanduskasvu toetades maksumaksja ra-
haga innovatsioonide teket ja levikut. Seeto˜ttu on selline raha jaotus ka avaliku
huvi osa ning tekib o˜igustatud ku¨simus, kas ja kui efektiivne on innovatsioonide
toetamine?
Ettevo˜tete huvi on saada konkurentsieelis uusi tooteid ja teenuseid ehk inno-
vatsioone luues. Ettevo˜tete sees ja neid u¨mbritsevas ettevo˜tluskeskkonnas on
hulk tegureid, mis mo˜jutavad strateegilisi otsuseid koostada ja ellu viia inno-
vatsioonistrateegiat (Rothaermel, 2017). Oskused, teadmised ja nende rakenda-
mise viis vo˜ivad luua konkurentide ees pikaajalisi eeliseid takistades toodete ja
teenuste kopeerimist. Ettevo˜tte valikud innovatsioonide loomiseks on osati ka
piiratud vo˜imalustega sektoritasandil (Nelson ja Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984).
Sektorites kasutatavad tehnoloogiad ma¨a¨ravad a¨ra uute innovatsioonide otsi-
miseks vo˜imaliku suuna nii tehnilisel tasandil kui nende loomiseks ja levita-
miseks vajalikud ressursid. Siiski toimuvad mingi hetk sellistes tehnoloogilistes
trajektoorides suuremad muutused, mis tervet sektorit korraga mo˜jutavad (Perez,
2009). U¨hisosasid innovatsioonistrateegiates on leitud peale sektoritasandi ka et-
tevo˜ttetasandil, kirjeldades strateegilistes valikutes tehtud sarnaseid otsuseid et-
tevo˜tetes so˜ltumata nende sektorist, vaid pigem innovatsioonide loomise viisist
(Frenz ja Prevezer, 2012; Hollenstein, 2003; Leiponen ja Drejer, 2007; Pavitt,
1984).
Sellele vaatamata on teadmistes lu¨ngad, kuidas muudavad ettevo˜tted oma innovat-
sioonistrateegiaid kui nad on saanud avaliku sektori poolt toetust innovatsioonipo-
liitika raames (Clarysse et al., 2009; Georghiou ja Clarysse, 2006). Innovatsioo-
nistrateegiaid on ettevo˜ttetasandil korduvalt ma¨a¨ratud (De Jong, Vanhaverbeke et
al., 2008; Leiponen ja Drejer, 2007; Pavitt et al., 1989) ning ettevo˜tlustoetused3 on
olnud aastaku¨mneid uurimise all (Dodgson ja Bessant, 1996; Martin, 2016; Salter
3 Eesti keeles on seni levinud termin toetuste hulgas on ettevo˜tlustoetused, mis ho˜lmavad ko˜iki
toetusi, mida ettevo˜tetele pakutakse so˜ltumata poliitikavaldkonnast.
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ja Martin, 2001), kuid ettevo˜tlustoetuste vo˜imalik mo˜ju innovatsioonistrateegiate
du¨naamikale on olnud va¨hese ta¨helepanu all.
Doktorito¨o¨s toon need kaks teemat u¨ksteisele la¨hemale. Doktorito¨o¨ eesma¨rk on
hinnata ettevo˜tlustoetuste vo˜imalikku seost muutustega ettevo˜tete innovatsiooni-
strateegias. Tegevused eesma¨rgi ta¨itmiseks on ja¨rgnevad:
• Hinnata ja kirjeldada ettevo˜tete innovatsioonistrateegiad ja nende
du¨naamika
• Analu¨u¨sida ettevo˜tlustoetuseid innovatsioonide toetamiseks ning luua et-
tevo˜tlustoetuste taksonoomia Eesti na¨itel
• Hinnata seost ettevo˜tlustoetuste ja innovatsioonide kui va¨ljundi vahel
• Hinnata seost ettevo˜tlustoetuste ja innovatsioonistrateegia vahel
Ettevo˜tete innovaatilisuse kasvatamiseks loodud poliitika ja meetmete u¨ldine ter-
min on innovatsioonipoliitika. Eestis on ka kasutusel olnud teadus- ja arendus-
tegevuse ning innovatsioonipoliitika (TAI)4 mo˜iste. Ideaalis ho˜lmab see tervi-
kuna nii ettevo˜tluspoliitikat ettevo˜tete arendamiseks kui TAI poliitikat teaduse,
teadus- ja arendustegevuse poliitikat, tehnoloogiapoliitikat ja innovatsioonipoliiti-
kat (Lundvall ja Borra´s, 2006). Doktorito¨o¨ raames on u¨htlaselt kasutusel katusena
mo˜iste innovatsioonipoliitka, mis ho˜lmab ko˜iki neid valdkondi korraga.
Po˜hjuseid, kas tasub poliitikameetmetega sekkuda eraettevo˜tete tegevusse nende
innovaatilisuse suurendamiseks, on uuritud kaua. Po˜hilised argumendid vo˜ib jaga-
da kolmeks. Neid vo˜ib ka kirjeldada kolme innovatsioonipoliitika lainena (Schot
ja Steinmueller, 2018).
Esiteks turuto˜rgetel po˜hinevad argumendid. Na¨iteks on ettevo˜tetel raske kaitsta
endi teadus- ja arendustegevuse tulemust konkurentide kopeerimise eest misto˜ttu
ja¨a¨vad osad projektid rahastamata (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). See aga va¨hendab
heaolu kogu u¨hiskonna jaoks.
Teiseks innovatsioonisu¨steemis erinevate osapoolte koosto¨o¨valmidus ja
vo˜imekus. Ettevo˜tted, teadus- ja arendustegevusega tegelevad asutused, ka-
pitali vo˜imendust pakkuvad asutused ja teised osapooled saavad u¨ksteisele
kasu tuua omavahel teenust pakkudes. Va¨hene koosto¨o¨ ja vo˜rgustumine in-
novatsioonisu¨steemis takistab ettevo˜tetel oma potentsiaali rakendamist ning,
taaskord, terve u¨hiskonna jaoks on heaolu kadu (Laranja et al., 2008; Lundvall,
2010). Sarnaselt peale koosto¨o¨valmiduse on oluline aru saada ka vo˜imekusest
u¨ksteisele teenust pakkuda ning vajadusel no˜rgemaid osapooli ja¨rele aidata terve
innovatsioonisu¨steemi tugevdamiseks (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005).
4 Tuleb u¨lekantuna inglisekeelsest science, technology and innovation policy ehk STI
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Kolmandana on levimas uusim koolkond, mis argumenteerib innovatsioonide rol-
lile u¨hiskonna jaoks oluliste probleemide lahendamisel (Mazzucato, 2015, 2018;
Schot ja Steinmueller, 2018). Vo˜rdluseks, esimesed kaks argumenti siiski eelda-
vad vaikimisi, et innovatsioonide loomise ja leviku roll u¨hiskonnas on majandus-
kasv. Uusima koolkonna argumendid juhinduvad ideest, et avalik sektor vo˜ib sek-
kuda pakkudes eraettevo˜tetele stiimulit uute lahenduste loomiseks va¨ljakutsetele,
mis u¨hiskonna jaoks on olulised. Seda kutsutakse u¨ldjuhul missioonipo˜hiseks
la¨henemiseks, kus missioonid on va¨ljakutsete raamistikud, na¨iteks linnakeskkon-
nas keskkonnaso˜bralikud transpordilahendused vo˜i kohaliku vesikonna keskkon-
natervislik seisund. Missioonipo˜hine la¨henemine on ka u¨heks aluseks ja¨rgmise
Euroopa Liidu raamprogrammi rahastamisel, mis on u¨ks suuremaid teadus- ja
arendustegevust toetavaid meetmeid (Mazzucato, 2018).
Andmed ettevo˜tete innovatsioonistrateegiate kohta baseeruvad innovatsiooniuu-
ringul (CIS), mida viib la¨bi Eesti Statistikaamet. CIS on Eurostati koordineermisel
u¨htlustatud uuring Euroopa Liidus ning seda viiakse la¨bi iga kahe aasta tagant.
See tagab vo˜rreldavuse teiste Euroopa Liidu riikidega. Eesti Statistikaamet tagab,
et CIS oleks sektorite lo˜ikes esinduslik u¨le 10 to¨o¨tajaga ettevo˜tete kohta Eestis.
CIS on maailmas ko˜ige levinum ku¨sitlusel baseeruv allikas ettevo˜tete ka¨itumise
uurimiseks innovatsioonide loomisel (Smith, 2005).
CISi andmekogule on lisatud andmed ettevo˜tlustoetuste, finantsna¨itajate ning in-
tellektuaalse omandi kohta. Ettevo˜tlustoetuste andmed on saadud otse kahelt Ees-
ti suurimalt ettevo˜tluse toetustega tegelevalt asutuselt ehk Ettevo˜tluse Arenda-
mise Sihtasutuselt (EAS) ja Po˜llumajanduse Registrite ja Infromatsiooni Ame-
tilt (PRIA). Teiste Eestis ettevo˜tlustoetuseid pakkuvate asutuste andmed on ko-
gutud Struktuurfondide registrist, mis ho˜lmab ko˜iki Euroopa Liidu Struktuurfon-
dide vahendatud toetusi, ja Riigiabi registrist, mis ho˜lmab nii riigiabi kui va¨hese
ta¨htsusega riigiabi. Viimaste alla kuuluvad ko˜ik ettevo˜tlustoetused, millel on mo˜ju
konkurentsisituatsioonile, teisiso˜nu nad peaksid ettevo˜tet piisavalt mo˜jutama, et
anda talle mingi konkurentsieelis.
Lisaks on CISi andmekogule lisatud A¨riregistrist ettevo˜tete finantsna¨itajad majan-
dusaasta aruannete alusel. Ta¨iendavalt on andmetele lisatud Eesti Patendiametist
saadud andmed ettevo˜tete intellektuaalse omandi kohta, mis ho˜lmab patente, ka-
sulikke mudeleid, kaubama¨rke ja to¨o¨stusdisainilahendusi.
Kogu u¨hendatud andmestik katab Eesti ettevo˜tteid vahemikus 2002-2012, ko˜iki
teadaolevaid valimisse kuulunud ettevo˜tete saadud ettevo˜tlustoetusi ning on
u¨ldistatav kogu populatsioonile.
Uuritava perioodi sisse ja¨a¨b Eesti liitumine Euroopa Liiduga, mis on
ma¨rkimisva¨a¨rselt mo˜jutanud innovatsioonipoliitikat, meetmete kujundust ja eel-
arvet. Po˜hilised argumendid avaliku sektori sekkumise o˜igustamiseks tulenevad
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esimesest ja teisest innovatsioonipoliitika lainest. Esmalt on vaja ettevo˜tetes inno-
vaatilistust suurendada, et tekitada majanduskasvu. Po˜hiliseks mehhanismiks on
uute toodete ja teenustega konkurentsieelise saavutamine va¨listurgudel ehk eks-
pordi suurendamine. Aastatel 2007-2013 on lisaks rohkem ta¨helepanu saanud eri-
nevate osapoolte kokku toomine ja koosto¨o¨d soosivad meetmed.
Vo˜rreldes mo˜ne enamlevinud u¨levaatega Euroopas kasutusel olevatest innovat-
sioonipoliitika meetmetest (nt Edler ja Georghiou (2007) ja Izsak, Markianidou
et al. (2013)) on Eestis u¨sna suur vaheldusrikkus ettevo˜tete otsetoetustes. Need on
innovatsioonipoliitika meetmed, kus otsene kasusaaja on ettevo˜te. Innovatsiooni-
poliitika raames on lisaks veel vo˜imalikud meetmed, mis toetavad mo˜nda teist
innovatsioonisu¨steemi osapoolt (Kuhlmann ja Arnold, 2001), nt teadlikkuse kam-
paaniad vo˜i haridus- ja finantssu¨steemi mo˜jutavad meetmed. Doktorito¨o¨s on foo-
kus selgelt otseselt ettevo˜tteid toetavatel meetmetel, mille mo˜ju peaks konkreetselt
uuritavale ettevo˜ttele ka avalduma.
Seeto˜ttu on peatu¨kis 3 pikemalt lahti kirjeldatud Eesti ettevo˜tlustoetuste taust aas-
tatel 2002 kuni 2012 ning va¨lja toodud vo˜imalikud argumendid avaliku sektori
poolseks sekkumiseks. Sarnaselt Edler, Cunningham et al. (2016) meetodile on
loodud tegevustel po˜hinev ettevo˜tlustoetuste taksonoomia, mis ho˜lmab ko˜iki vali-
misse kuulunud ettevo˜tete poolt saadud ettevo˜tlustoetusi.
Eesti ettevo˜tlustoetused saab loodud taksonoomia alusel jagada ku¨mneks:
koosto¨o¨meetmed; konsultatsioonid; koolitused ja oskuste arendamine; turundus-
ja ekspordiplaanimine; innovatsiooni ja teadus- ja arendustegevused; investeerin-
gud; to¨o¨jo˜ukulude toetamine; finantsgarantiid ja laenuka¨endused; riiklik subsidee-
rimine; ja segatoetused.
Peatu¨ki 3 lo˜pus on kirjeldus, missugust ettevo˜ttesisest innovatsiooniprotsessi need
meetmetu¨u¨bid ko˜ige rohkem vo˜iksid mo˜jutada.
Ettevo˜tete innovatsioonistrateegiad on hinnatud peatu¨kis 6. Aluseks on vo˜etud
ettevo˜tete strateegilised valikud innovatsioonide va¨lja to¨o¨tamisel. Na¨iteks eel-
arve sisenditele nagu uue tehnoloogia hankimine, teadus- ja arendustegevus,
to¨o¨tajate koolitamine, koosto¨o¨- ja partnerlussuhted teiste osapooltega, intellek-
tuaalse omandi kaitse, jne. Faktor- ja klasteranalu¨u¨si kombineerimisel on 24
vo˜imalikku strateegilist valikut taandatud iga ettevo˜tte kohta u¨heks tema stratee-
giat kirjeldavaks na¨itajaks. Sellist u¨ldistavat na¨itajat innovatsioonistrateegia kohta
nimetatakse innovatsioonimustriks (Castellacci, 2008).
Eesti ettevo˜tete innovatsioonistrateegiate analu¨u¨s viitab, et levinud on viis erine-
vat innovatsioonimustrit: tarnijapo˜hine, turupo˜hine, sisemiste ressursside po˜hine,
avatud innovatsioon ja teaduspo˜hine.
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Innovatsioonimustrid vo˜tavad kokku viisi, kuidas ettevo˜tted innovatsioone teevad.
Eristades omavahel ettevo˜tteid kasutatud teadmiste, tehtud tegevuste ja suhete in-
novatsioonisu¨steemis alusel. Innovatsioonimustrid kirjeldavad ettevo˜tete innovat-
sioonistrateegiat.
Eesti ettevo˜tete innovatsioonimustrid on u¨ldjoontes sarnased teiste Euroopa riiki-
dega (vt nt De Jong ja Marsili (2006), Hollenstein (2003) ja Leiponen ja Drejer
(2007). Va¨lja saab tuua kaks eripa¨ra Eesti ettevo˜tete innovatsioonimustrite kohta,
mida vo˜rreldavates uuringutes pole seni ta¨heldatud.
Esiteks on Eestis u¨sna va¨ike osakaal teaduspo˜histel innovatsioonimustritel. Need
on ettevo˜tted, kes teevad majasiseselt rohkem teadus- ja arendustegevust ning ti-
hedamat koosto¨o¨d teiste asutustega, kelle po˜hito¨o¨ks ongi teadus- ja arenduste-
gevus, na¨iteks u¨likoolid. Eestis on teaduspo˜histe innovatsioonimustrite osakaal
6% ko˜ikidest vaatlustest, kuid riikides, kus on vo˜rreldavaid uuringuid tehtud,
ta¨heldatakse pigem 15%-20% suurust osakaalu. Eestis tervikuna ongi ainult suu-
rusja¨rgus 250 ettevo˜tet, kes oma teadus- ja arendustegevust Eesti Statistikaametile
raporteerib (Mu¨rk ja Kalvet, 2015).
Teine Eesti eripa¨ra on selgelt eristuv innovatsioonimuster, mis po˜hineb sisemistel
ressurssidel. Seda tu¨u¨pi ettevo˜tteid kirjeldab toetumine grupisisestele teadmiste
allikatele ning grupisisene koosto¨o¨. Pa¨rast innovatsioonimustrite hindamist lisatud
va¨lised andmed kinnitasid, et sisemiste ressursside po˜histest ettevo˜tetest on 99%
neist mingi ettevo˜tete grupi osad, po˜hiliselt tu¨tarettevo˜tted. Sisemistel ressurssi-
del po˜hinev innovatsioonimuster viitab allhanke tu¨u¨pi suhetele, kus ettevo˜tted on
va¨ga selgelt spetsialiseerunud mingite konkreetse klientide teenindamiseks. Sar-
nast innovatsioonimustrit ei ole kirjeldatud u¨heski vo˜rreldavas uuringus. Kahjuks
ei ole vo˜rreldavaid uuringuid tehtud teistes Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riikides, kus se-
da tu¨u¨pi suhted vo˜ivad olla rohkem levinud.
Innovatsioonimustrite du¨naamika analu¨u¨s na¨itab, et ettevo˜tted on vo˜imelised oma
innovatsioonistrateegiat suhteliselt lu¨hikese aja tagant muutma ning teevad seda
tihti. Ettevo˜tteid, kes on ja¨rginud sama innovatsioonistrateegiat ku¨mne aasta va¨ltel
oli 15%. U¨leja¨a¨nud ettevo˜tted liikusid mingi hetk mo˜nda teise innovatsioonimust-
risse ja vahel ka tagasi.
Innovatsioonimustrite du¨naamika hindamiseks on minule teadaolevalt ainult u¨ks
vo˜rreldav analu¨u¨s Sˇveitsi na¨ite po˜hjal (Hollenstein, 2018). Sarnaselt Eestiga
ta¨heldab Hollenstein (2018) ettevo˜tete liikumist erinevate innovatsioonimustrite
vahel u¨sna lu¨hikese aja jooksul. Ta toob va¨lja, et seda po˜hjustab Sˇveitsi ettevo˜tete
va¨ga ko˜rge konkurentsivo˜ime, mis sunnib va¨ga kiiresti optimeerima oma innovat-
sioonistrateegiat, et pu¨sida maailma tippettevo˜tete hulgas. Innovatsioonimustrite
vaheline liikumine on Eestis sarnaselt aktiivne, kuid Eesti ettevo˜tete innovatiivsus
ja¨a¨b selgelt alla Sˇveitsi omadele ja pole Euroopa Liidu parimate hulgas (Hollan-
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ders ja Es-Sadki, 2018; Hollanders, Es-Sadki ja Merkelbach, 2019). Seega vajaks
selline innovatsioonimustrite du¨naamika ta¨psemat teoreetilist selgitust, mis kirjel-
daks paremini vo˜imalikke muutusi kui du¨naamiliste vo˜imekuste mudel (Teece et
al., 1997).
Peatu¨kkides 7 ja 8 on hinnatud ettevo˜tlustoetuste seost ettevo˜tete innovatiivsusega
ja innovatsioonimustrite vahelise liikumisega regressioonmudelite alusel. Nende
peatu¨kkide alusel on va¨lja valitud ko˜ige olulisemate ettevo˜tlustoetuste tu¨u¨pidena
investeeringud, innovatsiooni ja teadus- ja arendustegevused, turundus- ja eks-
pordiplaanimine, ja koolitused ja oskuste arendamine. Peatu¨kis 9 on hinnatud
Markovi ahelal po˜hinevate mudelite alusel nelja va¨lja toodud ettevo˜tlustoetuste
vo˜imalikku seost liikumisega u¨hest innovatsioonimustrist teise.
Ettevo˜tete innovatsioonimustrid on jagatud kaheks: lihtsamad ja keerulise-
mad. Lihtsamad innovatsioonimustrid on tarnijapo˜hised, sisemistel ressurssidel
po˜hinevad ja turupo˜hised. Keerulisemad on teaduspo˜hised ja avatud innovatsioon,
sest nad no˜uavad mitmetahulisemaid ning kulukamaid teadmisi, oskuseid ja et-
tevo˜ttesiseseid protsesse.
Ettevo˜tlustoetuste ja innovatsioonimustrite vahel liikumiste seoste analu¨u¨s na¨itab,
et toetuste abil ei vo˜ta mitteinnovatiivsed ettevo˜tted u¨le keerulisemaid innovat-
sioonimustreid. Toimub ja¨rk-ja¨rguline areng, kus esmalt liigutakse lihtsamate in-
novatsioonimustrite suunas. Seda vo˜ib kirjeldada kui o˜ppimisprotsessi, mis seab
oma piirangud. Seega peaks ettevo˜tlustoetuste puhul arvestama potentsiaalse siht-
grupi praeguste tegevustega ning suunama toetused vastavalt. Kui ettevo˜tetel pole
u¨ldse innovatsioonikogemust, siis ettevo˜tlustoetused keerulisemate innovatsioo-
nimustrite poole liikumiseks vo˜ivad ja¨a¨da ettevo˜tete vo˜imekuse piiridest va¨lja.
Tulemustest selgub, et mo˜ned liikumised innovatsioonimustrite vahel on oodatud
suunaga. Na¨iteks investeeringute toetused on olulised ettevo˜tete liikumisel mitte-
innovatiivsest tarnijapo˜hisesse innovatsioonimustrisse. Investeeringute toetamine
on esimene samm, mis on seotud ettevo˜tete liikumisel mitteinnovatiivsest staatu-
sest lihtsamate innovatsioonimustrite poole. To˜ena¨osus liikuda lihtsamate inno-
vatsioonimustrite poole on investeeringutoetustega ettevo˜tetel 50% to˜ena¨olisem.
Innovatsiooni ja teadus- ja arendustegevusele suunatud ettevo˜tlustoetused on seo-
tud ettevo˜tete liikumisega lihtsamatest innovatsioonimustritest keerulisemate suu-
nas, isea¨ranis teaduspo˜hise poole. To˜ena¨osus liikuda lihtsamatest innovatsiooni-
mustritest keerulisemate innovatsioonimustrite poole on innovatsiooni ja teadus-
ja arendustegevuse toetustega ettevo˜tetel rohkem kui kaks korda to˜ena¨olisem,
keskmiselt 160% ko˜rgem.
Sarnaselt on positiivne seos liikuda lihtsamatest innovatsioonimustritest keeruli-
semate suunas koolituste ja oskuste arendamisega seotud toetustega ettevo˜tetel.
Kuid ta¨psemad hinnangud konkreetsete mustrite lo˜ikes ei ole nii u¨hesed, misto˜ttu
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ei ole oodatav tulemus selge. Koolituste ja oskuste arendamisega seotud toetuste-
ga ettevo˜tted on va¨iksema to˜ena¨osusega liikumas mitteinnovatiivsesse staatusesse.
Seega vo˜ib sellistel meetmetel olla roll a¨rahoidmaks ettevo˜tete taandarengut.
Turundus- ja ekspordiplaneerimise toetustega ettevo˜tted ei olnud positiivselt ega
negatiivselt seotud liikumistega erinevatesse innovatsioonimustritesse.
Ettevo˜tlustoetuste mo˜jude empiirilisel hindamisel peab arvestama mitme ohuko-
haga, mis vo˜ivad statistiliste mudelite hinnangutes tekitada nihkeid. Sisuliselt on
toetuste mo˜ju hindamisel uurimise all ku¨simus: mis oleks juhtunud ettevo˜ttega
siis, kui ta poleks toetust saanud? Kahjuks ei ole vo˜imalik sellist tulemust sa-
mal ajal ja¨lgida. Seega on ainukene vo˜imalus hinnata toetust saanud ettevo˜tteid
vo˜rreldes neid sobiva vo˜rdlusgrupiga. Nihkeid mudelite hinnangutes mo˜jutavad
ko˜ige rohkem vo˜rdlusgruppide valik. Ideaalis koosneb vo˜rdlusgrupp ta¨pselt sama-
sugustest ettevo˜tetest nagu toetust saanud ettevo˜tted, ainus erinevus oleks toetuse
mitte saamine. Praktikas on selles va¨ga keeruline veenduda. Kuna enamik toetu-
sed, eriti Eestis, on avatud va¨ga suurele ettevo˜tete hulgale korraga, siis toimub
enese-selektsioon. Mingil po˜hjusel u¨ks osa ettevo˜tteid soovib toetust saada ja u¨ks
osa ei soovi. Kahjuks ei ole vo˜imalik ta¨pselt ja¨lgida ega kindlaks ma¨a¨rata, mis
tingis selle enese-selektsiooni. Seega on toetust saanud ettevo˜tete ja vo˜rdlusgrupi
ettevo˜tete vahel mingi su¨stemaatiline erinevus, olgu selleks na¨iteks juhtimisva-
likud, ambitsioon vms, mis mo˜jutab toetuse saamist. To˜ena¨oliselt mo˜jutab see
ka ettevo˜tte sooritust pa¨rast toetuse saamist. See su¨stemaatiline erinevus loobki
nihkeid statistilistes mudelites (Heckman, 1979). Seega vo˜ib ka eeldada, et dokto-
rito¨o¨s esitatud tulemustes on mingil ma¨a¨ral positiivne nihe ning ettevo˜tlustoetuste
tegelik mo˜ju on mingil ma¨a¨ral madalam.
Doktorito¨o¨s kokku pandud andmestik ettevo˜tlustoetustest Eestis on u¨ks
ko˜ikeho˜lmavamaid ning pakub vo˜imaluse tulevikus sarnastel teemadel veel
uurimisteks. Isea¨ranis huvitav teema edaspidiseks on seotud ettevo˜tlustoetuste
koosmo˜judega ehk poliitikameetmete kombinatsioonidega. Erinevate meetmete
vastastikused mo˜jud on empiirilisel hindamisel olnud seni va¨hese ta¨helepanu all
(Martin, 2016).
Lisaks on innovatsioonistrateegiate du¨naamikas veel ta¨psemalt uurida vo˜imalikke
u¨hismuutujad. Doktorito¨o¨le lisaks on sarnasel meetodil tehtud seni mulle tea-
daolevalt ainult u¨ks uuring Sˇveitsi andmetel (Hollenstein, 2018). Selgusetu on
lisaks veel mitmete oluliste u¨hismuutujate roll innovatsioonistrateegiate vaheta-
mistel nagu intellektuaalse omandi suhtes, ettevo˜tete suurus, majandustsu¨klite roll
vo˜i juhtimiskvaliteet.
Kokkuvo˜ttes vo˜ib va¨ita, et mitmed loogilised ja soovitud suunad ettevo˜tlustoetuste
ja innovatsioonistrateegiate vahel on Eesti ettevo˜tete andmetel leitavad. Ettevo˜tted
to˜epoolest liiguvad erinevate strateegiate vahel, nad teevad seda tihti, ning need
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liikumised on positiivselt seotud ettevo˜tlustoetustega. Tuleviku innovatsioonipo-
liitika jaoks on see positiivne na¨htus.
Uute meetmete disainimisel tasuks arvestada sihtgrupi ettevo˜tete senise koge-
musega innovaatilistel tegevustel. Liiga suured arenguhu¨pped ei pruugi olla
vo˜imalikud. Kuid, tulemused siin doktorito¨o¨s viitavad, et muutused ettevo˜tete
ka¨itumises vo˜ivad tekkida mo˜ne aasta jooksul ning ettevo˜tted on valmis liikuma
keerulisemate innovatsioonistrateegiate poole. Ettevo˜tlustoetustega on vo˜imalik
seda sihtgruppi mo˜jutada, mis peaks olema ka innovatsioonipoliitika eesma¨rk.
Eksisteerib mo˜o˜dukas tasakaal, et mitte va¨listada ettevo˜tteid liiga keerulisena tun-
duvate tegevustega, tagades samal ajal piisavalt ambitsioonikad va¨ljakutsed.
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